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Negotiating Authoritarianism in Manjacaze, Mozambique:
Between Frelimo's Strategies and People's Tactics

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be submitted in whole or in part to another university for the award of any other degree.

Signature

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SUMMARY

This thesis considers the dynamics behind the construction and persistence of authoritarianism, a growing phenomenon in Africa and worldwide. Working within a frame of authoritarian institutionalism, it applies an ethnographic approach to the analysis of Frelimo's rule in the historically important district of Manjacaze in its heartland region of Gaza Province in Mozambique.

The findings suggest that, even in its own heartland, Frelimo's hegemony is widely contested and negotiated, and elections are privileged moments for this negotiation and contestation. These dynamics are constitutive of the evolving hegemony and, consequently, of authoritarianism itself. Elections emerge as arenas where the dialogical and mutually constitutive relationship between the incumbent's strategies and the people's tactics intensifies. Within this relationship, the role of negotiation stands out, an insight that has only been touched on in the literature hitherto. I argue that understanding the negotiation process, and the dialogical relationship between the incumbent's strategies and the people's tactics, is fundamental to capturing the dynamics of the construction and maintenance of authoritarianism in Africa and beyond.

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To God for allowing me to reach this stage.

Kanimambo!

(Thanks!)

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List of Acronyms

ACLLM – Associação dos Combatentes da Luta de Libertação Nacional (Association of Combatants of the National Liberation Struggle)

AGP – Acordo Geral de Paz (General Peace Agreement, GPA)

ANC – African National Congress (in South Africa)

AR – Assembleia da República (National Assembly)

CSO – Civil Society Organisation

CIP – Centro de Integridade Pública (Center for Public Integrity)

CNE – Comissão Nacional de Eleições (National Election Comission)

DG – Grupo Dinamizador (Dynamizing Group)

IOF – Inquérito sobre Orçamento Familiar (Household Budget Survey)

OTM – Organização dos Trabalhadores de Moçambique (Mozambique Workers' Organisation)

ONP – Organização Nacional dos Professores (National Teachers' Organisation)

ONJ – Organização Nacional dos Jornalistas (National Journalists Organisation)

EDM – Electricidade de Moçambique (Mozambique Electricity)

EMB – Electoral Management Body

EN1 – Estrada Nacional 1 (National Road N° 1)

IESE – Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (Institute for Social and Economic Studies)

INE - Instituto Nacional de Estatística (National Institute of Statistics)

EP1 – Ensino Primário do Primeiro Grau (EP1 - primary school education)

FRELIMO - Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)

IMF – International Monetary Fund

INGO – International Non-Governmental Organisation

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

MDM – Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (Democratic Movement of Mozambique)

MMV – Membros da Mesa de Voto (Members of Voting Mesa/ Polling Station Members)

MP – Membro de Parlamento (Member of Parliament)

OJM – Organização da Juventude Moçambicana (Mozambican Youth Organisation)

OMM – Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (Mozambican Women Organisation)

PIDE – Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (International and State Defense Police)

PRE – Programa de Reabilitação Económica (Economic Recovery Program)

PRES – Programa de Reabilitação Económica e Social (Economic and Social Recovery Programme)

PRI – Partido Revolucionário Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party-Mexico)

RENAMO – Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National Resistance)

STAE – Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral (Technical Secretariat for Election Administration)

UEM – Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (Eduardo Mondlane University)

UN - United Nations

ZANU - Zimbabwe African National Union

Figure 1: Map of Mozambique identifying Gaza and Manjacaze

PART I

BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

Chapter 1 Introduction and Background

Despite the growing "global turn to authoritarianism" (Wood, 2017), most studies still approach authoritarianism as a residual category (Art, 2012; Grugel, 2003; Glasius, 2018), always in reference to liberal democracy, understood to be "the endgame" (Grugel, 2003, p. 244). This approach is also predominant in governance research on Mozambique, an increasingly authoritarian state (cf., for example, Pitcher, 2020; V-Dem, 2020; The Economist, 2022). However, it is an approach that fails to capture fully how authoritarianism works in practice (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2019).

This thesis takes an alternative approach, informed by authoritarian institutionalism (Schedler 2009) and thus incorporating analysis of parties and elections, and aims to apply an in-depth ethnographic perspective to efforts to understand the dynamics behind the construction and persistence of authoritarianism. These dynamics are always situated in specific contexts that vary across the territory of any given state, ensuring that authoritarianism is both constructed and experienced asymmetrically. Based on this theoretical-methodological approach, I analyse a case of asymmetric authoritarianism in a particular setting within a broad context of authoritarian reconversion in Mozambique. My analysis focuses on Frelimo, the ruling party, and elections in the district of Manjacaze in Gaza Province, Frelimo's own electoral heartland.

In this introductory chapter, I outline my research scope, objectives, and research questions and introduce my study area and additional relevant contextual information, before concluding with a summary of the structure of the thesis.

1.1 Research Scope and Research Objective

In the beginning, when I first drafted the project for this thesis, I had in mind the question Étienne de La Boétie asks in his *Discourse on Voluntary Servitude* (1974 [1577]) about why people keep supporting rulers that do not respond to their needs. I thought about Gaza in southern Mozambique, the closest province to the capital, Maputo. I was intrigued by the fact that despite this proximity to the centres of political and economic power, it remains one of the poorest provinces in the country,[1] and yet Gaza has always been the province that had the highest levels of electoral support for Frelimo. How to understand such massive support for Frelimo in Gaza?

When I started sharing my research project, I was frequently reminded of the methodological challenges, given the context of Mozambique, described as 'unpropitious soil' for critical research (Nylen, 2018, p.270) – a setting in which independent research is perceived as oppositional. Indeed, the challenges would be even greater since I intended to investigate political issues, which are clearly identified as red-line topics in Mozambique. So, even my fellow researchers questioned whether I would be able to conduct such a study in Gaza, right in the Frelimo heartland.

However, having been involved in several political research projects, including in Gaza, I had prior experience of these methodological challenges, as reported in different studies (cf., for example, Brito et al., 2005, 2016; Forquilha, 2017). This included dealing with the unease and fearfulness of survey respondents when asked to answer questions about voting, abstention, and party preferences. Brito et al., for example, show that people tend to give "politically correct" answers, "in which the respondent says what he thinks the inquirer wants to hear, or what is in line with the politically dominant discourse of power, and not what he actually thinks, or has done" (2016, p.6). A glaring example is that respondents inflate their reported participation in elections, perhaps motivated by fear of reprisals, given the political control Frelimo exercises as a Party-State (cf., for example, Brito, 1988; Orre, 2010; Nuvunga, 2014; Bertelsen, 2016). Agreeing with the conclusion of Brito et al. (2006; 2016) that the

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[1] According to data from the IOF (2021), monthly per capita expenditure in Gaza stands at 1,008MT (USD 16), and the per household figure is 4,977MT (USD 79), the lowest in the entire country. The situation in the province has deteriorated in recent years, as data from the 2015 survey recorded a monthly expenditure of 1,199MT per capita, and 6,121MT per household (see also Maquenzi, 2021).

questionnaire surveys widely used in the political analysis were unlikely to produce valid information, I decided to take an ethnographic approach to carry out this research in Gaza, as discussed in Chapter 3.

To make things even more complicated, while I was still designing my research, new studies emerged which indicated that Mozambique was becoming increasingly authoritarian. One such study was conducted by Freedom House,[2] which since 1994 had classified the country as 'partly free', with a global score of 51 out of 100 possible points in 2018 but reduced that score to 45 points in 2019. Similarly, the 2020 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) index, which also measures freedom of expression and the quality of elections, recorded Mozambique's score as having dropped from 0.49 to 0.41 between 2009 and 2019. The Economist Intelligence Unit report, in turn, was even more incisive, labelling Mozambique an authoritarian regime (EIU, 2019). As Pitcher (2020, p.469) points out, these data are clear indicators of the "erosion of [Mozambique's] already weak democratic institutions and increasing authoritarianism," reflecting a growing trend observable elsewhere in Africa (Yates, 2021; Okino, 2021; Campbell & Quinn, 2021) and across the world (cf., Bermeo, 2016; Wood, 2017; Glasius, 2018; Waldner & Lust, 2018; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019; Cassani & Tomini, 2019; Hyde, 2020; Haggard & Kaufman, 2021; Gaventa, 2022).

Given this context, I decided to redefine the scope of my thesis, in two ways. First, I broadened my research aims, integrating my starting point – the analysis of the sources of Frelimo's support in Gaza – into a study of the dynamics behind the construction and maintenance of this growing authoritarianism. Second, I narrowed down the study area, focusing on a specific district in Gaza – Manjacaze. This second measure was consistent with my decision to adopt an ethnographic approach, as ethnography "provides a privileged access to 'invisible' or difficult to access social phenomena…(and) gives access to people's practices, and not (just) to their oral justifications or representations… that is, to all those 'natural,' hidden taboos or difficult to express practices which people have difficulty in describing (or would not like to describe even if they were aware of them)" (Buscato, 2018, p.4).

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[2] Freedom House, '2020_country_and_territory_ratings_and_status_FIW1973–2020', *Freedom in the world*, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world> (accessed on 10-04-2021).

1.2 Research Questions

There were two assumptions behind my theoretical-methodological choices: that "vote totals and incumbent victories mask almost constant change in regime strategies" (Smyth, 2021, p.1); and that examining such strategies is fundamental to understanding the regime itself (Hermet et al., 1978). This led me to focus on Frelimo and elections, framing the study within authoritarian institutionalism, an approach that studies parties and elections, as well as legislatures, courts, and other institutions, not as exclusively part of liberal democratic regimes but rather as pillars of authoritarianism (Gueddes, 1999; Magaloni, 2006; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Schedler, 2009).

My research questions flow from this focus on institutions, particularly Frelimo, the incumbent political party, and elections, as the sites from which I seek to understand the dynamics of authoritarianism in Manjacaze. As discussed in Chapter 2, following Sartori (1976), I focus on the role of party hegemonies in authoritarianism, and thus I frame these dynamics in terms of the construction and maintenance of Frelimo's position as a hegemonic party within a context of authoritarianism.

Thus, the overarching research question for this thesis is: **how is Frelimo's hegemony in Manjacaze constructed and maintained?**

I put the question in an 'eternal present' to highlight that the dynamics I examine are continuous and that the construction and maintenance of hegemony are ongoing processes. My focus on a dyad of elements of these ongoing processes – 'sources' and 'mobilisation' – as well as the centrality of elections to my analysis are reflected in my sub-questions:

- **What are the sources of Frelimo hegemony?**
- **How are these sources mobilised and adapted in the electoral context?**
- **What is the role of elections in negotiations around Frelimo's efforts to maintain its hegemony?**

Identifying the 'sources of Frelimo hegemony' is the first step for examining how they are mobilised and adapted in elections, the latter leading to a broader analysis of the very role of elections in the construction and maintenance of party hegemonies and, consequently, of

authoritarianism. In analysing elections, however, I focus on Frelimo's strategies and electors' tactics for responding to these strategies. I am referring to the concepts of strategies and tactics as outlined by De Certeau (1984), for whom, despite both being actions undertaken by actors engaged in a power relationship, strategies belong to the realm of the most powerful, while tactics belong to the least powerful. I frame tactics as people's resistance, and the dialogical and mutually constitutive relationship between them and Frelimo's strategies is behind the entire narrative of the thesis. However, also within this dialogical relationship, elements of negotiation stand out, and I focus on them at the end, identifying the drivers, the forms, and their impact, while placing elections as one of the main arenas for both hegemony and resistance, as well as for negotiating authoritarianism.

Before presenting details of the broader context within which the thesis is framed (in Sections 1.3 and 1.4) and elaborating on my theoretical and methodological approach (in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, respectively), in the next section, I introduce my research site and my rationale for selecting it.

1.3 Why Manjacaze?

> "We came to this district because the history of Mozambique is closely linked to Mandlakazi (...). Here great battles were fought. The inhabitants of this district never accepted domination. That's why we came to pay homage to them..." (Samora Machel, in Notícias, 23 June 1975, p.8.)

As Samora Machel, the first President of Mozambique, points out in the speech quoted above, Manjacaze is a land of struggles, resistance and, in Ribeiro's terms, a "land of heroes" (2005, p.261).

The very name 'Mandlakazi' refers to this legacy. From the Zulu *Mandla ya ngazi*, Manjacaze or Mandlakazi means "hands of blood" (MAE, 2005), and refers to the bloodshed during the clashes of its people with the powerful army of the Gaza Empire in the mid-19th century when the latter tried to conquer that territory and expand its presence to the southern part of what is now Gaza Province (Ibid., MAE, 2008). Another version of the name's origin translates Mandlakazi as "great strength or strong and beautiful city" (Liesegang, 1986, p.32), while yet another refers to the phrase *"Va lhakazi"*, meaning "whom they hit with spears and killed".[3] The first version is the best known, and in this context the name of Ngungunhane is always evoked.

Ngungunhane (in ci-changana or ci-chopi), or Gungunhane (in Portuguese), was the fourth and last emperor of the Gaza Empire.[4] Under his rule, Manjacaze became the imperial capital in 1889. However, before he was able to impose his power in the region, Ngungunhane faced strong local resistance, especially from the Chopis, one of the two main ethnic groups of Manjacaze, along with the Changanas (MAE, 2008). This resistance is associated with the emergence of the meaning of Mandlakazi as "hands of blood" since Ngungunhane, faced with the casualties inflicted by the Chopis, allegedly asked "why this suffering? why am I eating blood?" (Ribeiro, 2005, p. 261).

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[3] Tempo, n. 600, 11 April 1982, Suplemento, in Ribeiro, 2005, p.261.
[4] Ngungunhane (known as Gungunhane in Portuguese) reigned from 1884 to 1895, following his father, Muzila (1861-1884), his uncle Mawewe (1858-1861) and his grandfather, the founder of the empire, Soshangane, also known as Manicusse (1824-1858).

After Ngungunhane had consolidated his leadership, Manjacaze became an arena for other important battles, this time against the Portuguese colonial occupation. Ngungunhane, the erstwhile invader, became a major symbol of resistance and then one of the first national heroes. The Battle of Coolela, which took place near the present-day town of Manjacaze on 7 November 1895, saw Portuguese troops finally defeat Ngungunhane's guerrilla fighters.[5] After the defeat, Ngungunhane took refuge in Chaimite, a sacred village of the Nguni tribe where his grandfather, Soshangana, founder of the Gaza empire, was buried. There he was captured on 28 December 1895 and taken to the Azores Ireland in Portugal, where he died in 1906.

Although this represented the fall of one of the last obstacles to the effective Portuguese occupation of Mozambique, the names Manjacaze and Ngungunhane would forever remain associated with resistance, against all domination as well as specifically against Portuguese colonialism. Two decades after the death of Ngungunhane, Manjacaze was the birthplace of another important figure whose trajectory reinforced the historical legacy of Manjacaze. Eduardo Mondlane, born on 20 June 1920, just a few Km from the site of the Battle of Coolela, was Frelimo's founder and its first president, the leader who unleashed armed resistance against colonialism and the architect of national unity. Mondlane is part of the top triad of Frelimo leadership, alongside Mozambique's first and second Presidents Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano, both of whom were also from Gaza province – which helps to explain why people from Gaza are perceived as naturally identifying with Frelimo.

If its reputation as a site of struggles and resistance partially answers the question in the title of this section, **'why Manjacaze?'**, this image contrasts with the current situation of apparently full compliance with the dominant powers. This highlights its relevance to the puzzle that I originally set out to address, given the fact that Manjacaze is also a poor district despite its proximity to Maputo. Furthermore, despite the image of compliance of its population, Manjacaze records high rates of electoral abstention, which also leads to

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[5] Ngungunhane did not give in to the demands of the Portuguese, which included requiring him to pay taxes to the Portuguese Crown and, on the eve of the battle, to hand over some of his protegés, whom the Portuguese accused of being involved in attacks on the colonial authority. These terms were unacceptable to Ngungunhane, as they implied his submission and that of his peoples. Since the Portuguese had already set in motion the process of 'Effective Occupation', as agreed at the Berlin Conference in 1884, the Empire of Gaza was a major obstacle and the confrontation with its ruler was inevitable.

questions around the real extent of this apparent compliance. Below, I present data on the economy, geography, demography, and elections in Manjacaze, to better highlight the apparent contradictions that I set out to understand in this thesis.

1.3.1 Location, demographics, and economy

The district of Manjacaze is in the southern part of Gaza Province, some 72 km from the provincial capital Xai-Xai. To the north and east, it borders the districts of Panda, Inharrime and Zavala in Inhambane Province. To the south, it is bordered by the Indian Ocean, to the southwest by the district of Chongoene and to the west by Chibuto, also in Gaza. It has five Administrative Posts (district sub-divisions), namely Manjacaze-headquarter, Chidenguele, Chibonzane, Chalala and Macuacua. Manjacaze-headquarter, the town that serves as the district headquarters, has municipal status, which means that it has an elected local government whose remit covers the urban area within the Administrative Post.

Figure 2: Map of Gaza Province showing the location of Manjacaze.

Source: INE, 2013

The district covers an area of 3,797 km^2 and it was estimated to have a population of 197,986 in 2022 (INE, 2010[6]), corresponding to a population density of 52.1 inhabitants/km^2. The population is young (78% under 35 years old, of which 46% are between 0 and 14 years old) and predominantly (54%) female (INE, 2010). Two ethnic groups predominate in Manjacaze: The Chopis, who live mainly on the coast, primarily in Chidenguele, the most populous Administrative Post; and the Changanas, who live mainly in the interior (MAE, 2008).

The economy of Manjacaze is based on agriculture, livestock, and tourism (MAE, 2008). Agriculture is the principal livelihood of about 80% of the district's population, using family labour to manage arable land (which covers 175,450 hectares) and pasture (which accounts for 35,650 hectares). The tourism potential of the area is mainly located in the Administrative Post of Chidenguele, which has four beaches (Chizavane, Chidenguele, Muholove and Dengoine) and several lagoons. Fishing is also practised, and the exploitation of forest resources (for medicinal plants, firewood, reeds, stakes, and charcoal-burning) also contributes to local livelihoods.

Migration to work in South Africa has historically been an important activity in Manjacaze. It involves mainly young and adult men, motivated to look for alternative sources of income by the limited possibilities for employment in Manjacaze and the high levels of poverty prevailing in the district (Liesegang, 2012).

1.3.2 Poverty

Despite visible progress with infrastructure development in recent years, especially in Manjacaze-headquarter, where the main access road to the district has been paved, and the public lighting and telephone networks have been expanded, Manjacaze district still scores very poorly on most indicators of multidimensional poverty.

The few disaggregated data available indicate that only 9.7% of the population of Manjacaze has access to water from standpipes and only 2.7% has access to electricity as an energy source (INE, 2013). Manjacaze's figures for some indicators of access to electricity and water are below the average for Gaza, one of the poorest provinces in the country. Even in the

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[6] Based on data projections for the period 2008 to 2040 (INE, 2010).

district headquarters, which is considered to be "the area with the best conditions", only 20% of the houses are built from brick or wood and have zinc roofs (MAE, 2005, p.12). Fully 42.4% (14,032) of the 33,095 households in the district do not own a bicycle, refrigerator, television, radio, or any means of accessing the internet, let alone a car (INE, 2017).

Health indicators are also problematic, as people travel, on average, 10km to reach a health centre (Chaimite & Forquilha, 2015). Education indicators are equally critical, and Manjacaze went from being the most highly educated district in the country in 1932 to having the second worst educational indicators in Gaza Province in 1997, and current illiteracy rates are 53% for men and 60% for women (Liesegang, 2012).

1.3.3 Political Situation

This widespread poverty suggests that Manjacaze's situation is not one of a simple 'authoritarian bargain' (Desai et al., 2009) where economic security is provided in exchange for support for the regime. Nevertheless, despite the long history of resistance in Manjacaze, the incumbent party Frelimo is almost totally dominant in the district, as shown in the table below.

Table 1: Parliamentary Election results in Manjacaze, 1994 – 2019.

Political Party	Results (% of valid votes)					
	2019	2014	2009	2004	1999	1994
Frelimo	94	92	96	92	85	80
Renamo[7]	3	4	2	3	5	3
Abstention (%)	56	49	41	64	26	10

Source: Author's compilation based on data from CNE, IESE and CIP

In addition to the massive victories for Frelimo, which, at least in the last four general elections, exceeded 90% of the total vote in Manjacaze, two other important trends can be distinguished from the above data.

The first has to do with the relative insignificance of support for the opposition parties, led by Renamo (Mozambique National Resistance) and the MDM (Mozambique Democratic Movement), and their difficulties in gaining space in Manjacaze, where they achieved an average vote of around 4% in all six general elections.

The second trend concerns electoral abstention, which is massive and sometimes higher than 50%, as was the case in 2004 (64%), and in 2019 (56%). Particularly relevant is the finding that abstention levels in Manjacaze tend to be higher than those for the province as a whole. In the most recent Presidential Election, which took place in 2019, Gaza's abstention levels stood at 49%, against 56% in Manjacaze. To use Francisco's term, where abstention exceeds 50%, and therefore accounts for a larger share of the electorate than Frelimo's vote, it could be said that it is the "greater political force" in Manjacaze (2008, p. 1). This calls into question the extent to which Frelimo's leadership can claim legitimacy in its own heartland.

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[7] The Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) has also run candidates since its creation in 2009, but, like Renamo and all other opposition parties, always with insignificant results. In 2019, for example, MDM secured 1% of the vote in Manjacaze.

In short, as noted above, my overarching research question is about how Frelimo constructs and maintains its hegemony in Manjacaze. But the puzzle of continued apparent compliance with this hegemony despite high poverty rates and a history of resistance in Manjacaze needs to be understood within the broader context of Gaza and Mozambique. As mentioned in Section 1.1, Mozambique is undergoing a process of 'authoritarian reconversion,' and I delve into this process more thoroughly next.

1.4 Authoritarian Reconversion

Messiant (2006) and Péclard (2008) use the term 'authoritarian reconversion' in the case of Angola to refer to the passage "from dictatorial one-party rule to authoritarian hegemonic rule adapted to multi-partyism, but in which democracy and legality are both used and ignored, circumvented and violated within and by the regime" (Messiant, 2006, p.160). Here I address three main phases of authoritarian rule in Mozambique: the 'foundation years' during the first republic (1975-1990); the 'transition' to democracy from the mid-1980s; and the incremental 'reversion' of the regime,[8] from the beginning of the new millennium. As I show, despite periods of apparent opening-up, the Frelimo-dominated regime has undergone a 'transformation without change,' to paraphrase Forquilha & Orre (2011), and has always been authoritarian (Macamo, 2017).

1.4.1 Foundation

In the literature, the phase in which the one-party regime was established in Mozambique is considered to be one of 'closed authoritarianism'[9]. It was also when the political and social control system that still exists was established.

After leading the liberation war against Portuguese colonialism, between 1964 and 1974, with the independence of the country in 1975, FRELIMO (the Liberation Front of Mozambique[10]) assumed power and immediately proclaimed itself the "leading force of the state and society" (article 3 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique, 1975), and since then has become a constitutionally enshrined party-state. Indeed, even before 1975, FRELIMO already considered itself the 'only legitimate representative of the Mozambican people' (Brito, 2019; Mosca, 2022), and the idea of establishing a one-party regime was crystallized while the war was still ongoing (see Mondlane, 1970). State power only made it easier to establish this desideratum, now as a political and social project which a few years later was defined in terms of 'building socialism'. For Frelimo leaders, this project implied transforming

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[8] Haggard & Kaufman (2021) distinguish 'erosion' from 'reversion', the latter meaning a return to authoritarianism, while the former implies only the degradation of the regime, without, however, becoming necessarily authoritarian.

[9] To understand the distinction between the types of authoritarianism, see, for example, Gueddes (1999).

[10] I use FRELIMO (in capital letters) to refer to the Liberation Front of Mozambique before its post-independence transformation into a political party, Frelimo.

FRELIMO into a 'Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party', which happened during its Third Congress in 1977.

At the Third Congress, Frelimo formalised the adoption of a centrally planned economy, with the State as the key actor, agriculture as the basis, industry as a driving factor,[11] and the suppression of all other political parties and the various social organisations that existed under the previous regime. As the main vehicles of supervision and control during this First Republic, Frelimo introduced the 'Dynamizing Groups' (DGs) in all neighbourhoods and workplaces. These DGs were added to the already very repressive state apparatus, which included the police, the military, and the courts, now under Frelimo's command. Particular emphasis was placed on the Mozambican Women's Organisation (OMM) and the Mozambican Youth Organisation (OJM), founded in 1973 and 1977 respectively. In 1983, the Organisation of Mozambican Workers (OTM) was added, followed by National Teachers' Organisation (ONP), the National Journalists Organisation (ONJ), and so on. These were integrated with the DGs, whose role has been summarised by Brito as follows:

> "Firstly, they were the instrument of local transmission and diffusion of Frelimo political guidelines; secondly, in the workplaces, and especially in the state apparatus, they were Frelimo leaders' auxiliaries in controlling the bureaucratic machine; thirdly, in all neighbourhoods (including in rural areas) they ensured control and dissemination of party messages within the population; finally, in addition to being party control bodies, they were institutionalised spaces for citizen participation, often called upon to recognise the party's leadership, but also to give their opinions in that context" (Brito, 2010, pp.19-20, my translation).

After 1977, Frelimo transformed the DGs into local base structures, especially in urban areas, where "they remain in some way... part of the municipal structure, although with a tendency to reduce themselves to ward secretariats" (Ibid., p. 26). The functions of social and political control formerly entrusted to these groups came to be exercised by party cells, created with the same spatial logic as the DGs, in all neighborhoods and workplaces. Just as Bayart (1984) describes in the case of Cameroon, in Mozambique it was necessary to subordinate the popular masses, to renew social control mechanisms, and to prevent people from freeing themselves in the new political context. In the same vein, Sogge describes this phase of the First Republic as one of 'colonisation', just as in the previous regime, as Frelimo "colonised

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[11] For a detailed analysis of the merits and demerits of these economic measures, see Castel-Branco (1995).

associative life, preserving the spirit of the laws of the colonial era and its standards of supervision" (1997, p.47).

A new war broke out in 1976, just a year after independence. Renamo (Mozambique National Resistance), the guerrilla movement fighting the Frelimo government, later argued that it was a pro-democracy war and it intended to change the regime. However, the government saw Renamo as a puppet of external forces waging a war of aggression and destabilisation, a view shared by some analysts (cf., Fauvet, 1984; Hanlon, 1984; Saul, 1987; Roesh, 1992; Abramansson & Nilsson, 1994; Morier-Genoud, Do Rosário & Cahen, 2019). Other analysts, by contrast, described the conflict as a civil war because, notwithstanding the influence of external factors, it was also driven by contradictions within Mozambican society and within the authoritarian regime itself, and pitched Mozambicans against other Mozambicans (Geffray, 1990; Cahen, 1990; Morier-Genoud, Do Rosário & Cahen, 2019).

The war had a devastating impact on the country's economy and its social fabric. By 1992, there had already been more than one million deaths (Abrahamsson & Nilsson, 1994). Mozambique was "the world's poorest, hungriest, most indebted and most aid-dependent country" (Hanlon, 1991, p.1). This crisis, combined with the changes in the international context – especially the end of the Cold War – forced Frelimo to introduce profound reforms in Mozambique, leading to a political and economic transition, which implied a "...turn [of the country] to the West" (Hanlon, 1997, p.15).

1.4.2 Transition

At the economic level, the country had since 1987 been implementing an Economic Rehabilitation Programme (PRE), which was extended and transformed into an Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programme (PRES) in 1990. In the political realm, the decisions of the Fifth Frelimo Congress in 1989 were unparalleled. At this congress, the party formally abandoned its reference to Marxist ideology and the one-party regime, making explicit its intention to embrace multi-party democracy. A year later, in 1990, the then Popular Assembly, composed exclusively of Frelimo members, approved a new constitution, which established that the People's Republic of Mozambique was now known as the Republic of Mozambique, that the country adopted the market economy model and that formerly banned parties could now operate legally.

Another event that marked the transition process, with very profound implications that would last to this day, was the General Peace Agreement (*Acordo Geral de Paz*, AGP) signed in Rome in 1992 between Renamo and the Frelimo Government. The peace negotiations and the agreement itself laid the foundations for the political bipolarisation that followed, because they determined that the genesis of the Mozambican party system would be associated with the role of war in structuring the political field, as I show in chapter 4.

During the negotiations and subsequent implementation of the AGP provisions, Frelimo and Renamo effectively excluded all other parties and organisations, taking upon themselves the responsibility for defining the rules of the political game in the country. Since then, both Frelimo and Renamo have justified their legitimacy in terms of their roles in wars: the liberation war in the case of Frelimo and the civil war in the case of Renamo. Thus, for example, the commissions created to put into practice the AGP protocols and guarantee the country's political transition, were composed of representatives indicated by Frelimo, Renamo and the international community. There were only two ways in which other parties could participate: in the (non-binding) consultation process that took place before the submission of the draft electoral law to the National Assembly; or, subsequently, by seeking access to one of the three seats (out of a total of 20) on the National Election Commission that were allocated to parties other than Frelimo and Renamo (Brito, 2010, p.11).

Although Renamo claimed to be pro-democracy, it also proposed some measures intended to prevent other political parties from gaining space in the country's political field. Renamo tried to stop the authorisation of multi-party coalitions in electoral processes, and demanded that no party which failed to obtain 20% of the vote could be represented in parliament. However, neither was agreed, and the final agreement permitted coalitions and set the quota for representation in parliament at 5% of the vote.

Renamo also proposed adopting a proportional representation system, while Frelimo argued for a majority (first past the post) system. Reflecting Duverger's famous law (1950), according to which proportional systems facilitate the diffusion of small parties and the fragmentation of parliament, smaller parties praised Renamo's proposal (Carilho, 1995). However, despite Mozambique having adopted a proportional system, political bipolarisation has prevailed ever since (see Table 2).

Table 2: Parliamentary Election Results since 1994.

Political Party	Results (%)					
	2019	**2014**	**2009**	**2004**	**1999**	**1994**
Frelimo	71,3	56,0	74,7	62,2	49,0	44,3
Renamo	22,3	32,5	17,7	28,8	39,0	37,8
MDM/UD[12]	4,24	8,40	3,90	____	_____	5,20

Source: Author's compilation using data from CNE & IESE

Within this bipolarisation, Frelimo and Renamo have always had a combined vote share in excess of 80%, and, in some elections (2004, 2009 and 2019), it has exceeded 90%. Although, especially after 1999, Frelimo's share has been far larger than Renamo's, Renamo is always in second place and, therefore, in a leading position in the opposition.[13] Elsewhere, I have referred to this as "double domination" (Chaimite, 2013): a situation characterised by Frelimo domination over all parties in the country, including Renamo, but also by Renamo domination over the other opposition parties.

Renamo made several strategic mistakes during the transition period, of which the most important was the fact that it not only failed to force the establishment of a transitional government that could give it access to strategic sectors such as the police and intelligence services, but also left these strategic sectors in the hands of Frelimo. Since then, Frelimo has had control of the state and, above all, of the main instruments of coercion, which, as I show throughout this thesis, it uses extensively to build and maintain its hegemony.

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[12] UD in 1994 only and MDM from 2009. They are the only parties aside from Frelimo and Renamo that have secured representation in parliament.

[13] Since 2014 the country has given official status to the role of 'leader of the opposition', though this served only to confirm Renamo's position, since it has always been the second largest political party in Mozambique.

1.4.3 Reversion

Coercion, and with it repression and violence, characterises the 'reversion' phase, the third and final stage of the 'authoritarian reconversion' process in Mozambique. As the data in Table 2 shows, after two relatively competitive elections, from 2004 the scenario changed completely. Not only did the electoral gap between Frelimo and Renamo increase significantly, but this went along with the strengthening of political and social control mechanisms, including those that made use of repression and violence. These changes coincided with the rise of Armando Guebuza, first as Frelimo General Secretary in 2002 and then as president of the country after 2004.

Guebuza is a former liberation war fighter and has always occupied leadership positions in Frelimo. He emerged as an alternative to the party and country leadership in a context in which had been weakened by the fact that, during the transition, little had been done to organise and mobilise its members, and the cells and committees "practically ceased to function, reducing the party's presence and its influence on voters" (Brito, 2010, p.14). Inside Frelimo, at least among some war veterans, Joaquim Chissano, Guebuza's predecessor who had become President after Samora Machel's death in 1986, was seen as weak, since he had allegedly made many concessions to Renamo during the negotiations that led to the signing of the AGP in 1992 (Weimer & Carilho, 2017). Chissano's leadership was further weakened after the 1999 general election results, in which he avoided having to fight a runoff against Afonso Dhlakama, the Renamo candidate, by a margin of just 2.3 percentage points – which some analysts consider only to have been secured thanks to electoral fraud (Brito, 2010a). Given this scenario, Chissano's attempts to obtain internal support to remain in power were unsuccessful, paving the way for Armando Guebuza to emerge as a leader considered capable of revitalising Frelimo, albeit one who was also known for his intransigence. For example, the independent journalist Carlos Cardoso (who was to be assassinated in 2001, following an investigation into the embezzlement of money in one of the country's commercial banks) argued in 1997, before Guebuza even became a candidate, that not only was he incompetent,

but that people "shut up because of him" since Guebuza "does not have a tenth of Chissano's tolerance of criticism", and risked inspiring "fear and revolt among the citizens". [14]

Under Guebuza's leadership, the state was increasingly subordinated to Frelimo in at least two ways. One was the reactivation of party cells within the state apparatus, which, as had been the case during the First Republic, greatly facilitated political control (Orre & Forquilha, 2011). The other was the use of State resources such as the District Development Fund (known as '7 Millhões' because of the initial allocation of seven million meticais per district) for political co-optation, especially of local leaders who had previously supported the opposition (Orre & Forquilha, 2011; Sande, 2011). Likewise, with Guebuza in power, the open assertion of Frelimo hegemony become more frequent (Chichava, 2010; Chaimite, 2011), and political intolerance significantly increased (Kleibl & Munck, 2016).

Individuals and organizations working on governance who were critical of corruption and the abuse of power were referred to as "apostles of doom", "enemies of development", "professional agitators", "marginals" and even as "instrumentalised by the white people".[15] Members of a group called 'G40', tasked with discrediting CSOs and individuals who were critical of the Government and Frelimo, were omnipresent on social media, on radio and on public TV.[16] The result was that political polarization directly affected CSOs themselves, as they came to be classified as supporters of either Frelimo or Renamo. The perception of political cooptation intensified distrust among CSOs to the point where some organizations refused to work with others who they suspected of having different party alignments. A leader of one of the most vibrant civil society organizations in Mozambique stated in an interview that:

> "It is a very suspicious environment. Either you have worked with a partner for a long time, and you know you can work with them, or you have not worked with a partner for a long time, but you know that this partner has no history of taking a critical position [and] stands in favour of certain political interests [in which case] one must protect oneself ... We are in a political civil society: either it is

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[14] In « Metical », 15 July 1997. Available at https://ambicanos.blogspot.com/2016/04/guebuza-nao-por-carlos-cardoso-1997.html (accessed on 12 March 2018).

[15] See, for example, the article published in *Canal de Moçambique*, available at http://macua.blogs.com/moambique_para_todos/2012/12/não-nos-venha-dizer-o-senhor-armando-guebuza-que-não-gosta-da-cr%C3%ADtica.html (accessed 13 August 2018).

[16] The G40 was composed of 40 individuals, including renowned academics and journalists.

> anti-Frelimo, or it has proximity in several ways. It is not a purely civic movement." (Interview with A.N., in Maputo, 23 January 2015, in Chichava & Chaimite, 2015, p.66.)

While civic space was becoming increasingly closed (Pereira, Forquilha & Shankland, 2021), in a context of economic crisis, with worsening transport and living costs and no adequate response from the Government, the first major popular uprisings erupted in the country in 2008, followed by a second wave in 2010. The state responded with violence, resulting in at least 3 deaths and more than 200 injuries in 2008, with more than ten deaths and 500 injuries in 2010. In 2012, when messages of mobilisation were circulated in response to further rises in transport prices and the cost of living, the spectre of violence and repression was still fresh in citizens' memories and was reinforced by a massive police presence on the streets, mobilised to forestall further demonstrations.[17]

In 2013, after two decades of peace, the country returned to war, when Renamo, already in visible decline since the rise of Guebuza, resumed armed attacks, partly in response to growing political intolerance, exclusion, and marginalisation (see Pearce, 2020). These attacks, which were especially concentrated in the central region, echoed those at the beginning of the civil war. This new Renamo-´Frelimo´ war ended with the signing of a peace agreement in 2019, some four years after the end of Guebuza's second term in office, but its root causes remained, especially the issue of political intolerance. By the time the 2019 peace agreement was signed, a new insurgency (this time claiming inspiration from Islamist jihadi ideology rather than the legacy of Renamo) had already taken hold in the Northern Province of Cabo Delgado.

Violent repression continues under Filipe Nyusi, who succeeded Guebuza in January 2015, even for peaceful demonstrations, except those in support of Frelimo. A group known as the 'death squad' has allegedly been responsible for a wave of kidnappings and murders of people who have incurred the displeasure of the government. Their victims include the scholars Gilles Cistac and José Jaime Macuane, the journalist Ericino de Salema and the civil society activist Anastácio Matavel. Cistac and Matavel were shot dead, the first in Maputo, the country's

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[17] For a more detailed analysis of the protests, see Brito, L. (org) (2017). Agora Eles têm medo de Nós: uma colectânea de textos sobre revoltas populares em Moçambique (2008-2012). In https://www.iese.ac.mz/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/IESE-Food-Riot.pdf

capital, in 2015, and the second in Xai-Xai, capital of Gaza province, a week before the 2019 general elections.[18] Macuane and Salema were kidnapped and tortured in 2016 and 2018, respectively. As recently as August 2022, Adriano Nuvunga, another academic, activist, and human rights defender, was targeted with threats: two AK47 bullets being thrown into his backyard, wrapped in paper bearing the message 'Be Careful Nuvunga!'. 'Be careful' has become a watchword in the Mozambican public sphere, as coercion, described by Art as "the core of authoritarian regimes" (2012, p.353), has become increasingly explicit in the country, especially in attempts to suppress critical voices. Along with electoral fraud, this rising level of coercion has underpinned the recent classifications of Mozambique as increasingly authoritarian (cf., The Economist, 2019, 2020, 2021; Pitcher, 2020) and, therefore, characterises the process of authoritarian reconversion, as I have been referring.

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[18] Cistac had just publicly defended the possibility of creating provincial-level municipalities in the country, as Renamo later suggested, against the Government's plans. Matavel was preparing observers for the 2019 general election in Gaza, one of the main epicentres of the fraud. His death occurred precisely a week before said elections were held. Macuane and Salema were commentators on an important opinion program broadcast by a private television station, the STV. The program had a huge audience, and the critical opinions of those commentators were widely reproduced on different digital platforms and in the press.

1.5 Asymmetric authoritarianism

Although the overall trend is clear, the authoritarian reconversion process, like authoritarianism itself, is not experienced uniformly across Mozambique. It has different geographical dynamics depending on the province, district, and other territorial dimensions. To capture this diversity, I use the expression 'asymmetric authoritarianism,' in the sense adopted by Lyons and Verjee. With reference to Ethiopia, these authors argue that while "some regions experienced heavy-handed political domination and voting with only the ruling party competing", others had "circumscribed political space and opportunities for the opposition to win votes" (Lyons & Verjee 2022, p.2). My research site is situated within the largest authoritarian enclave in Mozambique[19] and has differences as well as similarities in relation to other sites that are differently located across Mozambique's uneven political terrain.

To understand this terrain, Brito's (1995) pioneering analysis of electoral behaviour in Mozambique is an important starting point, since it distinguishes 'spaces of hegemony' from 'sanctuaries'. More recently, the same author has added the category of 'electoral territories' (Brito, 2019). Brito classifies as 'spaces of hegemony' those constituencies where Frelimo or Renamo won twice as many votes as their closest opponents; cases where one of the parties took at least 75% of the total vote are classified as 'sanctuaries', while 'electoral territories' are spaces of greater political competition where the party nonetheless manages to preserve control over time. Thus, in 1994, for example, Frelimo won in four areas in the South (Maputo City, Maputo Province, Gaza and Inhambane) and two in the far North (Niassa and Cabo Delgado), but it gained hegemony only in the four in the South, which also stood out as Frelimo sanctuaries. Renamo, in turn, won in five areas located the centre and north-central part of the country – Manica, Sofala, Tete, Zambézia and Nampula – but was hegemonic only in Manica and Sofala, with the latter as its sanctuary.

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[19] In the literature, enclave is a peculiar subunit of a democratic or authoritarian system, being more democratic when the system is authoritarian and more authoritarian when the system is democratic. Thus, two types of enclaves can be distinguished: authoritarian enclave and democratic enclave (see Benton, 2012). Thus, when I say that Manjacaze is part of "the largest authoritarian enclave in Mozambique," I refer to Manjacaze as part of a relatively distinct subunit within a broad context of authoritarianism, which I describe in this section and in section 1.4. In this specific case, the distinction of Manjacaze, like the entire Gaza province, stems from the fact of being a place where the dynamics of authoritarianism are potentially more intense.

In addition to the political bipolarisation, this electoral distribution confirms the regionalisation of the vote in Mozambique (Lundin, 1995; Pereira, 2008; Silva, 2015). With some exceptions, the same regional distribution of votes prevailed in the 1999 elections, in which the sanctuaries and hegemonic spaces mentioned above remained unchanged. However, from 2004 onwards, the power correlation between Frelimo and Renamo changed significantly, including in the Renamo sanctuaries themselves. Frelimo kept all its territories and conquered Renamo's, starting with Nampula (the largest constituency in the country), Tete and Manica in 2004. Then, in 2009, it conquered Zambézia, the second largest constituency, and Sofala, the Renamo sanctuary. In 2014 Renamo somewhat rebalanced the field, recovering Zambézia and Sofala taking half of the seats in Nampula and Manica, but in 2019 it would lose all these provinces to Frelimo once more.

Below the regional level, the asymmetries are even more striking. At the provincial level Gaza stands out even from the rest of the South for its consistently massive levels of support for Frelimo. Since 1994, only one of the province's twelve parliamentary seats has gone to the opposition, taken by the *União Democrática* coalition in that first post-AGP election; in 1999 and in every election since, Frelimo has won 100% of the seats in Gaza. This makes Gaza stand out as the most undeniably Frelimo-dominated electoral territory in Mozambique (António et al., 2015; Chaimite & Forquilha, 2015).

In seeking to explain how Gaza has remained so inaccessible to the opposition, including Renamo, most studies invoke historical factors (cf., Brito, 1995; Ribeiro, 2005; Silva, 2015). Gaza is classified as a 'historic cradle', given that Frelimo's first leaders were born in the province, whilst Renamo leaders such as Afonso Dhlakama were born in Sofala (Brito, 1995). The legacy of the liberation war (1964-1974) and the civil war (1976-1992) is also invoked, as some argue that the Frelimo party continues to reap the dividends of the FRELIMO front which led the liberation war, while Renamo is being punished for the atrocities it allegedly committed in Gaza and the southern region in general when acting as a guerrilla movement during the civil war (Ribeiro, 2005; Silva, 2015; Chaimite & Forquilha, 2015).

To date, most studies of party dynamics within Mozambique's context of asymmetrical authoritarianism have focused on the opposition, particularly Renamo.[20] These tend to examine the causes of its decline over the last two decades (cf., for example, Manning, 1998; Hanlon, 2004, 2013; Cahen, 2010; Chichava, 2010; Nuvunga, 2013; Silva, 2015). Some authors emphasize the opposition party's internal weaknesses, and its personalized and centralized management (Cahen, 2010; Chichava, 2010; Brito, 2018), with some even arguing that "Renamo as a party does not differ much from Renamo as a guerrilla group" (Silva, 2015, p.2).

While several authors agree that Renamo has faced difficulties in transitioning from a guerrilla movement to a political party (Hanlon, 2013; Brito, 2018), others explain the defeats and decline of the opposition as also a result of the strategies of control, co-optation, and fraud which Frelimo perpetrates while operating as a party-state (cf., for example, Hanlon & Fox, 2006; Nuvunga, 2013, 2014). In other words, even when seeking to understand the opposition parties, some authors emphasise the role of Frelimo.

Although many authors have emphasised fraud, control, and political co-optation as part of the explanation for Frelimo's electoral success in general (cf., Hanlon and Mosse, 2010; Orre, 2010; Nuvunga, 2014; Bertelsen, 2016; Cortês, 2018), there are few studies on Frelimo itself, and fewer still that delve into how this party-state works in practice and how it exercises control. Even when historical factors are invoked, analysts do not investigate how they are mobilised, in practice, in the electoral context, a gap this thesis seeks to address.

More importantly, almost none of these studies are conducted in Frelimo territories, and none have asked about alternative mechanisms for contesting Frelimo, given the apparently complete absence of opposition parties in contexts such as Gaza. In such contexts, full support for and full compliance with Frelimo are taken for granted. This thesis, however, questions the extent of this apparent compliance, even in a part of Gaza, Frelimo heartland. It does so through an in-depth ethnographic investigation of both Frelimo strategies and people's tactics to resist these strategies. It examines how, particularly at election time, it is within the

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[20] Here I refer to asymmetries in the sense of Lyons and Verjee (2022), for whom authoritarianism is not experienced uniformly, and may have different geographical dynamics depending on the province, district, and other territorial dimensions.

dialogical relationship between Frelimo and those who are resisting its hegemony that the conditions for this hegemony itself are negotiated.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

The remaining two chapters in this first part of the thesis set out the theoretical foundations for the research and describe the research process itself. Chapter 2 presents the framework I will use for analysing the dynamics of party hegemony in Manjacaze, starting by explaining 'authoritarian institutionalism' and going on to discuss the concept of a 'Party-State,' before situating Frelimo in relation to the broader debate about 'dominant' and 'hegemonic' parties and in the context of a reflection on the meaning and variants of 'authoritarianism.' In setting out my analytical framework, I explain why the electoral arena stands out as a key space for producing Frelimo's hegemony. In Chapter 3, I detail and explain why I adopted the ethnographic approach to understanding what has hitherto been treated as classic political science issues, thus grounding my methodological options and the approach I adopted for the study and discussing issues of ethics and positionality.

The second part of the thesis consists of two chapters that focus on the sources of Frelimo hegemony. Chapter 4 explains how the dynamics of war structure the political field in Manjacaze and, simultaneously, are mobilised to maintain Frelimo's influence in the district. Chapter 5 focuses on the issue of political control, made possible, above all, because of Frelimo's imbrication with the State, from which the party extracts the resources to exercise this control not only on a day-to-day basis but particularly during electoral processes.

The third part consists of two chapters that analyse how day-to-day control mechanisms, the history of war and other Frelimo mobilisation strategies are adapted and used in electoral contexts. Chapter 6 presents Frelimo's campaign strategy and analyses how it works. It begins by addressing Frelimo's preparation for this important stage of the electoral cycle, which includes the revitalisation of its cells and shock groups, before presenting details of how violence is integrated into control mechanisms and how and when it is mobilised, showing that the strategy is based on practices of voter control that are made possible by Frelimo's privileged access to state resources. Chapter 7 is about fraud, how it is carried out, by whom,

and its scale. It shows that electoral fraud is fundamental to the process of building Frelimo's hegemony in Manjacaze but is also evidence of the weaknesses of this hegemony.

The fourth and final part of the thesis builds on this by demonstrating that Frelimo hegemony in Manjacaze, like any hegemony, is constantly contested and negotiated – and that this contestation and negotiation is more intense in electoral periods. Chapter 8 addresses the tactics adopted by the citizens of Manjacaze to confront Frelimo's hegemonic strategies in the electoral context. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes by connecting the elements of all the previous chapters with a discussion of the centrality of negotiation in the construction of Frelimo's hegemony, before discussing the broader contribution of the thesis and identifying avenues for future research.

Chapter 2 Studying Authoritarianism

This chapter outlines the conceptual framework I will use to analyse the dynamics of the construction and maintenance of authoritarianism in Manjacaze. It consists of two parts. The first conceptualises and presents the debates around parties, party states, party domination and party hegemony, and connects these concepts and debates with authoritarianism. The second addresses resistance and negotiation as essential elements of a framework that situates elections as one of the main arenas for the construction and maintenance of hegemony, and, thus, for negotiating authoritarianism in Manjacaze.

2.1 The point of departure: key concepts and debates

Two major perspectives predominate in studies on the origin, transformation, and durability of authoritarianism: autocratisation and democratisation studies. 'Autocratisation studies' focus directly on authoritarianism – or 'authoritarian practices' to use the terms defined by Glasius (2018; 2021). These are practices that "sabotage accountability and thereby threaten democratic processes" (Glasius, 2018, p.3796). On the other hand, as I noted in the Introduction, the more established and predominant 'democratisation studies' approach tends to treat authoritarianism as a residual category (Art, 2012; Grugel, 2003; Glasius, 2018). This approach seeks to understand "how democratic norms, institutions and practices evolve and are disseminated or retracted" (Haynes & Croissant, 2021, p.1), and includes studies on the erosion of democratic institutions, termed 'democratic backsliding' or 'autocratisation'. The conceptual definition of 'democratic backsliding' is still under discussion, but its parameters are summarised by Bermeo's influential study as "state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy" (2016, p.5).

The inverse movement, forward towards greater democracy, is the focus of another related approach: 'transitology.' Transitology presupposes that democratisation occurs in a set sequence of stages, the first being the *opening* of the authoritarian regime, also called political liberalisation or, in the terms defined by Bayart (1991), 'authoritarian decompression'. The second stage is that of the *transition* or *breakthrough*, and involves initial elections. The third is *consolidation*, which corresponds to the habituation of society to the democratic order, with the holding of regular elections and the strengthening of civil society.[21] However, as the analyses of 'democratic backsliding' show, transitions are not unidirectional (cf., also Karl, 1995; Carothers, 2002; Levistky & Way, 2002; Jason, 2007; Grujel, 2003; Haggard & Kaufman, 2021).

Autocratisation studies focus instead on 'authoritarian practices' such as electoral fraud, political surveillance, and coercion. Democratisation scholars tend to treat these authoritarian practices as deviations or anomalies in democracies, resulting in regimes that they term 'in-between' (Van de Walle, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002), 'hybrid' (Diamond, 2002; Lindberg, 2003), 'ambiguous' or 'semi-authoritarian' (Mirshak, 2019; Ottaway, 2003), 'semi-democratic' (Mirshak, 2019) or 'pseudodemocracies' (Sartori, 1976). Autocratisation scholars, by contrast, treat these practices as an integral part of modern forms of authoritarianism (Tapscott, 2021; Van de Walle, 2002; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Boban, 2017; Smyth, 2021). These modern forms are labelled 'electoral authoritarianisms', defined as "regimes that practice authoritarianism behind the institutional façades of representative democracy" (Schedler, 2015, p.19).[22]

Informed by historical and institutionalist approaches, autocratisation scholars seek to answer Art's question on "how are authoritarian regimes constructed in the first place?" (2012, p.354), as well as understanding their trajectories (Magaloni, 2006; Levitsky & Way, 2010), legacies (Slater, 2010; Riley, 2010), and their maintenance and persistence (Guedes, 1999; Magaloni, 2006; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Gandhi, 2007; Levistky & Way, 2010;

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[21] See also O'Donnell, Schmitter & Schmitter (1986); Carothers (2002).
[22] VDem calls them 'electoral autocracies', defined as "De jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature, but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisite of polyarchy as measured by VDem's Electoral Democracy Index" (Coppedge et al., 2019, p.254).

Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). They analyse factors that include the role played by the 'authoritarian party' (Magaloni, 2006; Jason, 2007; Morse, 2012a), by elections (Schedler, 2006; Lust-Okar, 2006; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009), and by other institutions (cf. for example, Gueddes, 1999, 2005; Schedler, 2009; Gueddes, Wright & Frantze, 2018).

Almost all of the existing studies on elections, parties, and the regime in Mozambique have been guided by democratisation theories (cf., for example, Brito, 1995; Hanlon & Fox, 2006; Pereira, 2008; Cahen, 2010; Chichava, 2010; Orre, 2010; Bertelsen, 2016; Nuvunga, 2013, 2014; Matsimbe, 2017; Silva, 2015). In this thesis, I take a different approach that is informed by authoritarian institutionalism, with its focus on parties, elections, legislatures, courts, militaries, police, and propaganda machines (Gueddes, 1999; Magaloni, 2006; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Schedler, 2009).

There are, however, two variants of authoritarian institutionalism: the 'old' authoritarian institutionalism, which pays more attention to party-states, military juntas, police, propaganda machines, and other institutions of repression and manipulation (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Schedler, 2009), and the 'new' authoritarian institutionalism, which "takes seriously previously neglected pillars of non-democratic governance… such as legislatures, multiple parties, and elections" (Schedler, 2009, p. 323). Both variants of authoritarian institutionalism share with democratisation studies the basic assumption that 'institutions matter' (Gueddes, 2009; Magaloni, 2006; Schedler, 2009; Gueddes, Wright & Frantze, 2018). However, the 'old' authoritarian institutionalism dismissed nominally democratic institutions as 'insignificant' (Gandhi, 2008, p. xxi), 'banal' (Hermet et al., 1978), 'not meaningful' (Lust-Okar, 2006) and thus not worth studying, since their outcomes are preordained in authoritarian contexts (Hermet et al., 1978, Karlius, 1986).

It was "real-world developments" (Art, 2012, p.351) that shifted the focus from the old to the new authoritarian institutionalism. As Schedler points out, "contemporary non-democratic regimes, more than their historical predecessors, tend to set up elaborate façades of representative institutions (such as multiparty elections), rather than trusting the persuasive force of repressive institutions" (2009, p. 324). Thus, the new authoritarian institutionalism began to recognise the importance of parties, elections, legislatures, and other institutions

nominally associated with liberal democracy, now also seen as pillars of authoritarianism (cf., for example, Gueddes, 1999; Magaloni, 2006; Schedler, 2009; Smyth, 2021).

These institutions are mainly regarded as sites for the accumulation, legitimation, and perpetuation of power (Hermet et al., 1978; Karlins, 1986; Schedler, 2009; Art, 2012; Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009) and as instruments of regime stability (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Boban, 2017), as well as instruments and sites of control and co-optation (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Gandhi, 2008; Lust-Okar, 2005; Wright, 2008; Schedler, 2009; Vokes & Wilkins, 2016). However, they are also arenas of contestation and bargaining (cf., for example, Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Gandhi, 2008; Schedler, 2009; Boix & Svolik, 2013; Smyth, 2021). In this thesis I take a new authoritarian institutionalist approach that places particular emphasis on the role of elections as arenas both for the construction and maintenance of hegemony and for resistance, which I consider to be intrinsic to hegemonies. Before going on to set out how I have conceptualised resistance and negotiation in relation to elections, I present the key theorisations and debates around the 'party-state' and its role in the construction and maintenance of hegemony in the context of authoritarian settings in general and Mozambique in particular.

2.1.1 'The Party' and the party-state

Since Mozambique's First Republic (1975-1990), when the country was formally a 'party-state' (cf. Brito, 1988; 1990), Frelimo has commonly been referred to as 'The Party'. The term's continued use in the contemporary multi-party context denotes the persistent legacy of the previous regime, highlighting the preponderance of Frelimo in relation to the opposition parties. However, Frelimo is also a party in the Weberian sense, which defines parties as "associations based on a [formally] free commitment whose aim is to provide their leaders with power within a group and their active militants with opportunities – ideal or material – to pursue objective goals, to obtain personal advantages, or do both together" (Weber, 1991, p.9). This definition also highlights the clientelist dimension, intrinsic to all parties, and quite prominent in other more recent definitions, especially when applied to African contexts (cf., for example, Banégas, 1998; Adejumobi, 2000; Van de Walle, 2003; Salih, 2003; Vokes & Wilkins, 2016; McGregor & Chatiza, 2020). La Palombara & Weimer (1966)

identify at least four criteria for any entity to be called a political party: (1) durability (outlasting their founders), (2) national territorial scope, (3) a focus on gaining power (both nationally and locally), and (4) an effort to secure popular support (through elections and by acting as mediators between the political system and society). Here I discuss Frelimo not simply as a party in the broader Weberian sense but specifically as a party-state.

The term 'party-state' refers to the symbiosis (Katz & Mair, 1995; Blondel, 2002; Kopecký, 2006), that results from 'invasion' (Blondel, 2000; 2002), 'usurpation' (Suykens, 2017) or 'capture' (Biezen & Kopecký, 2014; Kopecký, 2006) of the state by a ruling party. Blondel uses the term 'invasion' to describe how in party-states, ruling parties are strong enough to ensure that the State provides "'jobs for the boys' or contracts for businessmen willing (and obliged) to give funds to parties" (2002, p.3). Suykens (2017) describes as 'usurpation' the way in which the ruling party automatically transforms its decisions into policies, with the result that, in such contexts, people cannot distinguish the ruling party from the state and government. Biezen & Kopecký identify 'capture' as one of the three main dimensions for analysis in studying relationships between party and state (alongside party dependence on the state and state management of parties), stating that it "relates to the extent to which parties penetrate and control the state and use public offices for the purposes of party organisational building and advancement" (2014, p.176).

'Dependency', defined by Biezen & Kopecký as "the extent to which parties depend on the state for their organisational survival" (2007, p. 238), is the most widely-analysed indicator of party–state linkages. This derives from the assumption that "the introduction of public subsidies has made political parties increasingly dependent on the state at the expense of their financial linkages with society, such as membership contributions or other forms of grassroots funding" (Kopecký, 2006, p. 171). Based on this assumption, Katz and Mair developed a model to analyse party evolution from the end of the 19th century, showing that the main trend consisted of their growing disconnection from society (the basis of mass parties), and their becoming more integrated into the state apparatus to the point where they become 'cartel parties', which are "characterised by the interpenetration of party and state, and also by a pattern of inter-party collusion" (1995, p.17). These authors consider that all parties today are cartel parties because their survival depends, above all, on the state.

However, they also argue that the emergence of cartel parties is "uneven, being more evident in those countries in which state aid and support for parties is most pronounced, and in which the opportunities for party patronage, /*ottizazione*, and control are most enhanced" (ibid.).

According to Kopecky, while the dimension of state management of parties involves "the regulation of party activities, financing, ideology and organisation through public law, including the constitution" (2006, p. 256), the dimension of capture "refers to the rent-seeking behaviour of political parties within the state apparatus" (op. cit. p..258). Kopecký refers to capture as a process of 'party colonisation of states', which takes two forms, 'patronage' and 'clientelism'. Patronage "involves the allocation of jobs and other important public and semi-public positions, for example in the civil service, public sector companies, advisory boards, quangos, universities, and school and research institutes" (ibid.), while clientelism "is a form of representation based on selective release of a wide variety of public material resources – contracts, housing, subsidies, 'pork barrel' legislation – in order to secure electoral support, either from individuals or from selected segments of society" (op. cit. p..259). While there is a strong link between patronage and clientelism, because both are ingredients of neopatrimonialism (Médard, 1990)[23] and involve exchange relations between patrons and clients, Kopecký argues that "without an ability to control appointments within the state institutions, political parties would not be in a position to distribute selective benefits," and thus that clientelism is more in the domain of the party-society relationship while patronage is in the domain of the party-state.

Analyses of party-state dynamics in Africa also highlight the importance of patronage and clientelism in regime maintenance. In Zimbabwe, for example, McGregor & Chatiza demonstrated that "... the ruling ZANU-PF party promotes a view of access to urban land, housing, and security as a gift, conditional on demonstrations of party loyalty" (2020, p. 17). These practices constitute what they term "partisan citizenship," i.e., "political practices that render access to entitlements contingent on expressions of party political loyalty" (op. cit., p.

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[23] Cf. Jean-François Médard, "L'État Patrimonialisé", Politique Africaine, Paris, Karthala, n° 39, 1990 and Nicolas Van de Walle, "The path from neopatrimonialism: democracy and clientelism in Africa", in Bach, D. & Gazibo, M.(ed.) (2012), Neopatrimonialism in Africa and beyond, Londres et New York: Routledge.

18), a notion closely connected to the idea of citizenship as a privilege to be earned, not a right, widely promoted by African governments (Dorman, 2014).

In Uganda, in turn, Vokes & Wilkins's (2016) showed that the triad ´party networks, patronage and coercion,´ presented as the bases of the continued domination of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and its president, Yoweri Musseveni, are also embedded in Ugandan political culture. For this reason, they argue, one cannot speak only of imposition, or, rather, a mere ´imposed regime´ in Uganda, since this embeddedness also stems from genuine political support. However, they precise, if "...30 years of NRM rule, combined with social memory of the years of turmoil that preceded have produced a political culture in Uganda in which the regime´s electoral techniques are now fundamentally embedded" (op. cit., 2016, p. 583), in elections these memories and coercive practices are only activated, not simply imposed from a distance. This is how Vokes & Wilkins explain the occurrence of a dialectic relationship of power in that country, "... one that taps into ingrained repertoires and memories among the citizenry in order to produce their desired mobilisation and political control" (op. cit., p. 583).

In Angola, Schubert (2016; 2017) identifies similar dynamics to the functioning of the party state in Uganda and Zimbabwe. The author elaborates on what he calls "working the system...", implying a relationship of complicity between the ruling MPLA and the Angolans, who 'work', that is, co-construct, negotiate, make, and remake the authoritarian system in Angola. To refer to this complicity, which does not mean tacit consent, since there is also resistance and subversion, the author also uses the expression "culture of immediatism," which describes the Angolans' quest for benefits in the 'system', thus legitimising and perpetuating it.

In the three cases above, as in other party-states, the ruling parties stand out as ´patrons´and, therefore, in a position of strength in their relationship with 'their citizen-clients', precisely because they have 'colonised' or 'captured' the state, to use Kopecky´s terms. It is in this sense that I also approach Frelimo in Mozambique: as "The Party" that 'colonises' the state, taking advantage of its privileged access to state resources to feed patronage and clientelism networks, fundamental for maintaining and reinforcing its preponderance. This

preponderance over the other parties, in turn, needs to be conceptualized in terms of the debate on party dominance and party hegemony.

2.1.2 Beyond dominance: party hegemony

In the literature, attempts to account for the preponderance of one party over others tend to emphasise prolonged periods in power, characterising situations where one party wins successive electoral victories as 'party dominance' (cf. Carbone, 2006; De Jager & Du Toit, 2013; Greene, 2013; Boogards & Boucek, 2013). This designation has been used to describe Frelimo's position in Mozambique, where it has been in power for 48 uninterrupted years. However, it is problematic because the term 'party dominance' is used in the literature to refer to several quite different realities, not all of which accurately reflect the situation with regard to Frelimo.

On the one hand, Carbone defines 'party dominance' as a situation in which a party "wins a series of consecutive popular mandates (at least three, according to Sartori) in real elections – elections that are free from major fraud" (2006, p.33). On the other hand, the term is used when a party wins through extra-democratic means including fraud (Sartori, 1976; Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007). Kasuya & Sawasdee argue that "the dominant party is a party that controls the national executive for an extended period in both democracies and non-democracies" (2019, p.4), and thus the term encompasses, for example, both the Chinese Communist Party, operating in a context of closed authoritarianism or single party authoritarianism, and the Indian Congress Party, operating in a context of electoral democracy.

To distinguish between these different situations, other authors add the adjectives 'democratic' and 'authoritarian' to the term 'dominant party' (Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2013; De Jager & Du Toit, 2013; Greene, 2013; Boogards & Boucek, 2013; De Jager & Du Toit, 2013; Greene, 2013; Boogards & Boucek, 2010). Thus, parties that win their victories in free and fair elections are 'dominant-democratic', while those that win by resorting to fraud and other extra-democratic means are 'dominant-authoritarian'. Examples of 'dominant-democratic' parties in Africa include the African National Congress (ANC) and the Kenyan African National

Union (KANU), while the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and Uganda's National Resistance Movement (NRM) are 'dominant-authoritarian' parties. However, as Nuvunga highlights by using the formulation 'dominant (democratic)-party' (2014, p. 21) to refer to the Mozambican case, ambiguities continue to prevail.

This is exemplified by the way in which some authors resort to elements of 'authoritarian dominance' when seeking to explain 'democratic dominance'. For example, Karume highlights the way in which the manipulation of electoral rules favours the entrenchment of dominant parties, which "have usually gone on to win one election after the other" (2004, p.4). Likewise, Nuvunga describes the case of Mozambique as one that "meets the procedural requirements for inclusion in the category of democratic dominant-party systems" but explains Frelimo's dominance as in part derived from "manipulation of formal democratic rules in the exclusion of political opponents from electoral contestation and the resulting use of other political strategies that render the electoral playing field uneven" (2014, p.27). Nuvunga goes on to argue that his "conclusions significantly challenge the extent to which the situation in Mozambique can be regarded as a democratic dominant-party system" (op. cit. p. 174) and to categorise Mozambique as falling into the group of 'dominant authoritarian-party states' – but only after having described Mozambique as 'democratic dominant' throughout his analysis.

Thus, given the prevalence of the ambiguities I presented above, in establishing the conceptual framework for this thesis, I return to Sartori, who highlights that the term 'dominant party' has been "largely misused" (1976, p. 195), and taken to refer to "whatever major party outdistances the other parties in whichever type of party system" (op. cit., p.193). Sartori described 'predominance' as a term "which is less strong, semantically, than 'domination'" (1976, p. 195), using the former term to refer to the situation in which a party remains in power for at least three consecutive terms, with absolute majorities, and in free and fair elections. A predominant party is one that "manages to win over time, *an absolute majority of seats* (not necessarily of votes) in parliament" but in democratic contexts (ibid.). In other words, what authors such as Bogaards (2004), Carbone (2006), Doorenspleet & Nijzink (2013), De Jager & Du Toit (2013) and Greene (2013) call 'dominant-(democratic) parties' are classified by Sartori as 'predominant parties.' Rather than 'dominant-authoritarian

parties' he describes situations where a party wins through fraud and other extra-democratic mechanisms as 'party hegemony':

> "The hegemonic party neither allows for a formal nor a de facto competition for power. Other parties are permitted to exist, but as second class, licensed parties; for they are not permitted to compete with the hegemonic party in antagonistic terms and on an equal basis. Not only does alternation not occur in fact, it cannot occur, since the possibility of a rotation in power is not even envisaged. The implication is that the hegemonic party will remain in power whether it is liked or not. While the predominant party remains submissive to the conditions that make for a responsible government, no real sanction commits the hegemonic party to responsiveness. Whatever its policy, its domination cannot be challenged' (Sartori 1976., p.230).

Sartori also calls hegemonic parties 'fake predominant parties', which, according to him, operate in authoritarian contexts, or, in his terms, 'pseudo-democracies', defined as "regimes that tolerate opposition parties, which are legal, have many other constitutional elements of electoral democracy but fail to meet one of its essential requirements: a fair enough arena of contestation to allow the ruling party to be confronted and even withdrawn" (op. cit. p. 65)

In short, in Sartori's terms, which I follow, party hegemony occurs in authoritarian contexts. Hegemonic parties are authoritarian parties, though 'authoritarianism' itself is a term that refers to a political regime rather than a political party. In the next section, I return to the challenge of conceptualising authoritarianism, including its variants.

2.1.3 Hegemonic authoritarianism

Glasius (2018) points out that, despite the relative abundance of studies on authoritarianism, few make an effort to define it, with most simply following Linz (1975) and describing authoritarianism as a shortfall in democracy (cf. Nay, 2011). As noted in the Introduction, Glasius proposes a practice-based approach, defining practices as "patterned actions that are embedded in particular organised contexts" (2018, p.523) and authoritarian practices, such as secrecy, disinformation and disabling voice, as "patterns of action that sabotage accountability to people over whom a political actor exerts control, or their representatives" (*Ibid*., p.517). She distinguishes them from illiberal practices, "which refer to patterned and organised infringements of individual autonomy and dignity" and are thus a human rights

problem – unlike authoritarian practices, which he considers to represent a threat to democracy (ibid.).

Although I share Glasius' view on the importance of practices, in the conceptual framework for this thesis I have retained an element of the more limited conception of authoritarianism inspired by Linz (1975) as a shortfall in democracy, at least in the sense that Dahl (1971) conceives democracy as emphasising respect for a wide range of freedoms and rights, including participation in free and fair elections. This relates to my assumption, inspired by authoritarian institutionalism, that examining the quality of elections is key to understanding the regime itself (Hermet et al., 1978; Sartori, 1976; Schedler, 2009).

However, there are other forms of authoritarianism that do not have elections as a central feature. 'Classic' authoritarianism, or 'full-blown authoritarianism' (Levistky & Way, 2002; Bogaards & Elisher, 2016), generally does without elections, and does not open any space to contest central power (Tripp, 2004; Schedler, 2006; Boban, 2017; Hibrahim, 2019; Smith, 2021). It is the 'modern' variants – variously described as 'modern authoritarianisms' (Tapscott, 2021), 'modern autocracies' (Van de Walle, 2002; Hadenius & Teorell 2007; Boban, 2017) or 'modern dictatorships' (Diamond, 2015) that incorporate elections, at least de jure, with different levels of coercion and manipulation (Morse, 2012; Carothers & Press, 2020).

These variants are "characterised by a tension between authoritarian rule and democratic institutions" (Tapscott, 2021, p.17) and by "mixtures of democratic and authoritarian features" (Mirshak, 2019, p.707), with elections for the executive and legislature as part of the 'democratic elements' of an authoritarian regime (Morse, 2012). These are what Sartori (1976) calls 'pseudodemocracies', and other authors label 'nondemocracies' (Diamond, 1999), 'in-between regimes' (Van de Walle, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002), 'hybrid regimes' (Diamond, 2015; Lindberg, 2003), 'ambiguous regimes' (Schedler, 2003), 'semi-authoritarian regimes' (Mirshak, 2019; Ottaway, 2003) or 'semi-democratic regimes' (Mirshak, 2019).

However, when labels such as these are applied too broadly, they risk losing sight of the distinctive features of each regime, which is why, rather than simply categorising them, many authors emphasise the need for a better understanding of their dynamics and practices, in order to distinguish them from both democracies and classical authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002; Morse, 2012a; Ghandi & Lust-Okar, 2019).

This implies that it is not sufficient to clarify them as "regimes that practice authoritarianism behind the institutional façades of representative democracy" (Schedler, 2015, p.2), or to point out that they are characterised by a pattern "in which incumbents hold elections that do not live up to democratic standards of freedom and fairness and therefore facilitate repeated incumbent victory" (Morse 2012a, p. 162) or that they "allow regular elections, but manipulate the races to significant advantages – and usually ensure victory – for national leaders" (Tertytchnaya & Lankina, 2018, p.6).

According to Morse, the proliferation of these regimes means that we are now in the era of 'electoral authoritarianism' (Morse, 2012a). However, there is no agreement in the literature about whether electoral authoritarianism represents a single regime type or whether it also contains different variants. Some authors, while insisting on the need to distinguish between competitive and non-competitive electoral authoritarianism, also label the latter 'hegemonic electoral authoritarianism' (cf., Schedler, 2002; Levistky & Way, 2002; Morse, 2012; Donno, 2013; Bogaards & Elisher, 2016).

Based on the vote share, authors such as Levistky & Way (2002) and Roesler & Howard (2009) classify as 'competitive' regimes in which the incumbents renew their mandate with shares below 70% and as 'hegemonic' regimes where the share is higher. Other authors argue for the criterion of longevity, using the landmark of 20 consecutive years in power to determine whether a regime is considered competitive or hegemonic (cf. Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007). However, the proponents of narrower criteria such as longevity and vote share often highlight the importance of other elements, such as whether or not the opposition is banned from running and the magnitude of fraud (Levistky & Way, 2002; Morse, 2012).

Levitsky and Way write that, in competitive authoritarian regimes,

> "…elections are often bitterly fought. Although the electoral process may be characterised by large-scale abuses of state power, biased media coverage, (often violent) harassment of opposition candidates and activists, and an overall lack of transparency, elections are regularly held, competitive (in that major opposition parties and candidates usually participate), and generally free of massive fraud." (2002, p.55)

In the case of hegemonic authoritarian regimes, by contrast, uncertainty is eliminated since fraud is the norm, and opposition parties are physically precluded from competing or are

overly repressed. In the latter sense, hegemony can indicate the "regime capacity to dictate social choice or generate self-perpetuating large vote shares" (Morse, 2012a, p. 172).

Schedler distinguishes competitive electoral authoritarianism from hegemonic electoral authoritarianism according to the incumbents' chances of defeat, which is possible in the former and impossible in the latter because, in hegemonic contexts, the electoral arena is "little more than a theatrical setting for the self-representation and self-reproduction of power" (Schedler, 2002, p. 47). Hermet argues that hegemonic electoral authoritarianism provides nothing more than "elections without choice" which are "controlled or 'made' by authoritarian regimes and their leaders" (1978, p.1).

Frelimo qualifies as a hegemonic party in Manjacaze, in Gaza Province and in Mozambique as a whole, whether we take the defining criterion to be constantly exceeding a 70% vote share in elections or remaining in power for more than 20 years. Given that this vote share and longevity in power are supported by the use of fraud and other manipulation strategies, Mozambique also fits perfectly into the category of hegemonic authoritarian regimes. As noted in the Introduction, however, Manjacaze is also a site of resistance despite being located in the epicentre of asymmetric authoritarianism amidst a broader process of authoritarian reconversion in Mozambique. In the next section, I outline a theoretical framework for analysing the dynamics behind the construction and maintenance of Frelimo's hegemony in Manjacaze in this context characterised by both authoritarianism and resistance.

2.2 Resistance and negotiation in contexts of electoral authoritarianism

In order to develop an integrated framework[24] for analysing the case of Frelimo hegemony and resistance in Manjacaze, I chose to combine aspects of the literature on parties and authoritarianism discussed above with other conceptual strands from the study of contentious politics and theories of resistance, with particular reference to Scott (1985; 1990) and Hirshman (1970). My framework understands resistance to be omnipresent but also intrinsic to the processes of production and maintenance of hegemonies, situating the latter within a dialogical and mutually constitutive relationship (cf. Schubert, 2017, 2018).

I have also sought to situate this analysis specifically in relation to elections. As noted above, the role of elections is central to the debate on party domination and hegemony, as well to discussions of 'modern authoritarianisms'. Given my interest in resistance, my framework highlights elections as an arena not only for the production and maintenance of power in a context of party hegemony and authoritarianism, but also for contentious politics, which are sometimes barely visible, but whose visibility is intensified during election periods. In framing elections as privileged arenas for the different actors involved in this dialogical relationship to seek to influence one another, I apply the framework to identifying and distinguishing negotiation dynamics within the electoral context.

2.2.1 Contention, resistance, exit and voice

The literature on contentious politics, defined by Tilly as "interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interest, in which governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties" (2008, p.5), shows that protest dynamics are context-dependent (cf., for example, Tilly, 1986; McAdam et al., 1996, 2001; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). It is these contextual influences that lead McAdam et al. (1996) to refer to the 'political opportunity structure', defined by them as the degree of openness of a political system to contestation (1996), and by Nay as "the set of aspects of the political context that facilitate or limit political mobilisations" (2001, p. 542). McAdam et al. (1996) distinguish an open political structure, in which the political system is inclusive and tolerates protests, from a

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[24] An integrated or synthesis framework combines different theoretical approaches, which complement each other, allowing a more thorough study of phenomena that each one, individually, addresses in a limited way (cf. John, 1998; Brunton, Oliver & Thomas, 2019).

closed one, with exclusionary practices and where demonstrations are confronted and repressed. However, despite the increased risks in authoritarian contexts with closed political opportunity structures, these do not completely dissuade protests (Ong & Han, 2018; Carothers & Press, 2020).

In fact, as Foucault (1978) puts it, resistance is ubiquitous – which means that it is present even in contexts characterised by hegemonic authoritarianism. Foucault's famous phrase "where there is power, there is resistance" (op. cit., pp.95-96), which, conversely, is also stated as "where there is resistance, there is power" (Abu-Lughod, 1990, p. .42), indicates that power and resistance not only coexist but are also "dialogically constructed" (Schubert, 2018, p.6), endlessly redefining each other (Reddy, 2020). According to Hollander & Einwohner, resistance "involves oppositional action of some kind" (2004, p. 544), while Oosterom points out that "it can also be viewed as the rejection of power holders by people who do not have the means to oust them" (2014, p.40). In this thesis, I take as my starting point the definition by Scott, who argues that

> "Resistance includes any act (s) by member (s) of a subordinate class that is or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims (for example, rents, taxes, prestige) made on that class by superordinate classes (for example, work, land, large farmers, the state) or to advance its own claims" (Scott, 1985, p.290).

Based on Scott's definition, I conceptualise acts of resistance in the context of my field research site in Manjacaze as the refusal, sometimes explicit, of certain individuals or groups to comply with orders, rules and decisions from the party-state that is hegemonic in Mozambique, despite the risks involved, especially during election periods. Scott also points out that

> "The parameters of resistance are also set, in part, by the institutions of repression. To the extent that such institutions effectively control their work effectively, they may preclude any forms of resistance other than the individual, the informal, and the clandestine. Thus, it is perfectly legitimate – even important – to distinguish between various levels and forms of resistance: formal-informal, individual-collective, public-anonymous, those that challenge the system of domination-those that aim at marginal gains." (op. cit., p.299)

Scott understands that the context will require people to adjust their tactics (cf. De Certeau, 1984). This may involve being able, for example, to conform and comply in public and contest

in the background. This is the sense in which Scott refers to a 'false impression of compliance,' which Greenhouse (2005) describes as an exaggeration in the performance of subordination. Scott distinguishes "public transcripts" – when people adopt the role expected of them in public – from "hidden transcripts" – tactics that are not made publicly visible. He also underlines the need to pay attention to the vast arsenal of protest weapons contained in hidden transcripts, not least in order to understand better what is displayed in public.

Associated, above all, with the domain of hidden transcripts, Scott also elaborates on what he calls 'everyday resistance,' which is "about how people act in their everyday lives in ways that might undermine power… typically hidden or disguised, individual and not politically articulated" (Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013, p. 2). Practices of 'infrapolitics', another term which Scott uses interchangeably with 'everyday resistance,' include food-dragging, escape, sarcasm, passivity, laziness, misunderstandings, disloyalty, slander, avoidance or theft, the intent behind which is to "survive and undermine repressive domination; especially in contexts when rebellions are too risky" (Vinthagen & Johansson op. cit., p.4).

The subtlety of these acts derives from the fact that they "take place 'offstage', beyond direct observation by powerholders" (Scott, 1990, p.4). When there is direct contact, either the identity of the protester or the content of the message can remain implicit, thus ensuring that "the key characteristic of everyday resistance is the pervasive use of disguise" (Vinthagen and Johansson 2013, p.7). Scott highlights the importance of the ambiguity of the message: "instead of a clear message delivered by a disguised messenger, an ambiguous message is delivered by clearly identified messengers" (1989, p.54-55).

This ambiguity of everyday forms of resistance is also a feature of some of the 'voice' mechanisms identified by Hirshman (1970). He defines 'voice' as "any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs… through various actions and protests, including those that are meant to mobilise public opinion" (1970, p.30). Hirshman's category of 'exit', by contrast, is the expression of discontent through leaving an organisation, a practice of 'desertion' which is typical of the economic sphere, while 'voice,' is "a political action par excellence" and "can be graduated, all the way from faint rumbling to violent protest" (ibid., p.16). Thus, 'voice' mechanisms can be ambiguous, allowing power-holders to identify the messenger but not to decipher the message, or conversely to receive

an explicit message without identifying the messengers, ensuring that sometimes they are connected with hidden and everyday forms of resistance.

Hirshman deploys another concept, 'loyalty', to refer to the attachment to an organisation that can act as a barrier to exit since it "activates voice" and "helps redress the balance (between exit and voice) by raising the cost of exit" (ibid., pp.78-80). Loyalists can deploy a "threat to exit" (ibid., p.82), thus using their 'loyalty' as bargaining currency, but these are also situations where both the message and the messenger are explicit, which in a context such as that of Manjacaze, makes them much riskier.

In this thesis, I combine Scott's and Hirshman's approach to identify and analyse the most common forms of resistance in Manjacaze – everyday, hidden, and ambiguous voice mechanisms – which I distinguish from exit strategies that are more daring (being public and therefore riskier), as well as from more public voice mechanisms that are sometimes found, in particular in the electoral context. These are crucial elements of the dynamics that underlie the construction and maintenance of Frelimo hegemony in Manjacaze since they make it possible to discern a dialogical relationship in which – particularly in the electoral context – aspects of negotiation are visible in the midst of authoritarianism.

2.2.2 Negotiating between resistance and hegemony

Sartori suggests that the occurrence of voter control is *per se* an element that makes it easy to identify party hegemonies, since it involves information that is "both easy to obtain and easy to interpret" concerning "whether the vote is controlled or, at any rate, controllable" (1976, p.194). This thesis examines negotiation dynamics in a context of 'authoritarian reconversion' characterised by 'asymmetric authoritarianism' – one in which elections, however "exclusionary" or "without choice" (Hermet et al., 1978) are also fundamental for the survival of the incumbent (Geddes, 1999). Their importance stems from their potential to stabilise the regime (Lust-Okar, 2006; Boban, 2017) and help to legitimise it (Hermet et al., 1978; Karlins, 1986), as well as to "co-opt the opposition" (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009, p.405), making them more than "a theatrical setting for the self-representation and self-reproduction of power" (2002, p.47).

In approaching elections as arenas (cf. Levistky & Way, 2002), I examine their importance not only for Frelimo but also for voters, who use elections to oppose the incumbents' strategies for 'self reproduction of power' even under authoritarianism (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009), while negotiating with the incumbents the conditions for reproducing authoritarianism itself.

Taking into account the context of political control in Manjacaze, which imposes risks on citizens who seek to challenge this control, I define resistance as a refusal to comply with orders, rules and decisions from the Frelimo party-state. I also highlight the role of elections as moments of power not only for Frelimo (the incumbent), but also for the voters. On the incumbent's side, I analyse the manipulation strategies that enable the production of Frelimo supermajorities in Manjacaze, including voter and voting control. On the voters' side, I identify resistance tactics that include elements of both 'voice' and 'exit', with the former being more ambiguous – sometimes being more camouflaged while at other times it is more open – and the latter generally being more daring, challenging and risky.

It is in the interface between the voters' resistance tactics and the incumbent's manipulation strategies, an interface defined by their dialogical and mutually constitutive relationship, that elements of what I have called "the negotiation of authoritarianism" stand out. The main moments at which these elements become visible are elections, which I conceptualise as negotiation arenas.

"Negotiation is communication", according to Steinel (2020, p.5). Fisher, Ury, & Patton define negotiation as the "back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed" (2012, p.xxv). Quite often, 'negotiation' and 'bargaining' are used interchangeably in the literature. However, Lewicki et al. (2002) maintain that 'bargaining' refers to win-lose situations, whereas 'negotiation' is more complex, involving both win-lose and win-win situations. Steinel argues that bargaining, as a win-lose situation, is distributive because "a fixed amount of resources (e.g., money or time) is divided, so that one party's gains are the other party's losses" whereas negotiations "usually involve several issues" and may include interdependent parties who can "try to find mutually acceptable solutions and may even search for win-win solutions, that is, they cooperate to create a better deal for both parties"

(2020, p.2). I conceptualise negotiation in the broader sense, as encompassing both bargaining in win-lose situations and the search for win-win solutions.

The process of negotiation is inevitably shaped by its political context. This provides the negotiation arena, defined by Hagmann & Péclard as "the broader political space in which relations of power and authority are vested", extending beyond the 'negotiation table', defined as "a formalised setting where contending social groups decide upon key aspects of statehood over a given period of time" (2010, p.551). Levitsky & Way identify at least four arenas "through which opposition forces may periodically challenge, weaken, and occasionally even defeat autocratic incumbents", namely elections, the legislature, the judiciary, and the media, with elections representing "the first and most important arena of contestation" in authoritarian regimes (2002, p.54).

I argue that elections are privileged arenas not only of contestation but also of negotiation in authoritarian regimes. As I mentioned earlier, I conceptualise elections as moments of power for voters themselves, even when they are subject to intense political control, and located, as the citizens of Manjacaze are, in the epicentre of authoritarianism in Mozambique. In applying this framework, I examine what is being negotiated, how and with what impact, when Frelimo – the incumbent – and the voters of Manjacaze engage in this process of negotiation of authoritarianism. In doing so, I dialogue with Hagmann & Péclard (2010) and Sumich (2010) who refer to the ruling Frelimo party has an arena in which the state is negotiated. I connect Hagmann & Péclard´s idea of ´Frelimo as an arena´ to McGregor & Chatiza´s notion of ´partisan citizenship´ in Zimbabwe, Vokes & Wilkins´s ideas of ´embeddedness' of regime strategies in Uganda, Schubert´s concept of ´working the system´ and ´culture of immediatism´ in Angola, which I referred to in section 2.1.1. I return to this reflection in Chapter 9, where I also evoke and draw parallels with broader literature on party states and authoritarianism in Africa and in the world (cf. Bermeo 2016; Glasius 2018; Lührmann & Lindberg 2019; Cassani & Tomini 2019; Hyde 2020; Haggard & Kaufman 2021; Gaventa 2022), which I also refer to, especially in chapter 1.

However, my analysis of the dialogical relationship between hegemony and resistance in Manjacaze is informed by the literature on protests in authoritarian contexts, which emphasises 'drivers', 'triggers', 'forms', 'means', 'responses' and 'impacts' (Ong & Han, 2019;

Carothers & Press, 2020). The 'drivers' (Ong & Han, 2019) or 'triggers' (Carothers & Press, 2020) of protests are also defined by Hagmann & Péclard, in their work on 'negotiating statehood', as 'objects of negotiation' (2010). Carothers & Press (2020) identify four categories of 'objects of negotiation': political, governance, economic and societal. Political objects have to do with the limitations placed on political pluralism, including asphyxiation or suppression of the opposition, attempts to change term limits and dissolution of parliament, with the most common being associated with elections: namely fraud and delays in counting votes. Governance objects stem from deficiencies in the provision of different public services, such as health, education, energy, water, or transport, but can also include issues of corruption, police brutality, and extrajudicial killings of dissidents. Economic objects include inflation, weak growth, labour disputes and low wages, while societal objects "include religious issues, minority and women's rights, ethnonationalism, and restrictions on freedom of expression" (Carothers & Press, 2020, p.18).

Carothers & Press emphasise that protests are spontaneous, leaderless, short-lived or intermittent, and that authoritarian regimes' responses can include repression, making minimal concessions or offering sacrificial scapegoats (2020). Smyth points out that even when the concessions secured are minimal, by engaging in negotiations and resistance citizens can "constrain the regime by forcing it to develop strategies and making choices that reveal information" (2021, p.26). In this thesis I argue that in 'modern authoritarian' settings it is not only protests but also elections that are key arenas for this process, which centres on a dialectical relationship between hegemony and resistance characterised by negotiations that form an integral part of the construction and maintenance of both hegemonies and authoritarianisms.

Research on protests and elections uses a range of methods, including media-based event tracking and large-scale surveys, that would clearly not be feasible or appropriate in a setting such as Manjacaze. Such methods would also not be a good fit for my conceptual framework, given its emphasis on the importance of hidden as well as public transcripts (Scott 1985; 1990) and on ambiguous forms of voice as well as clearly visible forms of exit (Hirshman 1970) in characterising the tactics that are used by citizens when negotiating authoritarianism. In seeking to understand how these negotiations take place, a more ethnographic approach is clearly required. In the next chapter, I discuss how I applied this approach and the issues of

ethics and positionality that emerged from the process of conducting ethnographic research into the construction, maintenance, and contestation of Frelimo's hegemony in Manjacaze.

Chapter 3. 'The comrade, friend and student': Methodology, positionality, and ethics

This chapter explains the research methods, starting with the relevance of conducting an ethnographic study and then the research phases, followed by a reflection on positionality and ethics, expressed in the triad 'comrade, friend and student ' in the title. The last two parts present the data collection techniques and the data analysis process.

3.1 Why Ethnographic Research?

The methodology by which this thesis has been built is affected by its investigation of authoritarianism in an authoritarian field, with a particular focus on the authoritarian party itself. Glasius *et al.* (2018, p.6), suggest that an authoritarian field means that '… there is some arbitrariness to their governance, resulting in various forms of insecurity for those who reside in or enter such territories.' The challenges range from the researcher's and research participants' personal insecurity to various difficulties in gathering the necessary information (ibid.).

In section 1.1, I referred to the fact that authors such as Nylen (2018, p.270) describe Mozambique as 'unpropitious soil' for critical research, as independent research is perceived as markedly oppositional. There, I addressed the risks derived from the political control exercised by the Frelimo Party-State, aggravated by the fact that I was investigating political issues precisely in the heart of Frelimo itself, the authoritarian party. Manjacaze, being Frelimo heartland, presents mechanisms of political control that are even more intense, so, for example, I had to have 'links in the party' and to obtain official authorisation from the same party to carry out the research, not to mention the usual constraints faced by any other researcher in the country, including the need to obtain accreditation from government institutions, sometimes the central government, but also at all other levels (provincial, district, administrative post, locality and village and/or hamlet), merely to hold conversations or interviews with ordinary citizens. Moreover, given that I am a researcher at the Institute for Social and Economic Studies (IESE), a research institution not linked to the State and therefore detached from Frelimo, the difficulties would even be more acute. Regarding the information collected, however, especially using questionnaire surveys, widely used in political science, I also referred to the challenges with its quality since respondents tend to

give politically correct answers because of fear. For this reason, as I also explained, according to Brito (2005, 2016), these techniques hardly produce valid information.

It was also my intention to go beyond capturing the opinions of my interlocutors on the central issues of my research, striving instead to understand their substrate. Such an undertaking implied going behind the scenes, capturing, among other things, what Scott (1990) calls the 'hidden transcripts': the words and actions behind the public interactions between citizen and state (public transcripts). Therefore, ethnographic techniques proved to be more appropriate for this study since, according to Buscatto (2018, p.4), they

> "…provide a privileged access to 'invisible' or difficult to access social phenomena … [and give] access to people's practices, and not [just] to their oral justifications or representations …, that is, to all those 'natural', hidden taboos or difficult to express practices which people have difficulty in describing (or would not like to describe even if they were aware of them)."

In the sections that follow, I elaborate further on how I carried out this ethnographic work, including how I overcame the different obstacles that arose. This begins with the presentation of the different phases of the research.

3.2 Research phases

To what extent did I get involved in the field? What strategies did I adopt and why? What are the implications? These are common questions in ethnographic studies. 'Going native' is an expression used to signify excessive involvement in the field site, which could potentially lead to a loss of objectivity (O'Reilly, 2012). Its meaning is similar to 'over rapport' (Hammerslay & Atkinson, 1995) or 'gone too far' (Roben & Sluka, 2007), both of which suggest that, due to the depth of immersion, the researcher seems undistinguishable from the people and/or the object of his study (Ibid.).

I spent sixteen months in Manjacaze.[25] I divided this period into three main phases: the first of five months, from May to September 2018; the second and longest, lasted seven months,

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[25] Initially, I planned to carry out fieldwork over just eight months, between October 2017 and November 2018, but, for different reasons, including the lack of financial means, I was obliged to postpone it several times, and when I overcame it, once in the field, given the need for greater immersion, I extended it, doubling the period.

from November 2018 to May 2019; the third and last, four months from August to November 2019. After the first phase, I was in Manjacaze for a week (6-12 October 2018), to follow the last days of the campaign and voting in the fourth municipal elections, taking the opportunity to make the contacts I needed for the second phase. During this time, I made my further observations of the different political control strategies I had researched during the first phase. In the second phase, I tried to understand the functioning of the bureaucracies and their connection with the citizens and vice versa, in addition to continuing to observe the electoral registration process, which I had started in the first phase. The third phase coincided with the election campaign, as well as the voting process for the 2019 Presidential, Legislative and Provincial elections. This latter material proved to be crucial for the thesis and is at the heart of all five empirical chapters.

I chose to disaggregate the fieldwork period into those three moments, stepping in and out, to create a balance between immersion and distance, the former to build trust with my interviewees and the latter to maintain objectivity, as ethnographers recommend (cf. Malinowski 1922; Powdermarker, 1966). On this, Malinowski (1922, p.6-7) wrote:

> "Proper conditions for ethnographic work… consist mainly in … remaining in as close contact with the natives as possible, which really can only be achieved by camping right in their villages ... [However,] it is very nice to have... a refuge. But it must be far enough away not to become a permanent milieu in which you live and from which you emerge at fixed hours only to "do the village." It should not even be close enough to fly to at any moment for recreation…"

Here, Malinowski highlights the importance of 'being there' with the people and communities being studied, moving away from one's own environment and usual company and settling amid those being studied. Meanwhile 'a refuge' is fundamental for one to 'observe with complete detachment' and, along with "... physical proximity of the fieldworker to the people studied," is key to ensure 'successful fieldwork' (Powdermarker, cited in Robben & Sluka, 2007 p. 12). Finding the equilibrium between maintaining proximity, as I call it below, and distance, was a source of permanent tension during all my fieldwork.

3.2.1 Entering and navigating the field: proximity

For entering the field, I relied on a network of acquaintances from previous projects and research. They were chiefs, secretaries, and leaders, but there were also other citizens from different communities of Manjacaze. I was first there in 2010, when I worked as a consultant to evaluate local governance issues in that district. After that, I was in Manjacaze during four other projects and consultancies. In 2015, during an IESE project on electoral abstention, I expanded and consolidated my network of contacts, which proved to be crucial for the fieldwork. As a result, when I started my fieldwork, I was already relatively well-known in the district.

The time I spent in the field, or simply being there, brought me closer to my interlocutors, not just physically but also in terms of trust. This trust, for example, was reinforced by the frequency they saw and interacted with me over time, normalising my presence, becoming less uncomfortable, and creating more spaces for dialogue, with increasing openness. Being in the villages made it flexible to schedule meetings, especially with the leaders, who are typically less available during normal business hours (7:30 am to 3:30 pm). Some of the chiefs lived alone and with few means to entertain themselves, so the conversations, sometimes about trivial things, were alternatives for spending time and venting, so they usually ended too late in the evenings. For some leaders, I became a confidant and was given access to details about their lives and activities. Over time, they started inviting me more often for the conversations, for, as some said, 'telling you the news of the day,' particularly during the last phase when greater trust had been established.

Above all, the ethnographic approach required that I be patient. This sometimes meant acting disinterested without insisting, pressuring, or asking for anything until being invited, especially when difficulties related to political control were more prevalent. In one of the administrative posts where I did my fieldwork, after about two months without conducting a single interview, apart from the first with the chief of the Post, the chief commented: 'time flies! It has been two months since you arrived. I see no progress in your work!'[26] In his area, I was still observing, but I was conducting interviews and conversations in other areas. He had

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[26] Américo Jossias, Administrave Post Chief, conversation, 1 November 2018.

not been aware of this since he had only seen me playing football and not doing much else of any importance in his community. In-depth interviews with him and other local elites began much later, many suggested by the chief himself, who at first believed I had no interest in local political issues.

In addition to leaders, my network of contacts included my former field assistants. Through them, their acquaintances, and relatives, I reached others. These introductions facilitated our communication and consolidated relationships. But it was not straightforward. For each interlocutor, I tended to highlight one part of my identity, depending on the context. For instance, I might emphasise my proximity to the leadership, from which I would be perceived as a 'comrade,' hence a Frelimo member. I would also try to appear useful to each of my interlocutors. Depending on the location, I would highlight one of my ethnic identities: Changana or Chope. When I was in a Chope area, I pointed out that I also had Chope roots, and made sure to mention my connections with the neighbouring district of Zavala, where my mother comes from. In Changana areas, I also introduced myself as a local, a strategy that was helped by a happy coincidence: my surname - Chaimite - is also the name of a historic place in the district of Chibuto, close to Manjacaze (cf. section 1.3). My relative mastery of both languages spoken in those communities - Ci-Shangana and Ci-Chopi - also facilitated my approach. In each case, though, I was also a student, who, as some elderly people said, had returned home to learn about my land. An elderly man from Chibonzane observed: '… he is Chaimite. Yes, that Chaimite from Chibuto here next door. Now he comes from America[27], where he is studying. He returned here to *marrumbine* [his origins] to seek knowledge from us the *madodas* [elders], to finish his studies. Let us help our son!' But being perceived as a local, whether Changana or Chope, was not enough. For many of my interlocutors, I also needed to be seen as a 'comrade' or, in other words, a Frelimo member. I invested in this image, starting with the leadership. I found that if the leaders were convinced of my 'comradeship,' other members of Manjacaze communities would follow, reducing their control over my activities.

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[27] The reference to America had to do with the link they stablished between my research and the figure of Eduardo Mondlane, a national hero, native of Manjacaze, who studied in the United States of America (cf. section 3.3)

However, election periods posed the greatest challenges, not only because they are typically accompanied by a strengthening of the mechanisms of political and social control (see Chapter 5), but also because visits by Provincial or 'Maputo' delegates were more frequent and I feared that my connection to IESE would be noticed, posing a threat not only to my research but also to my safety. These are the times when local leaders feel it essential to prove their loyalty and usefulness to the party, which includes making sure the people they are seen with are also known loyalists. In some cases, to dispel any doubts, visitors must be dressed like them - as Party members, with Frelimo T-shirts, caps, and scarves, which I had to do twice (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Me with Frelimo Scarf around my neck   **Figure 4:** My car with Frelimo campaign couplets

I made efforts to make myself useful in the communities I was studying. I became a historian to some, a driver, and a translator to others. I translated, for example, the dialogue between a South African investor and a team from the local Government that was going to inspect the activities of a factory, at the request of the head of the locality. In his words: 'we cannot suffer while having an English student here.'[28] Meanwhile 'historian' was a nickname I earned at the beginning of my fieldwork due to my constant questions about local names, the dynamics of colonial and civil war and other episodes in the country's history. Some elders even asked me

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[28] Dalton Chemo, Locality Chief, Manjacaze, 17 September 2019.

to help compile and write fragments of local history, to share them with the youth. It is a debt I still owe them.

The role of driver was mainly to serve the leaders, although, I also drove for others in the community. I called these 'investigative rides,' because I would often question my passengers about local life. This activity proved fruitful with state and Party leaders. During the election campaign, for example, my vehicle was often commandeered as a 'protocol vehicle' (Figure 4). The challenge was to deal with different requests at the same time as each one was an invaluable opportunity to capture the political information I needed.

3.2.2 Leaving the field: distance

I distanced myself to maintain objectivity in the analysis, for security reasons, and sometimes as a strategy to get away from leaders who wanted to monitor my activities. I assumed that the greater the access to information, mostly concentrated in urban areas, the greater the chances were of someone stumbling upon information about my connection with IESE. I made sure I was absent from all the sites where President Nyusi's visits took place: first, in June 2018, then, during the election campaign, in October 2019. I did the same, again in October 2019, when the then Minister of Education and Development, Conceita Surtane, visited Dengoine, and shortly before, in September of the same year, during the visit of the then Governor of the Province of Gaza, Stela Pinto Novo Zeca. Except for President Nyusi's first visit in 2018, for every other occasion, I received invitations from local officials, sometimes asking for my assistance in the preparations.

I also absented myself from research sites from time to time. In one of the administrative posts, for example, where the local chief blocked my communication with other bureaucrats despite formally authorising it shortly beforehand. I would keep my distance from Mondays to early afternoons on Fridays, when they were at their posts, and resume contact from Friday afternoons to Sundays. In that short window, when the chief had left his administrative post, I was able to talk with his subordinates. They were intimidated by his presence. Sometimes all the bureaucrats left the post on weekends, and we talked at their homes instead. As one bureaucrat put it when we started the conversation at his house outside the district of Manjacaze:

'It was good that you suggested interviewing me at home. If the chief sees us talking there [at the administrative post], he will want to know why I am disobeying, and you know how it is here in Gaza! [Referring to punishment] …. He told us not to speak, but I understand your work. I was a student myself.'[29]

I later had other conversations with him, some of which took place in the office. He made a point of informing me when the chief would not be there, emphasising that we could have our conversation during his absence, in the Administrative Post building itself. It became clear to me that, despite public officials in Manjacaze being members of the control structure (see Chapter 5), they were also controlled, and were not as completely attached to the party they publicly defended as at first appeared.

3.3 Positionality and ethics

My study was only possible because I managed to carry it out from 'within Frelimo,' as a "…comrade, friend and student," as one Frelimo First Secretary described me in 2019, during the election campaign. It was in the context of one conversation with him that he asked me to make comments and suggestions on Frelimo mobilisation strategy in his locality. He knew I valued my neutrality, and I repeated my wish during the conversation, avoiding making the suggestions he asked me for. So, reacting, he said, "Chaimite, don't forget! You are here as a comrade, student, and friend."[30]

As I highlighted earlier, and I return in more detail in chapter 5, to be a 'comrade' in Mozambique means, among other things, to be a Frelimo member. While I am not a party member, that I was perceived as a comrade gave me privileged access to different forums, documents, and key people for the research. Some leaders, like the one mentioned above, allowed me to follow them on their missions, and on some occasions, I was the only person authorised to film, record, or take notes at the events. According to them, my notes, images, and audio recordings would also be useful archive material for the institutions where they worked, although nobody asked me for them later.

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[29] Julião Cossa, Administrative Technician, Interview, Manjacaze, 13 April 2019.
[30] Obadias Guilende, Frelimo First Secretary, Conversation, Manjacaze, 24 September 2019.

I was also considered a friend by that leader and other Frelimo and State leaders at different levels, as well as by traditional and community leaders and other people with whom, on various occasions and in various situations, I interacted during the sixteen months of my fieldwork. When one of my interlocutors hesitated to provide me with data or information I requested, one teacher once reminded me, "… just call your friend, the [Administrative] Post head, this will all be sorted out," [31] and I often did so, with success.

However, as in the case referenced above, I always made clear that I was a student, who intended to learn from them about local life, highlighting, first, history and culture, and later, economics and politics. For many, especially the elderly, I was a 'son', who had come 'home,' although I am not from Manjacaze and have never lived in that district. How then was I a son and from 'there'? My interlocutors clarified that they were 'helping' me, sometimes also referring to Eduardo Mondlane,[32] who, after leaving Manjacaze to study in the USA, returned home, according to them, to reciprocate, joining Frelimo and fighting for the country's independence.

They also expected me to reciprocate, even if not immediately. I was asked to organise material on local history. Others hoped that someday I could mobilise support for the construction or rehabilitation of their schools, health centres and water sources, among other things. They told me of people who had done that: Manuel Mondlane, a native who went to study in Spain, obtained funds for the expansion of the then Chiguivitane Primary School (later becoming a Secondary School) and built the Cambane health center, both in Chibonzane. Also in Chibonzane, Pedro Bule, a politician and businessman, also a native, had obtained Indian funding for constructing a primary school in the village of Macedzene. Both are presented as good children who have not forgotten their origins, and the same is expected of others. As for me, one of my interlocutors was explicit: "For me, you are like Eduardo Mondlane. It was like that [like you]. It may not be today. Those who live will see your results. The Americans, the Swiss… came anyway [like you] … Our children may one day benefit from your work."[33]

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[31] Jacinto Chiziane, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 December 2018.

[32] Eduardo Mondlane is a national hero, the founder of Frelimo, and its leader during the early years of the liberation, until his death in 1968. He was from Manjacaze (see chapter 4).

[33] Bravo Job, Interview, Manjacaze, 2 November 2019.

Some interlocutors saw me as an intermediary who could convey their messages to those in more powerful positions – the higher authorities – as they termed them. Thus, the speaker quoted above asked me to "… register the concerns well and take them forward so that people can know how we live here."[34]

I was perplexed, as I had no way to respond. I repeatedly, during or at the end of conversations, made it clear that my contribution would be academic and, with the publication of my thesis, or parts of it, eventually, more would be known about the life of the different communities that I studied, including some of their concerns. On the issue of the booklet on local history, for example, I would point out that, in the thesis, there would be a section in which I would present the research sites in detail, and that once the thesis was concluded, I would also share it in Manjacaze, making the information available, and then, perhaps, they could use it. Despite feeling unsatisfactory, this explanation, repeated even to interlocutors with whom I had already talked and explained the objectives of my research, never dampened the enthusiasm with which they wanted to help me. Many intended to do it as 'friends', and, as such, they even stressed their willingness to be identified in the thesis. Of course, I cannot identify them, even if that would add relevance and significance to certain passages of the thesis because, given the context of strict political control, they could be punished, including by isolation or dismissal (see chapter 5).

One last aspect to be highlighted here: despite the privileges I present above, I met obstacles. For example, in one of the Administrative Posts, although I spoke regularly to the chief, who authorised me to undertake the research in his territory, later he instructed his employees that they should not give me access to any material, nor make themselves available for interviews. Nonetheless, I always found someone willing to provide me with data and participate in my conversations and interviews, even though, if discovered, he/she risked being punished, as happens to those perceived as being from the opposition (see Chapter 5). Given this situation and my desire to be quite clear about the circumstances in which I collected the data, in the last phase of the fieldwork, at the end of the conversations and interviews, I asked a direct question: 'for you, who am I? Where do I come from?' For some I was a comrade, friend, and student, as I explained above, but for some I was a spy. An elderly

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[34] Basilio Manhenje, Intervention in an FGD with elders, Manjacaze, 27 June 2018.

person I spoke to responded to my questions as follows: 'they talk about you, even those who laugh with you, eat with you… they don't tell you, but they say you're a spy. They say you are a spy because they do not know where you come from… For me, you are like Eduardo Mondlane…'[35] This, like comrade, friend, and student, was not an isolated perception, although it was not always very explicit, and I am aware of its impact on the quality and quantity of the material I collected during my fieldwork.

3.3 Data Collection

In section 3.2, on the research phases, I explained how I accessed the field, starting from my network of contacts that included chiefs and former research assistants, from whom I knew and integrated others they indicated and so on. This is a snowball sampling, also known as chain referral, a nonprobability sampling technique in which the researcher identifies and '… uses a small pool of initial informants to nominate other participants who meet the eligibility criteria for a study' (Given, 2012, p.2). It is an appropriate technique for accessing hard-to-reach populations (Tenzek, 2018; Chromy, 2011), as in my research, and for exploring more about a topic, before finally defining it (Given, 2012). I opted for this approach to limit the impact of political and social control on my work: familiarising leaders with the research topics from the beginning encouraged them to relax surveillance and order other actors to do the same.

Living, observing, and engaging in the villages, I could choose interlocutors for the most in-depth conversations. I had countless informal conversations, and in the last stages of the fieldwork, I conducted 104 semi-structured interviews. While carrying out informal or semi-structured conversations, I also made observations. The electoral campaign and voting process guided me in setting priorities.

Participant observation was my primary ethnographic technique (O'Reilly, 2012). It consists of '... a single researcher spending an extended period ... living among the people he or she is studying, participating in their daily lives in order to gain as complete an understanding as possible of the cultural meanings and social structures of the group and how these are interrelated' (Davies, 1999, p.67). In my case, I observed the daily life of bureaucrats, party

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[35] Bravo Job, Interview, Manjacaze, 02 November 2019.

leaders and community members, in their homes, in their domestic and leisure activities, and at work. I followed the work of administrative secretariats in posts and localities, meetings of committees of zones, circles and cells, and other more private meetings, as was the case of some ceremonies for purification of spirits. Of public events I gave emphasis to rallies and election campaign events.

Although I was observing continuously, there was a period during the election campaign when which I used it almost exclusively, most of all on voting day. During the campaign and voting period, where normally there is a great deal of tension and suspicion, I avoided conducting interviews, except with the people closest to me. I observed unofficially, but 'from inside;' an approach that proved better than taking on an 'official observer' role as I had done on other occasions.[36] I later followed up with interviews with key actors.

In informal conversations, I collected life stories from individual and focus group participants. By starting with histories, I avoided a focus on current political issues, which helped ease the tension and, relax the control of the more suspicious. The stories were still political (Abbott, 1991), and I found in them answers to my questions about current political processes. I started with focus groups in which I heard stories about each of the villages where I conducted the research. In individual conversations I heard life stories. Each life story contained details of local history, which I connected with the stories from the groups and other individuals. They formed narratives on different themes, which were useful in refining my focus on the strategies of political and social control (Chapter 5), and on electoral issues, and negotiation (Chapters 4, 6, 7 and 8).

There were at least three individual conversations with each interlocutor, with different approaches and sequences of questions. For some, I could start by asking about their personal life trajectories, such as where they were born, studied, lived, worked, etc., and then move on to the most thematic issues (political participation, party affiliation, political control, resistance, and so on). With others, I did the reverse, asking more direct questions, such as,

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[36] I had observed elections in Manjacaze in 2014 and had encountered a situation of fraud led by an observer from a local civil society organisation. This impelled me to want to understand more about electoral observation in that district and contributed to my interest in understanding the workings of electoral fraud strategies.

'With whom did you coordinate the electoral fraud?' The latter was only with people who were already very close and whose roles in certain areas I already knew.

After repeated informal conversations and extensive participant observation, I conducted 104 semi-structured interviews, most of which were carried out shortly after the 2019 Presidential, Legislative and Provincial elections. A standard set of questions included information about the interviewee's life, and detail about their experiences in three moments in the country's history, namely, the colonial, and the First and Second Republics. For each of these periods, and for each interviewee, I selected and highlighted specific topics, such as the issue of participation in the colonial struggle for the elderly; for the elderly and younger adults, the issue of civil war, establishment and functioning of communal villages; and for all, including young people, party participation and guidance, and their role in the Party and in elections, including in the processes and mechanisms of fraud control. Guided by the questions, these interviews also became informal conversations, with a broad focus on history and politics, shaped by the recognized domain of each interviewee.

The main interlocutors for the semi-structured interviews were the chiefs, secretaries and leaders, gatekeepers, civil servants, including teachers, but also technicians and employees of the Electoral Management Bodies (EMB, or, in Portuguese, OGE), Polling Station Members (PSM, or, in Portuguese, MMM), and other citizens who stood out in different activities and events that I observed and participated in. With the leaders, I queried the information they had provided me with during my stay in the field and what I had observed and been told by other interlocutors. With others, I tried to understand their roles and actions in the political, social, and electoral control structure, in the mobilization of Frelimo, in electoral fraud, and in resistance.

3.5 Data analysis

The analysis was a continuous and iterative process, starting before my fieldwork, with secondary sources, proceeding during the fieldwork with the help of a field journal and continuing after the fieldwork was complete. I transcribed interviews and notes every day when I was able and when there was electricity. I also made notes in my field journals about what I saw, heard, and experienced, including the nature and purpose of each event (public

or private meetings, visits...), the places where they were held, the list of participants, how they were organised, spoke, and their linguistic and facial expressions, among others. In reflective notes, I wrote about my speculations, feelings, difficulties, ideas, hunches, impressions, prejudices, analyses, plans future investigations, clarifications, syntheses, connections, and other ideas.

I highlight the notes because they formed the basis for my entire analysis and reflection process. Transcribing produced reflections, and highlighted gaps and contradictions, complementarities, and differences. As the data and information accumulated, I began to identify trends and categorise them according to themes. With the material from the first two months, I refined the research objective and reformulated the questions to focus on hegemonic and counter-hegemonic strategies. From each type of strategy, I located specific mechanisms which helped define each of the empirical chapters of the thesis.

I also had audio recordings of almost all the interviews and a few conversations and meetings.[37] I began the transcription process by determining their relevance for each chapter and the thesis in general.[38] Most transcripts were translated from Changana and Chopi, the two predominant languages spoken at my research sites, but some were done directly in Portuguese. After the transcriptions, I took some time to fictionalise and anonymise the names of the participants.

For the writing, one chapter at a time, I went back to the notes, but also to the transcripts and then to the literature. From the notes I selected the central aspects to be highlighted. From the transcripts, I sought complete citations, especially when those in the notes were relatively inaccurate. From the literature, I sought to confront the findings, identifying similarities, differences, and complementarities. The first drafts were more empirical and descriptive. Only after a thorough literature review did I review each chapter and its arguments, connecting them better to the central arguments of the thesis and positioning it in the literature.

In short, in this chapter, I presented and justified my methodological choices, including my positionality and ethics. I have shown how they were shaped by the fact of Mozambique in

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[37] Those for which I had received permission.
[38] Some were made by a team of assistants that I hired specifically for this job.

general and Manjacaze in particular be authoritarian fields, i.e., fields with "…some arbitrariness to their governance, resulting in various forms of insecurity for those who reside in or enter such territories' (Glasius *et al.*, 2018, p.6). My approach and the field in which I and my interlocutors were co-existing have also shaped what I learned. And indeed, the authoritarian field from which it was born will go on to influence how the thesis is understood.

PART II

SOURCES OF FRELIMO HEGEMONY

Chapter 4: 'I will praise God and Frelimo forever:'[39] understanding party support in Manjacaze

I took the title of this chapter – I will praise God and Frelimo forever – from writings on the front wall of the house of a couple of former liberation war fighters living in Cambane village, about 25 km from Manjacaze headquarters (figure 5). Based on reports from this couple and many other interlocutors in the district, including young people, adults and seniors of both sexes, and local leaders, in this chapter I reflect on party support in Manjacaze. I examine party support, both by identification and by what I call default. The latter applies to a situation in which party support is not necessarily the result of enduring attachment, i.e., "an effective bond or sense of loyalty" towards a political party (Greens & Baltes, 2017, p.3), as party identification is generally defined (cf., for example, Campbell et al., 1960; Down, 1957; Key, 1967; Fiorina, 1981; Miller et al., 1996). It is the opposite: by detachment, that is, by opposition to a certain party, an individual or group channels his/their support to the opponent, therefore, by default. In the literature, however, the default situation I evoke here is considered part of party identification, built in childhood, through socialisation, where norms and practices are learned and transmitted, composed of frames based on which people perceive and position themselves concerning political institutions in each context (Sapiro, 2004; Mclntosh & Youniss, 2010). As Denver (1994, p.31) puts it, during socialisation, individuals learn who are the "goodies and baddies" in their context, which is fundamental to their political orientation. I argue that although Frelimo enjoys both types of support, both rooted in early socialisation, we need to distinguish one from another. I begin by addressing the sources of party identification in the first section, and then, in the second, I analyse support by default. In both cases, I highlight the importance of the 'legacy of wars,' including in the socialisation process, which I address in more detail in the third section. Then, still in the third section, I reflect on the structuring role of such a legacy in the local political field.

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[39] Translated from the Portuguese, '*Deus e Frelimo Louvarei para sempre.*'

Figure 5: Mr Francisco's house with the writings giving title to the chapter.

4.1 'Frelimo is God': support by identification

I begin with Mr Francisco Mondlane's account, the former liberation war fighter and the house's co-owner I mention in the introduction of this chapter. He explains that although he and his wife are former liberation war fighters, neither took up arms: "we fought in the political realm,"[40] he explains. In such a realm, he clarifies, "*ahilwa hi ma rithu*" ('we fought with words'[41]), implying that they worked as informants and mobilisers. "We were informants; our task was to tell Frelimo about the positions of the Portuguese troops: where they went, how they were, and whom they talked to, in addition to helping to recruit people. We [also] raised money to help Frelimo. We collected it in churches and gave it to people travelling to South Africa. These people knew how to deliver that money [to Frelimo] …"[42]

Grandpa Mondlane, as my interlocutor is also known, is a bishop at the Zionist church. This also helped him to perform his mobilisation duties given that, as he explains, churches were part of Frelimo main mobilisation sites. However, his decision to become involved in the colonial war, and consequently, to ally with Frelimo, was not straightforward. It happened just after the PIDE (International Police for the Defence of the Portuguese State; the Portuguese secret police) arrested him and six of his friends. They were accused of working with Eduardo Mondlane, by then FRELIMO President, since, during the preparation for the war, Mondlane had recruited some young people from Cambane. Here is his detailed account:

> "Even before the [liberation] war, Eduardo Mondlane came here [to Cambane], looked for those of us who were also from the Mondlane family and said he wanted to start a war. Early on, he recruited Romão, who was the son of the *Régulo* (main traditional leader at the time).[43] Romão was the first person Mondlane took from here and his father knew everything. That was when confusion started with the Portuguese … [because] someone here informed 'The Whites' [Portuguese settlers]. So, the Portuguese started paying attention here … After Mondlane's death, the Portuguese came and wanted to know if it was true that Mondlane had died. They said that we [from Cambane] knew because Mondlane had local connections, since Romão had left the village with him…. We were taken by PIDE. We were forced to confess, but we knew nothing. We were unaware of Mondlane's death for two years, but for them, we were not telling the truth. They hit us with *chamboco* [a torture baton] … then they

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[40] Francisco Mondlane, Interview, Manjacaze, 8 February 2019.
[41] Translated from Ci-Changana, one of the most widely spoken languages in Mozambique – the second after Macua (INE, 1997).
[42] Francisco Mondlane, Interview, Manjacaze, 8 February 2019.
[43] The *régulo* were known for their alliance to the Portuguese settlers, so his son's connection with Frelimo was considered a huge betrayal by the Portuguese settlers.

kept us in Machava jail for two years.[44] What they wanted to know was whether Mondlane had really died ... after two years in jail, they released us. I came back home, but the war continued... I went back to *Machamba* [field crops], but I thought about the suffering I went through in jail because of Frelimo and decided to join up: what really made me a fighter was the beating I received because of Frelimo."[45]

However, if, on the one hand, the arrest triggered Grandpa Mondlane's adherence to Frelimo, on the other hand, as he explains, during his arrest, as well as with the intensification of the war and the spread of information about it, he became more aware of Frelimo motivations to fight, to the point that it sparked his interest in engaging in the war. In fact, adds Grandpa Mondlane, "I already envisioned a country without the settler, without the control of the PIDE, without *Chibalo* [forced labour] ...," and therefore, under the leadership of Frelimo. It is in the following quotation that he addresses his devotion to Frelimo, also expressed in the writings that give this chapter its title:

> "FRELIMO liberated the country forever. It freed us from the coloniser. We were dead [with the coloniser]. Frelimo gave us weapons and freed us. So FRELIMO is God ... I suffered at the hands of Portuguese colonisers. I was put in jail; me and my friends... They [my friends] all died, and I was left alone. Frelimo gave me life and allowed me to live until today. I am not the only person FRELIMO gave life to, but all Mozambicans... FRELIMO is like our God. It is not even like a God; it is [itself a] God and gives life; that is why I wrote, "I will praise God and Frelimo forever."[46]

Grandpa Mondlane had placed a Bible and Frelimo documents on the table. As he spoke, he opened those documents, showing some passages about the history of Frelimo, clearly illustrating his mastery over them, and reinforcing his arguments. He stressed that Mozambicans owe loyalty and gratitude to Frelimo as it liberated the country, and because of it, Frelimo should be praised in the same way as God, just as he does. He went on, explaining that the writings were also to dispel any doubts about his party preferences and to show his selfless surrender to Frelimo. He underlined that he would give his life for Frelimo since Frelimo gave him his life: "These Matsangas[47] must know that this is Frelimo's house... To know immediately that I support Frelimo. If they want to kill me, they can kill at will. I support Frelimo."[48]

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[44] Machava jail is the main maximum-security prison in Mozambique, also known as B.O.

[45] Francisco Mondlane, Interview, Manjacaze, 8 February 2019.

[46] Ibid.

[47] The name given to Renamo guerrilla fighters. In the next section, I explain in detail where the name comes from.

[48] Francisco Mondlane, Interview, Manjacaze, 8 February 2019.

Other interlocutors also justify their party support based on 'the liberator' argument: "Frelimo is the party that raised the flag," replied Mateus Mbila,[49] another elderly man from Chidenguele, when I asked, "why Frelimo?" He added: "People here will always recognise Frelimo because it brought independence". The recognition includes "… casting their vote for Frelimo. Many do not even look at the other [parties]. They just look for Frelimo and … *Boom!* [they cast their vote]!" For him, "to vote for Frelimo is to thank it for the sacrifice it made in the colonial war …"[50]

Mateus Mbila laments that "… those who did not experience colonialism, sometimes do not properly value Frelimo," and, like Grandpa Mondlane, suggested that the elderly and former combatants should pass on the legacy to the new generations: "look at this notebook! [pointing to a small leaflet containing Eduardo Mondlane's story]. There is much information about Frelimo. This is about Eduardo Mondlane and Frelimo… we walk around here [in Manjacaze] transmitting information and teaching the youngest. They must know Frelimo. We should carry on doing this."[51]

Indeed, there is a generational issue, since most interlocutors who refer to their attachment to Frelimo as gratitude for its being the "liberator of the motherland" are mostly the elderly who, as Mr Mbila points out, experienced colonialism. Indeed, some youth and adults also do so, but with peculiarities, as I address below. Before, two short reports, one from a 54-year-old man, only six years old when the country gained independence in 1975, another from a young woman born eighteen years after independence, now 30 years old. The first is Beto Massango, from Chidenguele. The second is Joana Mondlane, from Manjacaze headquarters.

> "I did not experience colonialism, but my parents say they grew up suffering from *Chibalo* [forced labour]. They said that they knew *Chibalo* and that Frelimo freed them… After independence, my mother worked with Frelimo until her death. [She] belonged to the Dynamizing Group (DG) and OMM [Mozambican Women's Organisation]. So, Frelimo here at home is everything. For me, Frelimo is in the blood… I must continue preserving our [party] legacy, even if it gives me nothing, not even a paper…"[52]

> "My father was a former liberation war fighter. He was arrested and jailed for ten years. When he was alive, he used to tell us this: 'I was there [in jail] for our party. We

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[49] Mateus Mbila, Interview, Manjacaze, 26 October 2019.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Francisco Mondlane, Interview, Manjacaze, 8 February 2019.
[52] Beto Massango, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 October 2019.

were there [in jail] because of our party. Mondlane's family Party… you are my children, [therefore] you belong to the party.' So, what should I do? I cannot betray [my father] ... I belong to Frelimo."[53]

In both cases, the interlocutors show that they learned about Frelimo at home, from their parents, who shared with them details about colonialism and the 'salvation' that Frelimo brought, fighting for independence. Like their parents, they also consider themselves attached to Frelimo by bonds of gratitude. In the case of Beto Massango, who, during the interview, was still furious with Frelimo local leaders because they had excluded him from the party mobilisation group for the election campaign, he still praised and defended Frelimo. For him, "Frelimo is in the blood." Joana Mondlane, in turn, stressed that she will never stop supporting Frelimo because she would be betraying her late father, a former liberation war fighter. Both are, therefore, illustrative cases of how the 'enduring attachment' towards political parties originates and is transmitted in primary socialisation, as discussed in the vast literature on party identification (cf., for example, Campbell et al., 1960; Key, 1967; Fiorina, 1981; Miller et al., 1996; Dinas, 2017). In Section 3 of this chapter, I will return to political socialisation and this generational issue. One last aspect is worth addressing from Joana Mondlane's extract. As her father 'instructed,' she refers to Frelimo as the "Mondlane's family Party," another key element to understand party identification in Manjacaze.

Mondlane is evoked both as a hero and a national unity architect, but, in Manjacaze, also as 'family,' as an 'acquaintance' through whom they feel connected to Frelimo, some by blood ties, since Frelimo is "Mondlane's party," as Joana points out. Many people share the 'Mondlane' surname in Manjacaze, and they feel even closer to Frelimo[54]. Thus, the name 'Mondlane' and the fact that Eduardo Mondlane is originally from Manjacaze contribute to part of Manjacaze people feeling connected to Frelimo as a family, even if some do not share blood ties with him. The following quote is from Jojo, a Frelimo leader who is from the Mondlane 'family,' despite not sharing any blood ties with Eduardo Mondlane, the hero:

"I am obliged to be a member of Frelimo, because of my surname [which is Mondlane]. My surname is that of the man who founded Frelimo in Mwadjahane [Eduardo

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[53] Joana Mondlane, Interview, Manjacaze, 4 April 2019.
[54] In Manjacaze, there are entire villages where people share the same surname: Massango in the village of Massangos, Chiziane in the villages of Chiziane, Mausse, Manhique, etc. The name 'Mondlane,' although it does not coincide with that of a specific village, is quite common in Manjacaze.

Mondlane's home village], so I am a member of Frelimo, and I cannot leave. I am going to die as a Frelimo supporter…"[55]

In short, for some, Frelimo is an extended family, which is why it is locally upheld as a father and mother figure, as I will also show in detail in Chapter 6, but the name of Mondlane, born in Manjacaze, reinforces this feeling of 'proximity', which also contributes for 'attaching,' and thus 'identify,' people with Frelimo in Manjacaze. However, Frelimo's historical role as a 'liberator' is central to this identification, especially among the elderly, who feel compelled to offer eternal 'praise' for it, some just as they would praise God, indeed, in the same way as Francisco Mondlane whom I quoted at the beginning of this section. The next section continues to analyse the weight of history in partisan support in Manjacaze, focusing on the dynamics of another war: the civil war.

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[55] Jojo Mondlane, Interview, Cambane, Manjacaze, 30 October 2019.

4.2 '[Because] Frelimo protected us from Renamo attacks': supporting by default

As with the analysis of the sources of party identification in the previous section, the reflection on support by default that follows highlights war memories. I emphasise the impact of perceptions of Frelimo and Renamo roles in the civil war on Frelimo support. The 'default', I argue, stems from the fact that, in opposition to Renamo, whom Manjacaze voters blame for the atrocities of the war, they end up supporting Frelimo, not because they are necessarily attached to it, as in party identification, but because detachment from Renamo brings them closer to Frelimo. It is, thus, negative partisanship, which Ramelet (2020) identifies in other contexts. For the case of Manjacaze, first, some details about the war.

In the introduction, I referred to at least two designations of the war, each highlighting its distinct nature and origins. For some analysts (cf., for example, Fauvet, 1984; Roesh, 1992; Abrahamson & Nilsson, 1994) and the Frelimo Government, it was a war of aggression and destabilisation, initiated by the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), later captured by Apartheid, in South Africa. For them, Renamo was just a puppet of those external forces. Renamo argued that it was a pro-democracy war and that it intended to change the regime. At the same time, for other analysts, it was a civil war because, as they argue, despite the influence of external factors, it was also due to internal contradictions inside Mozambican society and the authoritarian regime itself, and it opposed Mozambicans to other Mozambicans (Geffray, 1990; Cahen, 1990; Morier-Genoud, Do Rosário & Cahen, 2019). Here I call it a 'civil war,' for the reasons pointed out by the latter authors.

For my interviewees, however, it was simply *'Guerra de Dhlakama'* (Dhlakama war) or *'Guerra de Matsangas'* (Matsanga war), which is already a political choice. The term 'Matsangas' or 'Dhlakama' war resemble another local reference for the liberation war: the 'Mondlane war'. In both cases, they use the surname of the organisation's leader they perceive was responsible for the war. I have already referred to 'Mondlane' in the previous section. In the case of the civil war the term 'Matsanga' comes from André Matsangaissa, the first President of Renamo, while 'Dhlakama' is the surname of the second, Afonso Dhlakama. Now, while they positively mention Mondlane – as a liberator – Dhlakama and Matsangaissa are negatively evoked as 'bandits', 'murderers', 'predators', and 'violators', among other

adjectives, also attributed to Renamo. In this sense, being 'Matsanga,' for example, the most common name for Renamo supporters in Manjacaze, is to be perceived and treated as a bandit and, therefore, subject to marginalisation and exclusion. This is, therefore, a variant of the Government's version, which prevails today and is, in part, reinforced by the ruling party, as I will show in part 3 of this chapter and throughout the thesis, particularly in Chapter 6.

4.2.1 The war: origins and evolution

In Manjacaze, Renamo attacks started in the first half of the 1980s; many indicate 1982, some 1981. All, however, are unanimous in stating that, in the early 1980s, Renamo guerrillas were already in different parts of Manjacaze, although until then, the attacks were still limited to specific areas. The village of Mwadjahane (Eduardo Mondlane's birthplace), for example, and other surrounding areas, including the district headquarters, had been spared from Renamo attacks at the beginning. The explanation is that 'Mondlane's land' was 'sacred', even for Renamo guerrillas, who claimed to respect Mondlane and his ideals, which was no longer the case in most distant areas. Chidenguele Administrative Post villages fall into the former group. These were privileged targets of the attacks, also because they are in the vicinity of National Road Number 1 (EN1), the main route through the country and strategic for supplying the state army. However, despite this, during first contact, Renamo guerrillas did not attack the population:

> "I remember it well. Renamo [guerrillas] entered our village here [in Massango, in Chidenguele] on 10 May 1982. Then they moved to Dengoine [one of the five localities in Chidenguele, which includes a village with the same name]. There were two groups ... They were not yet cruel. They just chose adults, to carry their stuff [the guerrillas' belongings). After a certain distance with the cargo, they captured other people to continue and released the others. The latter could return home..."[56]

The extract that follows also addresses the way Renamo guerrillas interacted with people, at least at the beginning. The interlocutor is Arnaldo Manhique, an ex-government soldier:

> "When Renamo arrived in Gaza, it was not that violent... here in [the Manjacaze] headquarters, they used to pass on to Chibuto, to sabotage the railroad that runs from Macuácua to Chicome. In addition to the railway line, they used to head to the EN1 to stage some attacks and then return to their military bases. They were not so violent; they lived with people. For example, they usually recruited people here to help them

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[56] Paulo Matende, Intervention, Focus Group Discussion with elders, Massango, 29 May 2018.

carry them goods up to a certain distance, then replaced them and sent them back home and so on. That is why nobody was afraid of Renamo. They had weapons, but we were not scared."[57]

There are at least three different accounts concerning why Renamo intensified attacks in Manjacaze, targeting the population as well. The first, and the most evoked, was that Renamo was reacting to alleged false accusations of committing atrocities. Some interviewees pointed out that government forces committed some atrocities to demonise Renamo, which led the latter to start the killings. The second was that those people Renamo released, after transporting their goods, divulged Renamo's positions: "…after being captured, on our return, we used to tell government forces where we had seen Renamo soldiers. They were then chased… so they turned on us and started killing, saying that we were compromising their military positions."[58] The third was that Renamo attacked in response to state-allied militia offensives, which previously only protected the communal villages.

Regarding responsibility for the war atrocities, the informants widely cited one important figure – *Sathane* (in Ci-Changana and Ci-Chopi languages, which, translated into Portuguese, means Satan). Little is known about the origin of this 'Satan,' not even his real name is disclosed. However, his actions are still vivid in people's memories, mostly among Chidenguele residents, who consider him a true 'Satan,' as his nickname suggests. All that is known is that he was an FPLM (*Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique*[59]) commander whose killing influenced the violent turning of Renamo against the population. The following is a short illustrative extract, taken from a Focus Group Discussion with elders from Dengoine village:

> Me: What caused Renamo to change its behaviour, starting to kill, if you say it was not doing so before?
>
> Intervenient 1 (elder, male): The behaviour of the Frelimo commander [the FPLM commander] called *Sathane*. After Renamo soldiers moved on from here, he and his group would come and ask us if we had seen them. If we responded 'yes', he would kill so that he could say that Renamo had killed so many people in X community, but Renamo had not started killing anyone ..."[60]

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[57] Arnaldo Manhique, quotation, Manjacaze 6 July 2015 (interview taken from a research paper I wrote with Forquilha in 2015. Cf. Chaimite & Forquilha, 2015, p.4).

[58] Paulo Matende, Intervention, Focus Group Discussion with elders, Massango, 29 May 2018.

[59] The then designation of the state army, now FADM (*Forças Armadas de Defesa de Mocambique*).

[60] Gito Boene, Intervention, Focus Group Discussion with elders, Dengoine headquarter, 8 March 2018.

Other informants reported that *Sathane* killed because he suspected that people were Renamo agents. After all, they explained, Commander *Sathane* was not convinced that Renamo freed people: "*Sathane* was suspicious of everyone … if you responded 'yes' to his questions about having seen Renamo soldiers, he would try to find out how you escaped, then kill you. Then he would say on the radio that Renamo killed so many people in location X, and Renamo forces, after hearing that, on their way back, really killed. This is how Renamo became dangerous. So [since then], if caught, with luck, one would arrive [at Renamo's military base] or return home … Renamo soldiers were bewildered, while before they lived with the population.[61]

However, for some informants, *Sathane* was not just a satanic figure. Some episodes highlight his bravery in combat and his actions in defence of the population. As an example, the Focus Group Discussion with the elders, which I have been citing, addressed their role in blocking Renamo attacks after the destruction of the Communal Village of Betula in 1983: "… in this period, the [Renamo guerrillas] burned the villages in Betula, and learned that there were others in Massango. So Renamo sent word to those who lived in the village of Massango that they were on their way. They always warned… This time they warned and said that people should prepare *chima* (corn porridge), that they would bring curry … Curry was their way of saying that they were coming to kill … People left the village of Massango, but Renamo did not arrive because afterwards there was a patrol by the terrible Frelimo commander, known as *Sathane*."[62] As mentioned previously, the figure of *Sathane* is controversial and his story needs further investigation.

As for the role of the militiamen, the third justification for the intensification of Renamo attacks, there follows an account by Mr Arnaldo Manhique, the ex-Government soldier I quoted earlier:

> "The situation changed in 1985, when groups of militiamen began to form. It was said that militiamen were there to protect the communal villages, but instead of just protecting, they began making what they called offensives; they attacked Renamo positions... The militiamen were our relatives, they were our parents, they were people living in the villages themselves, who fought against Renamo… and, in turn, Renamo said, 'no, we leave these people alone, and they attack us!' So, the violence

[61] Panguene Madjojo, Intervention, Focus Group Discussion with elders, Dengoine headquarter, 8 March 2018.
[62] Gito Babene, Intervention, Focus Group Discussion with elders, Dengoine headquarter, 8 March 2018.

started. [Before, Renamo] felt comfortable when crossing an area to ask for a chicken, a goat… and people had offered them. There were no problems. But, from the moment they started being attacked [by the militiamen], they responded with violence…"[63]

After the account above, Mr Manhique also explained how and why the 10 August 1987 Massacre happened in Manjacaze:

"[Renamo guerrillas] did not attack [Manjacaze headquarters] for a long time. They had nothing to do with us. Therefore, they started attacking because of this militia offensive in 1987. At that time, already in the surrounding neighbourhoods, all the people had fled to the communal villages. Then, [Renamo forces] realised that. The way to catch those people who always attack us is to go to the rear.' That's when they attacked. The attack surprised some people, who were set on fire; some were stabbed…. typical things for offensives. It was an offensive intended to scare people and show they could enter Manjacaze headquarters. … evil does not come alone! They realised that the Government forces that should protect Manjacaze headquarters had left for Guambe [in Inhambane] during an offensive. …it was exactly when Renamo had arrived. Just thirteen government soldiers were protecting the administration. They just did what they wanted here. There was no resistance at all."[64]

After 10 August 1987, attacks on the village of Manjacaze became frequent and, by that time, the war had spread to almost all of the District's Administrative Posts, now with reports of looting, kidnappings, mutilations, and violations, all attributed to the 'Matsangas', the 'armed bandits', who allegedly spread terror among the people of the district. According to Mr Arnaldo Manhique, this image of Renamo, and above all, the death of his own father in one of the attacks in his village, not only made him hate Renamo, but also motivated him in the theatre of war, since he was also a soldier. As he explains, it was only with time that the anger that he felt towards Renamo, "… went out of my head. I started to realize that it was not easy for one to understand the origin of the war when still so young. So, as I grew up, I started understanding why that war broke out: it was because of the divisions within the armed forces. *Epha*! A lot, a lot of confusion."[65]

At the time of the interviews I have been quoting, Mr Manhique was a member of the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), the third largest political party in the country, and the only member of the opposition in the Municipal Assembly of Manjacaze. In subsequent interviews, namely in 2018 and 2019, he had already joined Renamo, having held

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[63] Arnaldo Manhique, Renamo Delegate in Gaza, Interview, Manjacaze 6 July 2015.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.

the position of that party's provincial delegate while also running to become a Gaza Provincial Assembly member. His trajectory is quite peculiar, at least in the context of Manjacaze and Gaza, where Renamo is widely held responsible for the atrocities of the civil war, but also because, in that context, "if you are from the opposition, you have to hide…"[66] especially in the most remote areas, as reported by another interlocutor, this time from Chidenguele. In the opinion of the latter, "[those in the opposition] are afraid… [because] people do not understand what opposition is. Regarding opposition, many equal it to Renamo and Renamo killed a lot here."[67] This leads to a reflection on how war memories are mobilised for political gains.

4.2.2 Who is to blame? The 'default'

In general, when people talk about opposition in Manjacaze, they have Renamo in mind and, even during the conversations and interviews, many interlocutors used the terms 'Renamo' and 'opposition' interchangeably. This is like when they say, 'the party', which refers to Frelimo, and simultaneously, the Government and the State (see chapter 1, chapter 2 and chapter 5). Thus, Frelimo is 'the party', the government and the state, while 'opposition' refers to Renamo, to which all other political parties are perceived as being associated. The explanation for this association lies in the perception that "… the other parties are children of Renamo. So, they are the same. Son of a bandit is a bandit…"[68]; the reason why many distance themselves from Renamo and the opposition in Manjacaze. So Renamo and all opposition parties are to blame for the atrocities committed during the civil war.

Indeed some, like Arnaldo Manhique, for whom war is a thing of the past, joined the opposition, despite the risks, which leed some Renamo sympathisers to hide. Mr Bravo Job, an 83-year-old man, living in Cambane, is one of them.[69] For Mr Job, "Renamo killed, but Frelimo also killed. They only say that Renamo killed, but Frelimo too. It is said that it is Renamo just because Renamo was hidden in the forest, but everyone [killed]." Then he explains why some people support Frelimo: "… many are still with Frelimo because they still

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[66] Beto Massango, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 October 2019.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Beto Massango, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 October 2019.
[69] Bravo Job, Interview, Manjacaze, 2 November 2019.

think about the war. They do not know that we must move forward…,"[70] and, he continues: "… since the introduction of elections, with Chissano [former Mozambique President], they say that Chissano brought peace and Renamo killed. They say, 'do not vote for Renamo' and we have been in it since [then]'."

Many interviewees mentioned that they support Frelimo in opposition to Renamo, who, as Mr Job points out, they consider to be a 'group of Matsangas' and therefore bandits, although some recognise that Frelimo also committed atrocities. "We know, Frelimo also killed, but, for us, it was Renamo. So Renamo will never have a single vote here,"[71] replied Mr Beto Massango, another interlocutor, from Massango, in Chidenguele, when I asked why he always evoked war to justify his support for Frelimo. An even more detailed explanation follows, taken from a long conversation with Malita Guibande, former leader of the Mozambican Youth Organisation, the youth branch of Frelimo.

> "Malita Guibande (MG): At the time, we entered politics based on our reality, unlike now, when people come in because of things they hear.
> Me (M): Can you explain it better?
> MG: I said, 'our reality'. I am talking about the war. Here we suffered a lot because of the war. I was still a child, but I know that at war, who attacked us was Renamo and Frelimo was by our side. So, we grew up with that in our minds… this multiparty thing did not exist, so it does not mean anything to us. We only know about Frelimo and Renamo and that Frelimo defended us while Renamo attacked.
> Me: If you were a child, as you say, how did you distinguish between attackers and defenders?
> MG: There are certain things that we can only analyse now that the situation is calm. In the time of action [meaning war], there was no time to analyse things because we lived with the militias from Frelimo. So, we knew that Renamo was the one in the woods and had come out of the woods to attack us. Today, when we analyse it, we can see that Frelimo soldiers also attacked us, and we mistook them for Renamo. We know that they [Frelimo soldiers] came to tarnish the other party's image [at the time of the guerrilla movement], but at the time of action, no one knew that.
> Me: And now, you are grown and better informed, does it change anything?
> MG: It depends on each person. Some change, but the majority say that, here, things are the same… here in the countryside, it is not easy for someone to come out and say that he is from another party, and so …
> Me: Why?
> MG: Maybe for young people still growing up, but people our age [he is 52 years old] who experienced the war, very few. Ha ha ha [laughs].

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[70] Ibid.
[71] Gumende Tair, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 October 2019.

> Me: Why do young people change, not those in your generation?
> MG: Young people did not experience the war. Most older people our age know what war is. So, not many [young people] understand when we explain what we experienced with the war ... as for the elderly, it is necessary to note that there is a lot of illiteracy here. When they explain to them [the elders] that Frelimo attacked too, nobody understands, nor do they want to hear it. They immediately say, 'I lost my parents, brothers ...' So, there is this ignorance. If you say that [meaning accuse Frelimo], they may even come to destroy your house, and it is the community itself that does this, not under the guidance of a leader. The community does that…"[72]

The long extract above is quite illuminating; it shows that part of the Frelimo support is not by identification, but by default; that is, in opposition to Renamo, perceived as representing the entire opposition. Opposition to the opposition parties, in turn, is also due to the responsibility attributed to Renamo for the atrocities committed during the civil war. Renamo and its members are perceived as 'bandits', 'murderers', 'predators', and 'violators', among other things. By extension, all other opposition parties are 'Matsangas' and 'bandits', common local designations for Renamo. Like the latter, people distance themselves from other opposition parties, and are largely intolerant of their presence in Manjacaze. Frelimo, however, stands out as a 'liberator' and 'protector', 'deserving' the population's support. Thus, the memories of war still influence the way people from Manjacaze evaluate, value, associate, or distance themselves from both parties in that district. There is also a generational issue, evident in the last extract above. As Malita Guibande explains, adults and the elderly, who have experienced war, are less tolerant of the opposition, unlike young people, without such experience and with greater access to information. However, adults and seniors try hard to transmit the legacy and the memories of war to younger generations, aiming to influence their party orientation with relative success, as I demonstrate next.

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[72] Malita Guibande, Interview, Cambane, 27 February 2018.

4.3 The legacy of war

> "We grew up with Frelimo. When we were children, we were obliged to attend party meetings. There were Dynamizing Groups (DGs), and my mother was part of them. At school, we also studied Frelimo ... But I also experienced the war and saw that Renamo did not come here in a good way. They destroyed and took everything, so we see Frelimo as our father, our defender, and I explain this to my children…"[73]

In addition to Frelimo's image as a 'protector', which, together with that of a 'liberator', contributes to the support it receives in Manjacaze, as explained in the previous sections, the extract above refers to political socialisation, highlighting the role of Frelimo itself as one of the main agents, together with 'families' and 'schools.' This section probes Frelimo's role, also as a 'big family', including the generational issue, which was also evident in the previous sections. Then, in conclusion, I reflect on the role of the war in structuring the local political field in Manjacaze, which I consider to be still 'political minefield' by the spectre of war', generating fear, intolerance, and the prevailing one-party hegemony.

4.3.1 Political socialisation

Political socialisation is the process through which people acquire and internalise norms, beliefs and values that inform and shape their political choices and behaviours (Sapiro, 2004; Nay, 2011; Braud, 2011). Studying political socialisation involves capturing where and how people form and crystallise their ideas about politics and incorporate them into their values, beliefs and behaviour or practices, as well as identifying the mechanisms and processes of such incorporation (Greenstein, 1969; Sapiro, 2004; Braud, 2011; Dinas, 2017). Here, Frelimo stands out as a key site of political socialisation in Manjacaze, together with families and schools. However, as I will demonstrate, the latter are also intertwined with Frelimo. The dynamics of war, though, are at the heart of the collective identity and memory formation process: people learn about parties, even before learning about politics, as in other contexts (Dinas, 2017). The stigmatisation of the 'other,' namely the opposition, is also integral part of the political socialisation process in Manjacaze.

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[73] Beto Massango, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 October 2019.

4.3.1.1 Frelimo (and) 'the family'

I ended the first section of this chapter underlining that, for some, Frelimo was like an extended family, therefore locally treated as a 'father' and/or a 'mother'. I mentioned that the name 'Mondlane' also contributes to the feeling of closeness and attachment to Frelimo. Frelimo is omnipresent in the political, social, and economic life of the inhabitants of Manjacaze. Church meetings, for example, are sometimes dominated by party politics, especially during elections (cf. Chapter 6); State meetings also turn into Frelimo meetings, and vice versa (cf. Chapter 5), and in this vein, being from 'the party' is also key to accessing state services, in contrast to the 'other', opposition members, who are marginalised, excluded, and persecuted (c.f. Chapter 5). In the household, Frelimo is the subject of frequent conversations, with parents insisting that their children respect Frelimo in the same way that they respect them, the parents, as evidence of their good education.

> "… Difficult or not, we must respect Frelimo. There is no choice… my parents used to say that Frelimo liberated this [country], [the reason why] we had to respect it ... I [too] tell my children: 'you have to respect the party'. It [the party] is like me, your father: I do not always do good things, but I am your father, and you must respect me... 'If you do not respect 'the Party,' they will say that it is the father's problem; that I did not raise you well…'"[74]

The last interlocutor is concerned with safeguarding his image in the 'Party', hence transmitting the legacy to his children, which his parents also transmitted to him. This denotes the existence of internal pressures in the party that transfer to the households themselves, and this is a result of what is called "power by anticipated coercion": when the action of an individual is influenced by the threat of the reaction of another (for example, a patron or anyone else who has power over him), even though said patron does not necessarily mobilise his power (Smith, 1997; Kabeer, 2006). The threat is internalised, even if not always explicit. The accounts of Joana Mondlane, the 30-year-old lady I mentioned previously, are more enlightening.

Joana is a daughter of a former liberation war fighter, which, according to her, makes her 'naturally' a Frelimo member: "So [if my father is from Frelimo], what should I do? I cannot betray [my father] ... I belong to Frelimo."[75] She explains that, as a child, she used to attend

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[74] Gumende Tair, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 October 2019.
[75] Joana Mondlane, Interview, Manjacaze, 4 April 2019.

the former combatants' monthly meetings with her mother on the 20th of each month, but for a while, she gave up because Frelimo did not fulfil the promise of giving her a state-paid scholarship. She later returned, now under the influence of her aunt, who is a senior Frelimo member:

> "When I was a child, my mother would sit with me and say: 'your father is this [former combatant] … we must attend party meetings', and so we did. At that time, at that age, I just attended, not because I understood what I was doing. Not because [I] knew what the [party's] role was … but, when you grow up in a family where everyone goes to church, you must do the same. Then you start valuing those things [when you grow]. … that is how I realised that Frelimo is this, Frelimo is that … that is when and how Frelimo got 'into my blood' … I used to stop right in the middle of people and say… Frelimo is this and that – those things I was also told… But, deep down, I wouldn't say I liked politics. Fortunately, or unfortunately, politics caught up with me and made me realise its advantages and disadvantages … For example, they said there were grants for children of former combatants. I applied for one, but they did not give it to me. That dark side appeared, so I gave up attending those combatants' meetings… I was discouraged … [but] my aunt came to me and said: 'if it was not this time, your time will come for sure', and insisted on going back to the meetings …"[76]

Indeed, Joana learned about Frelimo well before understanding politics. The pressure of friends and other community members also impacted her political socialisation and subsequent party orientation, as she points out:

> "Considering that our Manjacaze is small … others would easily see that Joana attended [the party meeting], Maria did not … that Joana is like this, Maria is not …. so, you end up going, sometimes, because of this. Not because it comes from here [pointing to her chest]. Only that it ends up being part of you. You see the situation in which you arrive and find Maria there; Ana there … they end up getting 3 to 4 people who become friends because of those meetings… So, monthly, those new friends will remind you to go, even if you do not want to … then here [in Manjacaze], we have nothing to do. That [meaning party events] becomes an occupation when you are not busy."[77]

She spoke about what happens in her family when someone leaves Frelimo and joins another party. She gave an example of her cousin who did so, joining the *Movimento Democratico de Moçambique* (MDM), even if only for a short while:

> "My mother, father, aunt and uncle, … they always said that if one wants to quit [Frelimo], better stay away from them, and always emphasised that, wherever one is, one cannot count on them for anything; they will never be there, neither as a family nor as anything else … you can organise an event, they will not show up… so, if you

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[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

are with MDM or PIMO [*Partido Independente e Moçambique*] ... they do not want to know about you. They want Frelimo.... They say, 'we stayed in jail. It is not for you to come here and say that I am fine with João' [meaning 'other parties'], so I will stay with João ... stay there! ... this is that. We already had one cousin who got into this situation. He went to MDM ... His father distanced himself from him. He ended up coming back..."[78]

For Joana, however, it is difficult for people in her community, including herself, to make different political choices, as the pressures described above are an intrinsic part of their socialisation process, but also because, for some, the connection to Frelimo is a matter of survival: "I do not know if this scenario will change in time. People were born, grew up and are eating at Frelimo."[79] But people have their expectations when they join Frelimo, including job opportunities for the young, or, in the case of more senior people, jobs for their children. Joana, for example, expected to receive a scholarship and still thinks Frelimo will help her with that. Gumende Tair on the other hand, now 58, hopes to be integrated into the state apparatus himself, or, he explains, if not him, at least one of his children can still benefit from the party's help.[80] However, adults recognise the difficulties involved in maintaining the loyalty of their children to Frelimo, precisely because, they explain, the latter do not have the same experience as they do, notably with war. Next, I address 'the generational question' that is implicit in party support in Manjacaze.

4.3.1.2 The generational question

The generational question is implicit in every analysis of the impact of war dynamics on party support in Manjacaze. The adults, and the elderly, who have experienced war, are considered to be 'the party's guaranteed', unlike the youth, who pose greater challenges, as one of the top Frelimo leaders in Manjacaze repeatedly mentioned during the 2019 general election campaign: "Those [adults and the elderly] are guaranteed. We do not need to spend a lot of time on them ... they experienced wars here. Our job is with the kids [meaning 'young people'].[81] Even without having experienced war, however, all of the young people I interviewed were able to recount detailed examples of war episodes, which shows how effective is the socialisation process. Like their parents, some praise Frelimo for liberating the

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[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Gumende Tair, Interview, Manjacaze, 21 de Outubro de 2019.

[81] Obadias Guilende, Frelimo First Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 September 2019.

country and perceive it as a 'protector'. Some are even more precise, mentioning the names of their family members killed during the civil war. Indeed, in addition to "… things that [young people] hear"[82] from adults, they have concrete evidence of the war in the form of the ruins still scattered throughout the district (Figure 1) and in the mass graves in memory of the victims of the 10 August 1987 massacre, right in Manjacaze headquarters (Figure 2). In remembrance of the massacre, a procession is organised annually, which ends with a ceremony at the mass grave. This is how the memories of war are kept alive, even for young people who have no experience of the traumas of war.

Figure 6: Remaining of a building destroyed during the civil war in Manjacaze.

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[82] Malita Guibande, Interview, 27 February 2018.

Figure 7: Mass grave in memory of the victims of a massacre in Manjacaze

Despite the impact of war memories on young people and the process of political socialisation itself, other factors cannot be underestimated since young people also live their own experiences, different from those of their parents, and these also influence their political orientations and choices. This is recognised by a father, himself a fervent Frelimo supporter:

> "… we don't have a school that teaches the seventh grade here. Children leave the area because they don't have eighth to tenth grades... They leave to find a school…. So, we talk just before they leave, because they do so when they are 15 and 16 years old… [in the conversations,] we say that the party is a mother… we explain about the war…. But … eheheh [laughs]… in the cities, they start to have another vision. They realize that Frelimo is not alone. There are other parties… they make their choices [but] they can never discuss it openly here. They mutely believe that Frelimo was deceiving them…"[83]

The 'father' above justifies the relative impact of primary socialisation on his children based on the argument that they leave the household early, allegedly to continue their studies. In fact, no matter how long they stay, it is worth recognising that "...people are not passive in the process of acquiring norms and representations..." (Nay, 2011, p.522) and that primary socialisation, per se, does not completely determine their political choices and orientations. They are not only subject to secondary influences but also resort to other elements to form

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[83] Beto Massango, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 October 2019.

and inform their options. The example of Ilidio Chemane, a twenty-two-year-old student in Chidenguele, is illustrative. He begins by recounting how his mother and grandmother try to influence him:

> "I live with my mother and grandmother. The two always say that Renamo destroyed our village. My mother says that Renamo killed her father, and that Frelimo united us to liberate the country and bring independence. I always believed that, but then, when I grew up, I started analysing it ... Look! from time to time, I go to Maputo [the capital of the country], and there we have good conversations with my uncles and other young people. One thing I discovered is that both Frelimo and Renamo, they all killed ... Renamo did not fight alone, but they always say that Renamo killed. What was Frelimo doing at that time?"[84] For Elidio, however, "this issue of war, they always talk about, is their [the adults and the elderly] business. Those from Frelimo are thieves. Do you see the issue of hidden debts? That is why I left Frelimo and joined Renamo. I want my things..."[85]

Another extract, this time from Rito, a twenty-year-old man, from Chibonzane. Like Elidio, Rito detaches himself from Frelimo, his parents' party, claiming that "Frelimo does not do what it promises ...," and talks of his freedom of choice:

> "Everyone in my house - mother and brothers-, are Frelimo supporters. They campaigned for Frelimo, but I did for MDM. When they asked me about it, I said that I am grown now, that I do what I want, and that vote is not mandatory… My explanation for them is that I was campaigning for MDM because I wanted a football, hospital, road, and water ... Frelimo's only promised these, but they did not deliver. I moved in search of better conditions."[86]

The three accounts above are purely illustrative. In Chapter 8, I will detail how young people contest Frelimo discourses and attempts to impose its hegemony in Manjacaze, including by joining the opposition. For now, continuing the reflection on the impact of war dynamics on party orientation, I will focus on the structure of the political field in Manjacaze.

4.3.2 Still, a political minefield?

The analysis made so far makes it clear that the spectre of war is omnipresent in Manjacaze, not just due to the widespread images (ruins and mass graves) but also because wars are part of people's memories, especially of the elderly and adults, and their discourses. It is part of the political socialisation process, at home, in the community, with and within Frelimo. The

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[84] Elidio Chemane, Interview, Manjacaze, 26 October 2019.
[85] Elidio Chemane, Interview, Manjacaze, 26 October 2019.
[86] Rito Brito, Intervention in the FGD with young people from Cambane, Manjacaze, 2 November 2019.

new generations also learn about war, and, similarly, make their own political decisions. Like the adults and the elderly, some also distance themselves from Renamo and the opposition, to whom they attribute responsibility for the atrocities committed during the war, thus supporting Frelimo, by default.

The spectre of war also structures the political field of Manjacaze. By political field, I mean an arena, a place "... of power [that,] as a field of struggles ... aims to transform the power relationship that gives this field its structure at a given moment" (Bourdieu, 1989, p.164). The structure of the political field, however, is "[the] state of power balance between the agents or the institutions in the struggle... whose specific forms must be engaged each time, between the newcomer who tries to break the bolts of the right of entry and the dominant who tries to defend the monopoly and exclude competition" (Ibid., 1984, p.113-114). In this sense, unlike at the national level, where the political field is markedly bipolarised (Brito, 1995; Lundin, 1995) in favour of former belligerents Frelimo and Renamo, in Manjacaze this bipolarization is only at the level of the discourse. In practice, Manjacaze political field is one-party dominated, as the electoral results presented in the introduction to the thesis illustrate.

The aforementioned political minefield is by fear and intolerance, which is also due to its continuous militarisation: "militarisation consists of basing authority on the war situation faced by the organisation and that can be produced by a work on the representation of the situation, to produce and continually reproduce the *fear of being against*, the ultimate foundation of all militant and military disciplines" (Bourdieu, 1989, p.201-202). Both Frelimo and Renamo have a military past (Alexander, 1997), from which they claim their legitimacy (Alexander, 1997; Macamo, 2017; Pearce, 2020), a "historical legitimacy" (Macamo, 2017, p. 205), which they seek to preserve, always referring to the dynamics of wars. Indeed, some people still fear a possible return to war:

> "I also experienced the [civil] war, and I am still suffering because of them [Renamo]. The country [meaning 'the Government'] says that they [Renamo guerrilla fighters] are responsible. So, how do they come here to mobilise? They cannot enter here. We don't want trouble with Frelimo either… there can be conflicts between parties, and we know that. Here we must be one [meaning Frelimo] … just Frelimo."[87]

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[87] Gumende Tair, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 October 2019.

Mr Gumende Tair whom I quote above, is intolerant of Renamo and the other opposition parties. This is also due to fear, which derives equally from the political control Frelimo have over him and other people in Manjacaze. He has internalised and reproduces this control, through political socialisation, through the logic of what I described earlier as "power by anticipated coercion: when the action of an individual is influenced by the threat of the reaction of another (e.g., a patron or anyone else who has power over him), even though the said patron does not necessarily mobilise his power" (Smith, 1997; Kabeer, 2006). This is also the reason why he openly expresses his aversion to multipartyism when he says, "here we must be one [party]," and he explains: "we don't want trouble with Frelimo." The fear is also explicit in the speech of Mateus Mbila, from Mungoi, in Chidenguele: "People are tired of war. War speech is used to mobilise and demobilise people, and many people are afraid. That is why they keep this idea of a father... they vote for continuity… [because] they say, 'you can't change your father… Frelimo is a father because he protected the population [in the civil war]."[88] However, distancing oneself from the opposition, or showing intolerance towards it, does not mean recognising its virtues. Some do, but the factors that bring them closer to Frelimo force them to distance themselves: "Not everything Renamo says is wrong. There's a logic behind what they say, but we don't want to know here. Rightly or wrongly, *baza baza* [go, go] …!"[89]

Throughout the subsequent chapters, I will repeatedly return to the issue of fear and intolerance, which, as mentioned here, mark the political field of Manjacaze. I conclude by emphasising that, in fact, the prevalence of the spectre of war, and its continuous evocation, makes the politics in Manjacaze a simple prolongation of war by other means, to use the inverted formula of Clausewitz (2015). As I have shown, these memories are even fundamental in socialisation and, consequently, in the political orientation, above all, of adults and the elderly. They also influence party support, being at the heart of the sources of party identification for some and support by default for others. The latter refers to the situation in which, in opposition to the Renamo and other opposition political parties, which they blame for the atrocities of civil war, people end up approaching and consequently

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[88] Mateus Mbila, Interview, Manjacaze, 26 October 2019.
[89] Beto Massango, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 October 2019.

supporting Frelimo, not necessarily by attachment, as in the case of party identification. It is a negative partisanship, as Ramelet (2020) also identified in other contexts.

Chapter 5: Party-state at the 'local' level: For party control?

This chapter is about political control, part of the coercive dimension, which, together with party support I analysed in Chapter 4, enables, and sustains Frelimo hegemony in Manjacaze. I start with the concept of '*estrutura,*' which is central to understanding the organisation and the functioning of the Frelimo party-state in Manjacaze. I apply the term party-state in the sense of 'capture' (Biezen & Kopecký, 2014) or 'colonisation' (Kopecký, 2006) of the state by the incumbent, the latter extracting from the former the resources that allow it to control and co-opt people, putting 'the part first', which is the title of the second section. Frelimo exclusionary language, which includes the labels 'comrade' and 'others', is a component of such control, which I also address in the second section. In the third section, I relativise the impact of this permanent control, as well as the appearance of full compliance by citizens with the party-state, introducing the notion of 'moments in the party-state,' here referring to circumstances and events specific to each of the two entities within the party-state itself.

5.1 The 'Estrutura'[90]

In Manjacaze, I suggest, the term *'estrutura'* is a fundamental starting point in our understanding of the organisation and the functioning of the party-state. Here I address two meanings of *'estrutura'*: one that is explicit locally and refers to a triad formed of chiefs, secretaries, and leaders" - *'estrutura'* is the group of managers [...] When I say 'manager', I mean chiefs, secretaries, and leaders."[91] The other is implicit in official documents such as the literature on structures of the State or Government (c.f., for example, Peters, 1985; Hall, 1983; Katzenstein, 1977) – that is, the 'internal organisation' of a certain entity, in this case, 'the party' and the State. I elaborate on these two meanings while also presenting the territorial organisation of both the state and 'the party' in Manjacaze, then show how they connect, complement each other, and overlap, resulting in the symbiosis that facilitates Frelimo political control. It should be emphasized, however, that in either of the two meanings of the *estrutura*, the discussion aims only to show how the party-state is composed and functions at the local level, without delving into the broader debate on the dynamics of local governance, in which it would be essential to address the Mozambican bifurcated system of local governance. Indeed, at the local level, i.e., from the province down, there coexist "local organs of the state" and municipalities (*autarquias*), the latter with elected bodies, generating much confusion regarding, among other things, the criteria for the creation of more municipalities, the division of roles between these and state bodies, the level of local autonomy of municipalities, and state control (see Alexander, 1997; Forquilha 2006, 2020; Weimer, 2012; Tvedten, 2009), a situation that became even more complicated when the traditional authorities were reintroduced in 2000 (see Florêncio, 2005; Gonçalves, 2006; Buur & Kyed, 2006; Mosley, 2021). I will refer to traditional authorities, but, concerning specifically the elements of the State in the estrutura, I will rely on those that make up the "local organs of the state," as specified in the Law of Local State Bodies (LOLE, 2003), which I will return to later. First, the local version of the *estrutura*.

In the local version, the chiefs represent the state, the secretaries represent the Party, and the leaders sit between these first two and the community: "The leaders represent the

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[90] Translated from the Portuguese, this means 'structure'.
[91] Gervásio Guimarães, former Administrative Post chief, interview Manjacaze, 29 January 2019.

community in the Government whilst the chiefs represent the Government in the community."[92] The Decree n° 12/2000, of 20 June, which established the norms of articulation between local organs of the State and the community authorities, refers to these leaders as community authorities, whose functions are both to represent "… local community interests and [work] as assistants of local state organs" (Buur & Kyed, 2006 , p. ii). My interlocutors, however, distinguish community and traditional leaders. The difference is that "while community leaders are elected and do not perform spirit evocation ceremonies, the *ku phahla* (spirit evocation ceremonies), traditional leaders do, and are chosen from within a given lineage".[93] Indeed, some are both community and traditional leaders. The previous interlocutor is just one example of this.

During the First Republic (1975-1990), 'leaders' in Mozambique were largely marginalized. They were even banned starting from 1978 (Alexander, 1977; Euclides, 2006), due, among other reasons, to their historical support for the colonial regime (Gonçalves, 2006; Buur & Kyed, 2007b; Forquilha, 2007, 2009). RENAMO took advantage of this situation to mobilise massive support in rural areas during the 1976-1992 civil war (Geffray, 1991; Pereira, 2006). However, there is evidence that even within the FRELIMO leadership, there were those who collaborated with traditional leaders (West, 2009), the reason why some argue that "although formally banned, the chieftaincy system continued in practice" (Buur & Kyed, 2006, p. 4). Yet, it was Renamo that advocated for their reintroduction during the negotiations of the General Peace Agreement in 1992, which eventually happened in 2000. Nonetheless, the roles were not clearly defined (Buur & Kyed, 2006). The ambiguity, which continues in practice as I will demonstrate later, revolves around whether they are truly representatives of local community interests or assistants of local state organs, but "the scale tips heavily towards the state-assistance role" (Ibid., p.ii). However, because the Frelimo party is intertwined with the State, as I show throughout this chapter, their reintroduction was seen by many as part of the strategy to expand Frelimo's influence into rural areas, which looked quite favourably on Renamo (cf., Brito, 2010; Forquilha, 2007). In fact, many leaders were successfully co-opted in favour of Frelimo, while many others were chosen from within Frelimo itself, from amongst

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[92] Gervásio Guimarães, Former Administrative Post Chief, interview Manjacaze, 29 January 2019.
[93] Jorge Timane, Community and Traditional leader. Interview, Manjacaze, 18 June 2018.

its secretaries at various levels (Gonçalves, 2006, 2012). Mr Timane, quoted above, is an example of the latter case.

As Mr Timane explained, after his uncle died in 1998, he became a traditional leader. However, following the approval of Decree n° 15/2000, he was also chosen to be a community leader, and began to carry out both functions, now with a quarterly subsidy of 2100 *meticals* (about 32 USD), paid by the State. For him, this payment is what legitimises his role as a state officer, but he has long been part of Frelimo 'structure':

> "Well, since they started paying me, I consider myself an official [of the state]. Now, here in my community, I represent the interests of the Government and work together with my party for the good of everyone ... They chose me because they know I have always been loyal [to the party] ... since Samora time,[94] I have been secretary for social affairs. I became the cell's first secretary..."

The secretaries, in turn, are eminently political or even partisan figures.[95] They are people who hold different leadership positions inside the Frelimo party, from the General Secretary at the national level, to the First Secretaries at the Provincial, District, Zone, and Locality levels, and those at the lower levels – secretaries of the *Circulo* (circles), cells, and other bodies that make up each level, such as finance, organisation, and mobilisation. There are also secretaries of Frelimo social bodies at all levels, including the Mozambican Women's Organization (OMM), the Mozambican Youth Organization (OJM), and the National Liberation Struggle Combatants Association (ACLLM).

The 'chiefs' are state figures and are, on the one hand, those in leadership positions, such as head of the Administrative Post, head of Locality and head of '*povoação,*' but on the other hand, for my interlocutors, a generic term to call all civil servants, including sector workers, that includes agricultural technicians and teachers, who, in my research sites, make up what Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan (2014, p.405-406) called high-density sectors: "High-density sectors…. are those in which the state's presence … is strongest and most visible by far [while] disabled [are those] in which the state has a low profile."

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[94] Samora was Mozambique's first president. He ruled from the country's independence in 1975 until his death in 1986.

[95] They should not be confused with state secretaries, state entities introduced in 2020, abolishing the ministries that, in the past, were responsible for labour, sports and youth.

Civil servants are 'chiefs'[96] because, according to Rito, a young student from Cambane, at the Chibonzane Administrative Post, "they are the ones who tell us what to do. When we need documents [for example, identity cards and certificates], we ask them. They guide us and, in electoral periods, they are the front liners, preparing rallies, distributing t-shirts…"[97] Noticeable here are some of the political functions performed by the chief, at the forefront of Frelimo's campaign activities. This happens because "if you are a chief, you belong to the party. If you are a leader, you belong to the party," clarifies Mário Nhandimo,[98] 'godfather' of one of the localities in Manjacaze.[99] Then he also mentioned the school director: "... and the school director, how did he become director? (...) all thanks to the Frelimo party. He belongs to the party."

Another important aspect stands out from Rito's speech: like many other interlocutors, he treats all civil servants as 'chiefs.' As revealed above, he considers the work of the 'chiefs' as favours, evidence of a problematic relationship between the State and the citizens those officials represent. The 'chiefs' present themselves as 'patrons,' while citizens appear as 'customers', suggesting that there are 'clientelist ties' between them. I will elaborate further on this clientelist relationship in the last three sections of this chapter. For now, I continue to address *estrutura* in terms of its second meaning, as the 'internal organisation' of 'the party' and the State. Two documents deserve mention: the Frelimo Statutes (EF, 2013, 2017) and the Law of Local State Bodies (LOLE, 2003).

Both documents contain specific sections on '*estrutura*', even though they do not define it explicitly: Chapter III of the LOLE (2003), for example, introduces the "Structure of the Local State Bodies", and Chapter V of the Frelimo Statutes is about "Party Structures". Separately, the two chapters address the territorial organisation of each entity, with a particular focus on their organic composition, their functioning, and the linkage between each of their bodies. It is, as previously mentioned, the approach to structure in terms of 'internal organisation,' or of 'bodies,' the second meaning of *estrutura*, that this chapter addresses.

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[96] Here, the term 'chiefs' has a double meaning: one, with quotation marks, that refers to civil servants, the other without quotation marks, that refers to the heads of organs in administrative posts, localities, villages/*povoações*, zones and blocks.

[97] Rito Brito. Interview, Manjacaze, 1 November 2019.

[98] Mario Nhandimo, Intervention in a Cell Revitalization Rally, Manjacaze, 12 June 2018.

[99] For each Locality, there is a godfather who links people from those localities to the Zone Committees. During the cell revitalization processes, they were sent by the zone committees to integrate the brigades.

For Frelimo, as for the State, the bodies, that is, the 'structures,' are at two levels: central and local. Likewise, 'local' starts at the Province, the level immediately below the Central Government. On the State side, however, LOLE[100] limits the State's territorial organisation to the Locality, being silent about the levels below, namely the *Povoação*, Zone and Block. At the same time, the Party has always been clear about what it designates as 'party bases' (art. 35) – the cells – in all neighbourhoods and workplaces (Figure 8). Since then, 'the Party' is physically more 'represented' at 'the local', at least if compared to the State, a situation that is slightly balanced with the approval of Law n° 11/2012, of 8 February, which revises the LOLE, starting to recognise the *povoação* as "the smallest territorial unit of the organisation, functioning and permanent contact of the local State administration with the communities" (art. 14A). However, as addressed in the next section, even with this change, below the Locality, the situation of State representation remains quite ambiguous, being the place of greatest confluence with the party, which acts as the main access point to interact and, thus, to experience the party-state itself. As I show throughout this chapter, this has implications.

As Figure 8 below illustrates, for each 'state structure', there is another, at the same level, in the party. For the provincial level, for example, for the newly created Secretary of State,[101] on the party side, there is the Provincial Committee. For the District Government, on the party side, a District Committee. At Administrative Posts and Localities, the last two *de facto* on the State side, there are peculiarities:[102] on the Party side, like at the above levels, the Committees prevail, together with other Bodies, namely Conferences, Secretariats, General Meetings and Liaison Elements. On the State side, however, in these two levels, there are just one to two bodies – (being) the chief – the Administrative Post chief, and the Locality chief, part of them. Thus, on the state side, down at the 'hierarchical structure', the Bodies are fewer, the same happening with other civil servants, especially in Administrative Posts and Localities, sometimes with just one, the chief himself. In the Party, conversely, at all levels, there are many Bodies, which reinforces the previous finding about a greater representation

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[100] Despite Decree 11/2005, of 10 June, which approves the Regulation of Local State Bodies, mentioning the *povoação*, it remains silent on its attributions, organisation, and functioning, thus maintaining the ambiguity.

[101] Before the 2019 general elections, the Provincial Government was the local state Body at the Provincial level. The functions of that Government, which, within the scope of the current decentralization process, has become municipality.

[102] For the moment, I omit the *povoação*, for reasons that become obvious in the next section.

of the Party than that of the State, especially at the lower levels of the *estrutura*, now in terms of Bodies. It is worth mentioning that only state Bodies "... can by law make decisions on behalf of the State" (Macuácua, 2019, p.97).

Figure 8: The Party and the State in Manjacaze.

Highlighting the weak representation of the State and, above all, its weaknesses at the local level, Paulo Jesse, the head of an administrative post I repeatedly mention in subsequent sections, pointed out: "I'm the state here. If I get sick, the State also gets sick,"[103] adding that "we dream of having staff even in localities and *povoação*. We would like to have state employees." In fact, in at least one of the localities of the Administrative Post, the administration was composed only of the respective head, which is why, when he was absent,

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[103] Paulo Jesse, Administrative Post chief, interview, 16 June 2018.

including to carry out political functions, citizens were completely deprived of access to State services in that institution once it was closed.

In section 3, on 'The party first,' I will discuss how different elements of *estrutura* at the same level interpenetrate and sometimes complement each other. It is now important to recall the double meaning of structure presented above: the first, explicit locally, as a triad formed by chiefs, secretaries, and leaders, representing, respectively, the state and the Party and, in the case of the leaders, located between the first two and the community; the second, as the 'internal organisation' of the party and the state, implicit in their official documents, namely the Law of Local State Bodies (LOLE, 2003), the legislation that complements it, and the Frelimo Statutes (EF, 2013, 2017). As became evident, especially from the local version, the term '*estrutura*' is a key starting point for understanding the organisation and functioning of the party-state. The next two sections continue presenting this '*Estrutura*' element at the lower levels, focusing first on the village, a party-state location par excellence.

5.1.1 The povoação

In his study of the Western African party-state in the 1960s, Aristide Zolberg (1966) argued that the overlap between the state and the party was more intense at the top and the bottom of the power structure. Here I corroborate his view, even if focusing only on the bottom. I show that the *povoação* is the locus of the party-state par excellence. It is, as mentioned earlier, the entry point at which to interact and thus learn about the state and experience the local party-state. This happens because, while their position in the State is, in practice, ambiguous, in the party it is clear, at least for some of its holders, who consider themselves more integrated into the party than the State. First, the situation of the *povoação* in the State.

The constitution of the Republic of Mozambique (CRM, 2004, art.7) establishes that the *povoação* is one of the Mozambican state's territorial organisational echelons, the smallest, according to article 14 of Law n° 11/2012, of 8 February, which carries out the occasional revision of Law n°8/2003, of 19 May, the Law of Local State Bodies (LOLE). The article also specifies that the *povoação* is the permanent contact entity of the local State administration with the community. This law fills a gap left by the LOLE and by Decree n°11/2005 of 10 June,

which regulates it. LOLE simply does not refer to the *povoação*, circumscribing the territorial scope of the State's Local Bodies from the province level, the maximum, to that of Locality, the minimum (articles 11, 12, 13 and 14). Its regulation, however, mentions the *povoação* as one of the "State Local Levels" (art.8 of Decree n° 11/2005) but is silent about its organisation and functioning, contrary to what happens with the levels above, namely the Province, District, Administrative Post, and Locality. Law n° 11/2012 corrects this scenario, making the *povoação* the first territorial unit regarding organisation, function and community contact. Its importance, also for the structure of the State, is widely recognised on the ground, as António Gonzalo, himself a civil servant in Manjacaze, points out:

> "The focus of the *estrutura* is on the *povoação*. The *povoações* lead the functioning of the 'Structure' at the base. Without them, I can guarantee we would not even have a Locality. They [chiefs of *povoação*] make all contacts and connections, and work directly with the community and traditional leaders, religious leaders, party representatives, heads of blocks …"[104]

The chief of the *povoação* is the first entity to whom citizens turn to access various State services. They issue *declarações* (declarations),[105] indispensable for any State service, collect taxes, and mobilise people for events, among other functions: "All State issues start at the *povoação*. All that goes up to locality, [Administrative] Post, District… up to Maputo [central government], is done by the chief of the *Povoação*. Nobody can go to the locality without going through the *povoação*. The Chief of the p*ovoação* issues declarations for loans, energy contracts, deaths… For most [public] services, people go to the chief of *povoação* first because he knows the people. Everyone must go there. Locality does not control the grassroots [while the *povoação* does]."

Below the *povoação*, there are blocks made up of ten households and Zones, which are sets of blocks (see Figure 8). *Povoações*, like Zones and Blocks, are headed by 'chiefs,' a designation that, as I showed in the previous section, is locally given to all civil servants. However, despite this designation, and the fact that they are indispensable to the entire *estrutura* of the State, as also mentioned above, the *povoação* itself, like the entities below,

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[104] António Gonzalo, administrative technician, interview, Manjacaze, 12 December 2018.
[105] In Portuguese, *Declarações*, are documents that confirm that the person who demands them is from a certain neighbourhood. It is necessary for installing electricity, water, and other services, also serving as important control elements at the local level.

exists without any 'formal organisation' and none of these chiefs is also formally linked to the State, through employment contracts, for example. Incidentally, in the case of the *povoação*, many consider themselves essentially party figures, as per the following testimony:

> "… I have been in the party for a long time [now]. It has been 8 years now as chief of the p*ovoação* (sic). Before I worked in the cell's finances… When they chose me as chief, I expected to be paid a salary because they said I would work for the state. They just say 'wait, wait …', but they never give us anything. I can only say that I continue helping my party … without a salary … have you ever seen an official [of the state] who is not paid?"[106]

In fact, it is not only because they depend on the party's trust to ascend to their positions that they consider themselves more connected to the party, but also, in the case of many, because they additionally perform the function of party secretary, some even before they become *povoação* chiefs. In some places, this accumulation of functions is standardised, as can be seen from the short extract from a conversation with Américo Jossias, one of the administrative post chiefs in Manjacaze. The question is, "who are the secretaries here in this administrative post? … We don't have [other secretaries] here. This separation is for towns and cities. Here it is the chiefs of the *povoação* themselves who work as secretaries."[107]

Indeed, depending on the composition of the circles, there are situations in which the heads of *povoação* are not secretaries. For example, where the circles coincide with the territorial space of the *povoação*, such as in some areas of Chibonzane Administrative Post, the secretaries are themselves chiefs. However, where the circles combine different *povoação*, as in Chidenguele Administrative Post, the chiefs of *povoação* are distinct from the secretaries.[108] However, even when they are distinct from the secretaries, the leaders consider themselves more connected to the party than to the State, also due to their lack of remuneration and the absence of any contractual bond, as mentioned above. At the lower levels, the overlap is more generalised, with *povoação* structures as the basis for the composition of party structures. The blocks, for example, are cells themselves and their heads are also cell secretaries, while zone chiefs are scattered among the different circle

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[106] Titos Goene, interview, Manjacaze, 24 August 2018.

[107] Américo Jossias, head of an Administrative Post, interview, Manjacaze, 1 November 2018.

[108] It is important to highlight here that the situation described here refers to the period prior to the creation of the figure of the Circle Committee, which I address in section 5.1.2.

secretariats.[109] More precisely, this means that some party cells are not composed, of "… a minimum of three members and a maximum of fifteen members," as defined by the cell manual (art. 3, section XV of the cell manual, 2017), but sometimes of more than thirty members, since they are based on blocks and therefore vary with the number of households of each block. This accumulation, however, especially in the blocks, stems from the difficulties Frelimo has in in mobilising their members to actively engage in the party, becoming, among other things, party secretaries, as will be further demonstrated in Chapter 6.

Thus, at the lowest level, the overlap between the State and the party is generalised, which stems in part from the ambiguity of the position of certain elements of the *estrutura* in the State, and given this ambiguity, such elements that, in practice, are indispensable to the State itself, also serve the interests of the party, to which they consider themselves more connected. This situation implies that, at the local level, the party is the entry point from which residents' access, interact with and experience the state, which is thus presents itself as a party-state. What follows is an analysis of how the State is used to reinforce the party.

5.1.2 The 'new' Locality Committee: When the state reinforces the party

> "Comrades! Assist the party in creating the Locality Committee. The Locality does not have an equivalent figure. So, the heads [of Locality] are suffocated when electoral periods arrive ... this [measure] was already approved at the party level. We must help create this figure to reduce the burden on the heads of localities ... we must create this committee... we are from 'the party' … we need to help the party."[110]

The speech above, by the head of an Administrative Post in Manjacaze, was delivered at a State event on 22 May 2018. It was an Ordinary Session of the Secretariat of the Administrative Post that said head was leading. I was among the participants as a guest, together with the refereed head of the administrative post, in these sessions designated "President of the Body", and other twenty people: five Heads of Locality, six school directors,

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[109] In addition to the First Secretary, the circle is composed of a Secretary for Organisation, Mobilisation and Finance, and a secretary for each social organ of the party, namely, the Organisation of Mozambican Youth (OJM), the Organisation of Mozambican Women (OMM) and the Association of National Liberation Struggle Fighters (ACLIN).

[110] Paulo Jesse, Intervention at administrative post session, Manjacaze, 22 May 2018.

two health technicians, an extension worker, an employee of Mozambique Electricity Company (EDM), an employee from the water sector, two administrative post technicians, one police officer, and Frelimo's secretary of mobilisation and organisation at the Zone level. It was already an electoral context since the first phase of voter registration was underway. In his speech, the head of the administrative post drew the participant's attention to the approaching general elections due to be held a year later. He then listed the problems that the absence of a locality committee created, namely the difficulties in coordinating party activities associated with the overloading of the locality chief, also jeopardising his ability to work for the State.

Indeed, the Locality Committee and its respective First Secretary was a new position in the Party. It had just been introduced into its statutes in 2017 after being approved at that party's Eleventh Congress in the same year. Earlier, the 2013 Statutes identified only five levels in the local party structure: province, district, zone, circle, and cell (art. 39). After the zone, which corresponds to the jurisdiction of the Administrative Post, those Statutes foresaw Bodies at the circle level, and then cells, resulting – as one of the former secretaries of a circle described the organisation and the functioning of the party at that level – in "a mess":

> "The different party leaders organised the party the way they wanted. There was no order, there was no harmony, and this complicated our work. Following the hierarchy that exists in the State facilitates our work ... since [without this harmonisation] the chief [of locality] had no one to answer to in the party. '...It was a mess.'"[111]

Frelimo's 2013 Statutes were relatively vague about the conditions under which the *circles* could be created: "When the number of members, socioeconomic importance or particular conditions so require, the cells may be grouped into Circles, by decision of the Body they depend on" (art. 32). There were situations in which, in the same locality, they created two circles, each combining up to four *povoações*, while other localities matched the number of circles to the number of *povoações*, each *povoação* being a distinct circle. The hierarchy, however, was rather clearer: "The Circles will depend directly on the Zone, District, Province or Central Committee Bodies, depending on the specific conditions and importance" (ibid.).

As the last interlocutor mentions, the 2017 statutes eliminated the 'mess' in the organisation of local party structures. They did so by adding to the party a level corresponding to that of

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[111] Gabito Malô, former first circle secretary. Interview, Manjacaze, 27 November 2018.

Locality, with a Locality Committee and its respective head, the First Secretary of Locality: "The local Party bodies have, in principle, provincial, district, zone, *locality*, circle and cell jurisdiction" (art. 34).[112] Thus, the party was reinforced at the local level with a new entity, the committee and the First Secretary of the Locality.

I underscore, however, that State figures took the lead to reinforce the party at a State event. The head of the administrative post quoted at the beginning of this section, for example, even drew attention to the urgency with which the 'comrades of the State' should help 'the party',[113] noting that they should also be pioneers in this endeavour: "... we are already taking too long. The political year is approaching. The party overburdens you [the Heads of Locality] because you do not have this [Secretary of Locality Committee] figure. We must be pioneers..."

This urgency, but also the protagonism that the leader seeks, also had to do with his interests in the party and those of his entourage. Elections are crucial moments of visibility and evaluation of the actors who compose 'the *estrutura'* and of other party members. In the case of the 'chief' I quoted here, he made it clear that he intended to guarantee his promotion after the elections, which happened not in the State but in the party itself, as he later left his position in the State to assume an even more important leadership position in the party. At the same time, most of his wards were also placed in better positions, some in the State. The next section addresses how and why the Party is put first in the symbiosis with the State, thus taking advantage of state resources to produce and reproduce its power and remain hegemonic in Manjacaze.

5.2 The party first

The hierarchy between the actors who make up the *estrutura* is clear, even for the *estrutura* members themselves: the party is first, not the chiefs or the leaders. The chiefs, who are civil servants, are considered deputies of the secretaries who are party figures [see arrow direction in figure 8]. Likewise, the leaders also submit to the secretaries, and the chiefs follow in the

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[112] Emphasis added.
[113] Later, I address the meaning of 'comrade' in the contexts studied here.

hierarchy. If the leaders are not the secretaries themselves, they work directly with them, but together and under the secretary's 'supervision'. Here is an excerpt from a conversation with a former head of a Locality:

> "The chief is the second in command ... The head of locality [for example] is an assistant to the secretary of the locality committee, who is the first. At the Administrative Post is the same: there is the First Secretary of the zone committee and the head of the administrative post. The head of the administrative post is also an assistant [and so on]."[114]

When there are meetings or other party events, state officials, most notably the heads of Administrative Posts and Localities, School Directors, or those they choose to represent them – usually teachers – are obliged to attend.[115] In fact, the heads of administrative posts and localities are permanent guests at the party sessions and when district delegations visit their territories. When the latter occurs, for example, the chiefs work with the secretaries to prepare, relegating the state's activities to a secondary plan, but all, including civil servants, favour partisan activities. When asked about the implications of his absence from classes during an evaluation period, a crucial time in the education sector, a School Director's explanation was: "The Party summoned me. I have no option! They [from the Party] are not doing well because they did not tell me in advance. The head of the locality just told me about the meeting yesterday. So, there is nothing else I could do to prepare. I left the students with tasks to do. When I am back, I will see how to catch up ... the Party is in charge."[116]

According to Paulo Manjate, another school director, the "school director is a political officer, and therefore, [our] absences to address Party issues are not sanctioned ... [because] ... we are working anyway."[117] Some are released from duty for longer periods, even years, but they keep their salaries in the state, as I could verify in one of the administrative posts. In that location, the first zone secretary, who is a teacher, is released from teaching activities to focus exclusively on his activities in ´The Party. ´ Still, he retains all his benefits in the state as a teacher. This is one of the ways in which state resources are used to support the party.[118]

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[114] Elton Gule, former head of locality, interview, Manjacaze, 7 June 2018.
[115] Julião Cossa, administrative technician, interview, Manjacaze, 22 January 2019.
[116] José Cavane, School director, Interview, Manjacaze, 12 June 2018.
[117] Paulo Manjate, School director, Interview, Manjacaze, 29 June 2018.
[118] In Section 3, and indeed all the thesis, mentions other ways in which Frelimo uses state resources to feed its clientelism, patronage and political control.

Teachers who hold positions as Mobilisation Secretaries are partially laid off, which, for some, means assigning only one shift to teaching or administrative activities. For all the chiefs, however, "the party is first" because, as they claim, and the party always recall them, it is thanks to the party that they hold their positions in the state; that is, if they are civil servants, and especially for those in leadership positions, it is because the party decided that they should be so. The following are the words of a locality chief in Chidenguele, addressing the participants in a public rally: "You know me. You know that I am head of a locality (….) I did become head of a locality for a reason. This position did not fall from the sky. I am here because of the Party. The party put me here..."[119]

Then he added:

> "And you… You have water here, don't you? You have electricity, schools… all this belongs to *Mfumo* (State), but *Mfumo* belongs to whom? [Mozambique Electricity Company] EDM belongs to whom? Some will say, 'Ah, but we have water because World Vision [an NGO] brought it.' World Vision belongs to whom? Who tells them to come here? … All this …*Mfumo*, projects… belong to Frelimo. Frelimo is in charge."[120]

Dalton Chemo's speech, the head of the referenced locality, like that of Paulo Jesse, the head of the administrative post quoted at the opening of the previous section, was delivered at a State event. It was a ceremony celebrating the Mozambican army day on 25 September 2019. The chief of the locality's entourage included mainly teachers and staff from the local health centre, and the ceremony occurred in the health centre. This event became a Frelimo campaign activity, which is recurrent, especially during election periods. Frelimo uses these 'State moments' as 'party moments', reinforcing the confusion between the party and the State in people's minds. In these 'moments', both the State chiefs from different levels and sectors and citizens in general are constantly reminded that they must thank Frelimo and that 'everything belongs to Frelimo.' Some examples.

During a zone committee meeting on 18 June 2018, soon after the attendance check, where the leaders noted the absence of some of the school directors whom they counted on for that event, the secretary for organisation and mobilisation reminded everyone present: "do not forget that you are chiefs and school directors thanks to the Party. The Party is a mother; the

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[119] Dalton Chemo, extract from his speech during Army Day celebrations, Manjacaze, 25 September 2019.
[120] Ibid.

State is a father. Do not ever forget this! Being here [in the party] is a condition of being there [in the State]. Let that be very clear!"[121]

The speech is like that of Dalton Chemo, the head of the locality quoted above, but being recurrent, it also has similarities with many others, such as one made by a locality godfather[122] during cell revitalization rally they held six days before the zone committee session. At this meeting, the locality godfather, after alluding to some misrepresented episodes from the national liberation struggle,[123] reminded the attendees that "…. everything is in the party. It belongs to the Party," having also stressed that this included all management and leadership positions. He concluded by urging all participants to be more involved in Frelimo activities, appointing the head of the locality as the key figure who connected them to the party in that area:

> "Look! If we can do our will, it is thanks to Frelimo … *Lhoniphani* [respect Frelimo], the one who gave you your life.... Down *khu bhavelana* [hate] .... From today, we want you to be more active in the party. If there are any problems here, talk to the head of the locality. He will take your concerns to the party."[124]

Thus, the party comes first, even for the 'chiefs' themselves.[125] They do this for different reasons, which include their own interests, as I also showed in the previous section. However, they also do it because they are subject to political control themselves, including in the logic of power by anticipated coercion I mentioned earlier; that is, an internalised perceived threat of the reaction of a patron that forces one to act according to his interests, even if the threat is not always explicit (Smith, 1997; Kabeer, 2006). 'Chiefs', for example, are 'forced' to act in favour of what they perceive are the party's interests, controlling people, even though they also have their own interests in the party. Earlier I mentioned the chief who was promoted by the party after performing good work in the 2019 general elections. Here is another example of how the perception of a potential for coercion, combined with the personal

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[121] Juvêncio Muholove, Frelimo Secretary for Organization and Mobilization. Extract taken from her opening speech at a Zone session, Manjacaze, 18 June 2018.

[122] For each locality, there is a godfather who links people from those localities to the zone committees. During the cell revitalization processes, they were sent by the zone committees to integrate the brigades.

[123] The focus of the presentation was simply to show that Frelimo saved the country from the Portuguese coloniser, the 'villain'. The 'godfather' presented Frelimo as a party that has always been united, without contradictions, which is unrealistic. The issue of leadership disputes, especially after the death in 1969 of Eduardo Mondlane, its first president, is just one example.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Here, the word 'chiefs' is used, with quotation marks, to refer to civil servants, and without quotation marks, for the heads of administrative posts and localities, in addition to those from *povoações*, zones and blocks.

interests of a chief, influences how they act. The speech is by another head of an administrative post:

> "I do not know if you understand… but it is like this: you either survive [obeying the party], or you are isolated here, Chaimite. Being isolated is worse than death here in the countryside... I have my daughters to feed and educate.... "[126]

In turn, the chiefs, who must also demonstrate good work for the party, act to reproduce and transfer the same logic of political and social control that are inculcated within the party to society as a whole, which happens daily, but with peculiarities in electoral periods, as will become evident throughout this thesis. In any of the situations, however, there is fear, including of 'isolation', as the above administrative chief head mentions. In the same conversation, the chief said: "one day, I will write about the things that happen here. It is too much Chaimite! Now, being here, it is dangerous."[127]

The party seeks to instil and maintain an image of 'danger' in the minds of different members of the *estrutura* and for them to disseminate the message to citizens in general. To this end, they also mobilise an exclusionary language, itself part of the socio-political control mechanisms at the local level, as shown below. The labels 'comrade' and 'others' are part of such language.

5.2.1 The 'comrade'

It was 16 May 2018, the first day of my fieldwork in Manjacaze. I had just moved into a teachers' condominium, and one of the teachers, who would later become part of Frelimo's top leadership in Manjacaze, welcomed me and asked: "is everything okay, Comrade?" Noticing my hesitation to include the word 'Comrade' in my answer, the teacher continued: "yes, comrade! Here we call ourselves Comrade… unless you are from the opposition."[128]

In Mozambique, the word 'comrade' does not just mean a partner or friend,[129] a generic term of affection and closeness, but also has political connotations, referring to Frelimo members

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[126] Américo Jossias, Administrative Post Chief, interview, Manjacaze, 7 November 2018.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Obadias Guilende, Frelimo First Secretary, Conversation, Manjacaze, 16 May 2018.
[129] See https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/comrade

or supporters, whilst the party itself is known widely as the 'party of the comrades'.[130] As in other quadrants, the integration of the term 'Comrade' in the political language of the country, and its consequent association with Frelimo derives from its left-wing past. It is precisely in this political sense that the teacher I quoted above used it to refer to Frelimo members or supporters, which is why I hesitated when I answered him since I have no connections with Frelimo and was not familiar with that type of greeting. The teacher's message was clear, however: that teachers' condominium was a 'Frelimo space' and the teachers themselves were Frelimo supporters. His tone indicated that opposition was not welcome, but it was equally evident that the term is also used for political control, as I later realized when I inquired further about its local usage.

"Comrade is a way of identifying [Frelimo members]",[131] commented Juvêncio Muholove, Frelimo Secretary for organisation and mobilisation at the zone level. However, when I questioned a former leader of the Mozambican Youth Organisation (OJM), the youth wing of Frelimo, about how to interpret a situation in which someone shows discomfort when treated as a comrade, as happened to me in the situation I described above, his response was illuminating: "I would understand that this person was not from the same pot; he was from another pot [i.e., from the opposition]."[132] About six months had passed since the episode involving the teacher, and it was clear then that I had failed the first control test that had been set for me. The former leader then went further, explaining that a "Comrade is one who stands firm in the party; those who work for Frelimo day and night, without hesitating..."[133] Firmness implies also being available to participate in party activities, including to block 'other' parties' activities, using "… sabotage and, if necessary, physical [and patrimonial] violence".[134] This is what 'shock groups' do, and in Chapter 6, I address in detail these violent means of political control in Manjacaze.

It follows that, at the State level, the widespread use of the term 'Comrade' among its agents is equally illustrative of both the Party's preponderance and domination over that institution,

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[130] Comrade is a person who is a member of the same communist or socialist political party as the person speaking". https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/comrade
[131] Jorsio Malate, former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid.
[134] Jorsio Malate, former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.

as demonstrated in the previous section, and the very political identity of those who compose it. This is how one can understand expressions such as Comrade Minister, Comrade Chief, Comrade Commander, among others. Here are number of further examples.

On 10 April 2018, in an ordinary session of the Mozambican Parliament, Verônica Macamo, the president of that sovereign body, addressed the then Minister of Education and Human Development, Conceita Surtane, saying, "Comrade Minister." Some members of Parliament murmured and laughed. Visibly 'annoyed' by their reaction, the President added: "She is my comrade," and moved on to other subjects. At 'the local, there are much more examples.

On 5 December 2018, at a locality Advisory Council meeting in Chimbonzane, one head of the locality referred to a police commander as 'Comrade Commander'. As I was there and was still a stranger to that officer, who was meeting me for the first time at that meeting, he turned first to the head of the administrative post, with whom I had joined the meeting, then to me, and added: "Excuse us [the others], but that is what we call each other here [and continued saying]: Comrade commander, our locality does not even have a police officer (…) if we could 'borrow' one now… "[135]. In this meeting, apart from me, the other 'comrades' included teachers, said commander and the head of the administrative post. The administrative post head, whom they called 'Comrade Chief' in these meetings, dispelled the head of the locality's doubts about me, saying: "You can be at ease. We are all comrades here";[136] in other words, we are all Frelimo members. Then the 'comrade chief of locality' continued, addressing, among other things, the implications of the lack of police officer in the locality, lack of motorcycles for the chiefs, lack of public transport, and lack of personnel in the administration.

In short, at 'the local level', 'Comrade' is not just a political identification term but is also used for political control. These two aspects – political identification and political control – are key to the double dimension that Dean (2019) identifies as being implicit in the term comrade. For Dean (ibid), camaraderie relations presuppose inclusion and exclusion. The first dimension implies horizontality and equality between individuals considered 'comrades', while the second, on the other hand, identifies 'the others' – therefore, outside that

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[135] Garrido Mazive, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 November 2018.
[136] Américo Jossias, Administrative Post Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 21 November 2018.

relationship. It is precisely in this double dimension that the term is used at the local level. Now I consider the second dimension – that of the excluded – 'the others.'

5.2.2 The 'others'

As part of the exclusive dimension, 'others' are defined in opposition to 'Comrades.' They are all those who do not support Frelimo, including opposition members and anyone indifferent to party issues. They are excluded, marginalised and sometimes persecuted, which is why, according to Jorsio Malate, former OJM Secretary at an administrative post level, "… if you are 'other', you must hide here. Some say *'long live Frelimo'* when they are not Comrades [Frelimo members and supporters]. They are afraid of reprisals."[137]

Other adjectives for 'the others' include 'lost', 'left', and 'discontented', but amongst the more explicit are those presented in Chapter 4 that refers to Renamo and the opposition, including 'matsangas', 'bandits' and 'assassins', part of the legacy of war. But how is it possible to identify the 'other' in Manjacaze, since not everyone makes their party orientation explicit?

They are sought both internally, among the 'comrades' themselves, and externally, in the community, and this is ongoing as part of the process of political control. Concerning those who are wanted internally, also known as spies, traitors or 'internal enemies', to use a common expression from the single party period (1975-1990), a high party leader in Manjacaze warned: "Be aware! Elections are coming ... There are many fake comrades here. We must be vigilant because 'the enemy' may be with us…. [Can] sing with us and wear our t-shirts, but still, be *xicova* [from Renamo].[138] Comrades, we cannot play! Let us be attentive! These are elections…"[139]

The criteria for identifying 'the other' is simple: if a person does not show up at party events, and, in the case of civil servants, does not pay party fees, or complains when the party automatically deducts the amount for quotas from their salary, then he is 'other.' It is worse if he makes negative comments about the Government or the party, and even worse if such

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[137] Jorsio Malate, Former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.
[138] *Xicova* is a misrepresentation of the Renamo symbol, which is a partridge. From the Changana, *Xicova* means owl, an ominous bird. This distortion aims to show that Renamo is 'a bad thing'.
[139] Bastos Nassone, Frelimo Secretary. Extract from his speech at an OMM shock group members' meeting, Manjacaze, 21 November 2018.

negative comments are frequent:

> "We see that the person is lost by the way he speaks in meetings and other spaces here in the community. In Frelimo meetings [for example] when everything is the other way around for him, then we can see that this one is not with us. When the party says let's do this and he doesn't do it or does the opposite, he's not with us. Sometimes he does, but he sabotages it. When he is given the floor and he say things from his head [understand that this ability is critical], he is lost... so we talk to one or two people to try to find out what his situation is; to correct it... it was like that with X [name of someone identified as a Renamo member]. We sent two comrades, and they went to talk to X. He said, 'I don't want to know about Frelimo; they are thieves...' so we realised that he was not on our side; That person is on the left."[140]

In Chapter 8, on 'resistance in Manjacaze', I address in more detail the case of the Renamo supporter mentioned above. Here the quotation highlights that being critical, not participating in meetings, and refusing to obey any order from the party, are aspects that lead to being identified as 'other', and therefore from the opposition. In this vein, those who express themselves as being from the opposition are clearly 'others', but everyone is always under strict surveillance, and that surveillance intensifies in electoral periods.

I was also tested many times, but here is an example to illustrate how it works. It happened on 21 November 2018, when one of the top Frelimo secretaries in Manjacaze visited Chimbonzane, where I was conducting my fieldwork. After the visit, at the chiefs' usual banquet, they began talking about the hidden debts and, more specifically, Manuel Chang's imprisonment.[141] The visiting secretary reproduced the argument about external interference and sabotage mentioned a few days before by Roque Silva, Frelimo General Secretary. According to Roque Silva, Chang's arrest was yet another assault by the international community, specifically the 'Americans', aiming to destabilise the country after failed attempts, namely the freezing of state budget financing. The 'visitor' said that "... after the 'westerners' realised that we could survive without their money, they came with other attacks. They are always like that..." As he spoke, others shook their heads, showing agreement. Then, suddenly, he turned to me: "Chaimite don't you agree?" Without

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[140] Jorsio Malate, Former OJM Secretary, interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.

[141] 'Hidden debts' refers to one of the biggest financial scandals in Mozambique. The Government of the former President, Armando Guebuza, illegally contracted debts of more than two billion US dollars without the consent of the Parliament, as required by law. Their uncovering, after the change of government in 2015, triggered an economic crisis in the country with numerous social implications. Manuel Chang is a former Finance Minister who was imprisoned in South Africa because of his involvement in this scandal.

hesitation, I responded, "Oh no! That is the opposite. I completely agree. Comrade, you are right." I had learned from the episode with the teacher I mentioned earlier, but I had also been told to always agree with the '*estruturas',* to avoid getting into trouble. In fact, after that meeting, in another conversation with an administrative post head, the latter commented: "I saw that you were attentive that day. Woe to you if you had disagreed with the boss! You could not be here now…"[142]

On another occasion, for fear of being suspected of supporting the opposition, one of the heads of the locality felt obliged to attend an Administrative Post session, even though he was seriously ill. Here is his explanation, in response to my question about the reasons why he felt obliged to do so:

> "I cannot miss it. I could even send the school director, but I am afraid. In these [election] periods, illnesses do not count. If I fail to attend a meeting, I might be suspected [of being other]. They may think it is sabotage because these are crucial times."[143]

A few weeks before elections, party brigades visit different areas to start mobilising people for party activities. On some of these occasions, school directors are responsible for preparing the events. One of them failed to complete 'his duties', not even informing the community, and worse, being absent when the visitors arrived. The visitors immediately met to discuss the situation. The first comment came from the head of the locality, who said: "We suspect this director. It is not the first time [he does this sabotage], and he knew we were coming here."[144] The head of the administrative post replied that he would act.

The actions against 'the others' vary, but isolation is a 'rule of thumb': citizens, in general, are isolated; some are even blocked from accessing public services, in addition to being beaten or their properties vandalised, especially in electoral periods. Given that I analyse these violent means of controlling and blocking dissent in Chapter 8, next I focus specifically on actions taken against 'internal enemies' – those suspected amongst the civil servants.

If suspected, civil servants are also isolated, but according to Américo Jossias, the administrative post head mentioned in the previous section, "[isolation] equals death in the

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[142] Américo Jossias, Administrative Post Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 21 November 2018.
[143] Dalton Chemo, Interview, Manjacaze, 17 September 2019.
[144] Garrido Mazive, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 November 2018.

countryside".[145] If they are in leadership positions, when they are suspected, demotion is the sanction. The warnings first: "If today you are what you are [chiefs or leaders], thanks to Frelimo ... If you do not comply with Frelimo rules, you know what happens, don't you? (...) you know... it is hard to go back. haha [laughs]. It really hurts, hey!"[146]

Then demotion:

> "We are all political [figures]... We are removed from office and demoted if we do not attend party meetings. They [the party] immediately say [that] 'you are selling out the country'. I know three of our colleagues who were replaced because of this."[147]

One of the main forms of isolation is the transference to a remote area. Teachers know the measure well. For them, there are the so-called "re-education schools".[148] In Manjacaze, some of these schools are in Manhique, in Ponjoane, a Locality in the Administrative Post of Chibonzane. Others are in Memo and Matumatawalo, both in Macuácua Administrative Post. In all these places, basic services are even more deficient. In the case of Manhique, for example, in addition to water and electricity shortages, public transportation is a particularly serious issue. The latter is available only on Mondays and Fridays, making one round trip each day. It leaves Manhique before 4 am and returns in the late afternoon. For these reasons, if civil servants choose to leave Manhique for the weekend, classes and other public services are only available three days a week: Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays. Most are therefore forced to stay in Manhique for longer periods as, if they leave without the possibility of coming back in time to fulfil their duties, they may be sanctioned.

> "In Memo, Matumatawalo, Mulhengetava and Manhique, there are re-education schools. We name them so because they only send those teachers, they consider suspicious. It is a punishment."[149]

Professor Heik, a teacher and now the only opposition member in the Manjacaze Municipal Assembly, was sent to one of the re-education schools in Mulhengetava. According to him, despite being a Frelimo member at the time, this happened because he criticized school leadership and government decisions in the education sector.[150] Being a primary school,

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[145] Américo Jossias, Administrative Post Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 21 November 2018.
[146] Mário Nhandimo, Godfather, Extract from his speech in a cell revitalization meeting, Manjacaze, 12 June 2018.
[147] Justino Paúnde, School Director, Interview, Manjacaze, 29 June 2018.
[148] Zelma Marina, Teacher, Interview, Manjacaze, 4 November 2018.
[149] Zelma Marina, Teacher, Interview, Manjacaze, 4 November 2018.
[150] Heik Sitoe, Teacher, Interview, Manjacaze, 5 November 2019.

Mulhengetava did not need, and had no space for, a physics teacher, although as a secondary school teacher this was his subject. For this reason, he sees no other explanation for his transfer than: "… I had to be isolated… [as] I was a danger for them… so they put me there [in a re-education school]."

After resisting the move, Professor Heik managed to leave the "re-education school". Still, his story, together with others mentioned throughout this and other sections, are just examples of what happens to those perceived as 'others': exclusion, marginalisation and persecution. They are treated as 'lesser citizens,' with fewer rights, at least compared to 'the comrades', the full citizens and the privileged. As one cell secretary points out, "with a party card, you show that you are a full citizen in this country,"[151] unlike 'the others.' However, the privilege of 'the comrades', to the detriment of 'the others,' is only possible because, at the local level, Frelimo is '*messa ni beúla*' (knife and Ax), as it openly calls itself in one of its songs:

> *"Ferelimoooo!!!* [Frelimo]
> *hi messa ni beúla.* [knife and axe]
> *Hi ta hine keh?* [What does it do?]
> *Hita tsemelela, tsemelela hinkwasfu swo biha."* (Repeat this line many times.) [It cuts, cuts everything bad.]

The song makes clear that Frelimo is the alpha and the omega. As such, being a 'knife and axe,' it chooses who is in and who is out, including for accessing public services and what is good and bad. The opposition and all 'others' are considered bad and not welcome at the local level,' a space perceived as exclusively for Frelimo. Thus, the label 'other' and 'Comrade' are part of Frelimo's exclusionary language, a component of control. Exclusion, marginalisation, persecution, and, as I demonstrate in chapter 6, even violence falls on those considered other, especially during elections. A reflection now follows on 'moments in the party-state,' specific circumstances and events of each entity within the party-state itself.

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[151] Maria Josefina, Cell Secretary, extract from her speech at a cell meeting, 20 November 2018.

5.3 'Moments' in the Party-State

From the analysis in the previous sections, it follows that the party-state, as the symbiosis between party structures and those of the state, and its consequent political control, is comprehensive and omnipresent, while the party that benefits from such control stand out as having unquestionable authority, imposing total submission, as the electoral data presented in Chapter 1 also suggests. However, the term 'moments' in the party-state, which I refer to here, relativises this finding. It highlights that, even though the party-state is often presented and perceived as a full-time party-state, there are specific circumstances and events for each of its entities – the state and the party – and in them, sometimes because of their respective weaknesses, separately, they mobilise the other, also to reinforce their own legitimacy when citizens call it into question. The moments,[152] that is, the circumstances or events highlighted here concern the state within the party, and the meetings and rallies for the revitalisation of Frelimo cells in 2018, were fundamental to the analysis.

Indeed, there are party moments in the state. Take, for example, the situation that occurred at the Ordinary Session of the Secretariat of the Administrative Post on 22 May 2018, in which Paulo Jesse, the president of the body, appealed to the other leaders to help the party. It was a state event as they were dealing with the normal affairs of that local state institution, including the presentation of reports by the heads of localities, police, health, education, and agriculture, among other sectors. It was during these activities that the chief referred to the need to create a Locality Committee with a First Secretary. The other example is that of Dalton Chemo, the head of the locality who led the delegation that guided the celebration ceremonies for Independence Day on 25 September 2019, which ultimately became a Frelimo campaign event led by the head of the locality himself at a health centre, a state institution. These are moments of the party in the State, although, especially in the latter case, no specific party weakness, that required State intervention to resolve it is identifiable. State moments in the party, however, clearly derive from weaknesses in the party. The following is a detailed example.

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[152] 'Moments' is in the Gramscian sense, who referred to 'moments' of consent and direzione of moments of force and dominion, which always coexist, but the predominance of one over the other, in each context, determines the nature of power, more authoritarian when it is more based on force and less when it is based on consent. Here I use moment to highlight and distinguish specific circumstances and events from elements of the structure.

On 12 June 2018, at one of Chidenguele cell revitalisation meeting. The delegation comprised seven elements, namely a locality chief, a godfather from that locality, two teachers, one of whom was replacing the first circle secretary,[153] who was sick, a *povoação* chief who was simultaneously party secretary, and a community leader. There were initially nine people from the community, joined by another twenty-one as the event progressed, making a total of thirty attendants. Participation was therefore weak, given the event's magnitude, and was symptomatic of subsequently recognised deficiencies in the party mobilisation in that *povoação*. One of the teachers, a director of a primary school, was the first to intervene. He sang and danced two Frelimo songs, then gave the floor to another teacher, who was representing the first secretary of the circle. This last teacher's intervention was brief, summed up in his presentation and the announcement that he would give the floor to the head of the locality, who, as will be noted later, assumed the leadership of the meeting.

The head of the locality began by questioning whether the participants knew him, with some responding negatively. He stressed that he was the head of the locality and said "we are working for the party. The party brings us here today, and I am just a guest."[154] Then he asked other questions that required them to have political knowledge, namely whether the participants knew the Governor, the administrator, and the head of the administrative post. Few knew them, even the head of the administrative post who had been to that village ten days before to inaugurate a square named '*Praça dos Continuadores*.' The head of the locality expressed his displeasure, stressing that this lack of knowledge about those figures was a sign that they did not attend the meetings when summoned. He then gave the floor to the Locality godfather.

After singing Frelimo songs, the godfather made a long intervention, repeating the sequence of stories he tells at all other revitalisation rallies: first, he focused on episodes of colonisation, underlining the absence of freedoms and the exploitation to which Mozambicans were subjected. Then he addressed the genesis of Frelimo, its role as a liberator, moving on to the opposition, highlighting the need to block its progress. Finally, he presented the revitalisation

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[153] It should be noted that this was before the creation of the first Locality Secretary. Until then, there were two circles at the level of that locality. The person attending the meeting was representing one of them.

[154] Delton Chemo, Locality Chief, speech at a Frelimo Cells Revitalisation Rally, Manjacaze, 12 June 2018.

objectives concerning the party's preparation for the elections. About Frelimo, he asked the participants if they knew Frelimo, being surprised by the answers: "we know, but we don't really know what it is,"[155] replied a lady of about thirty years of age. As she spoke, the godfather turned to the other members of the brigade, astonished. Then, after the lady's brief intervention, the godfather replied: "Are you listening to that?" Then he repeated the stories of the atrocities of colonialism, again presenting Frelimo as a 'saviour'. Then he said:

> "If we don't know what Frelimo is, we must think hard. [Pointing to some people, he said] These elders can tell you ... Frelimo is a vanguard party: it is at the forefront of everything. It brought the peace we have. If we're doing well today, it's all thanks to Frelimo. It brought education so that no one need be poor... praise the one who gave you life!"[156]

He continued, speaking about the opposition, and referred to some civil war episodes, which Frelimo leaders always used to discourage people from joining the opposition, as discussed in the previous chapter:

> "That's why the opposition parties come in here. People don't know what Frelimo is... today you say that Frelimo is nothing. You let Renamo and MDM in. They are the ones who promote killings. How can you forget that Renamo used to order a father to kill his own son? Did you forget?... don't you remember that Renamo used to bury our sons in the mortar? Don't you remember? Who cut off ears and noses... did you forget?"[157]

It was a true moment of electoral campaigning, a year before its official opening. However, the reactions of the participants showed that they were not happy with the party, as they sometimes, for example, muttered and waved as an indication of their disagreement with the members of the delegation, and for this reason the godfather eventually stressed that the party needed to be revitalised: "We are going to rearrange the party. Let's recreate party cells here! They must be at the forefront…. the party cannot stay like this," he concluded.

The teacher who was representing the First Secretary of the Circle intervened again. He continued to explain the purpose of the revitalisation process: "here we must create cells, choose the OMM, OJM representative..."[158] As he spoke, many laughed, some muttering. One of the participants interrupted the teacher's speech and said: "you must let us know in

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[155] S.n. Intervention at a Frelimo Cells Revitalisation Rally, Manjacaze, 12 June 2018.
[156] Mário Nhandimo, speech at a Frelimo Cells Revitalisation Rally, Manjacaze, 12 June 2018.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Zelma Marina, Teacher, Intervention at a Frelimo Cells Revitalisation Rally, Manjacaze, 12 June 2018.

advance so that we can plan better and do this. You can't come here like this and suddenly say that we must create cells, choose leaders...".[159] Noticing the uneasiness, the other teacher intervened, singing songs praising Frelimo, while the head of the locality prepared to intervene.

The locality chief returned to the subject of revitalisation, telling the *povoação* chief and the community leader to continue discussing the revitalization process after the brigade had left, since he realized that the atmosphere in the meeting at that time was not suited to pursuing the matter. Then, aiming to galvanise the attendants, he took advantage of his State leadership position to create a clear state moment at the party level; he announced to those present that they would be rewarded for their presence at that meeting, receiving latrines that were available in the locality. His speech: "That's how it is… Good news: you who came here, organise yourselves, go to the locality headquarters, and take a latrine. You who came here can receive, not those others [referring to those who were absent]."[160] Then he ordered the community leader and the party's chief secretary to compile lists of those who were there to guarantee that those absent did not benefit from these State assets. The latrines had already been in the locality for a long time. They were donated by an international NGO, as part of its program to improve sanitation in the district of Manjacaze. The transfer of resources only to participants of the party event was, therefore, a political use of the party, made by a figure of the State, for its benefit. This demonstrates that the party first, as shown in the previous section.

Applauded for the announcement, the head of the locality then gave the floor to some members of the community, who began their interventions with songs of thanks to him, the chief, and to the party. Visibly happy, one of the participants said: "Now we can see that our Father has arrived from South Africa, and now that you're here we want you to know that this is your home. We thought you had abandoned us and gone to live in South Africa. Welcome home Dad![161] Continuing, he added, "If *Xicova* [a dramatic representation of Renamo, based upon the partridge on its flag] comes, we are going to fight, because we know that our father

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[159] Beto Tombene, Community member, Intervention at a Frelimo Cells Revitalisation Rally, Manjacaze, 12 June. 2018.

[160] Dalton Chemo, Locality Chief, Intervention at a Frelimo Cells Revitalisation Rally, Manjacaze, 12 June 2018.

[161] Gracio Cheze, Community Member, Intervention at a Frelimo Cells Revitalisation Rally, Manjacaze, 12 June 2018.

has returned from South Africa.… We were scattered, but we are going to reorganize ourselves." While he was finishing, another participant prompted him to add: "There will be no *xitombi* [partridge in Chopi] in these elections. Long live Frelimo!"[162]

Similar episodes occurred at other events, in other locations, under identical circumstances, that is, when participants were critical or unmotivated to participate in the revitalization activity of the party cells. Right at the beginning of one of the meetings, in a *povoação* that was apparently even angrier with the party, one of the members of the revitalisation brigade, a party secretary, recommended that someone should go after the young people who were absent. They should tell them they were to be enlisted to participate in a training course on the assembly of solar panels, which would be organised in the locality, when the husband of the then governor of Gaza province, Stela Pinto Novo Zeca, was paying a visit to the community. As in the event detailed above, lists of these young absentees were produced to control the process.

Thus, although the party-state presents itself and is perceived as a full-time party-state, it is important to identify specific moments of the party and the state within it. Analysing these moments is central to understanding the dynamics of the party-state itself and, for this thesis, understanding how the party draws upon and uses state resources to negotiate with citizens, which, as can already be seen, is not limited to electoral periods. In these elections, however, the negotiation intensifies, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters.

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[162] S.N. Community Member, Intervention at a Frelimo Cells Revitalisation Rally, Manjacaze, 12 June 2018.

PART III

MOBILISING THE SOURCES

Chapter 6: Frelimo Mobilisation

"Frelimo mobilises during the 365 days of the year, whether there are elections or not, [Frelimo] does that. So how can [the opposition] parties win by mobilising for just 45 days [of the election campaign]? There would have to be a miracle…." (Mateus Mbila, Interview, Manjacaze, 26 October 2019.)

Mateus Mbila, quoted above, is incredulous at the thought that the opposition parties might beat Frelimo in the elections. He speaks of the need for a miracle for that to happen because, as a party-state, as discussed in the previous chapter, Frelimo has advantages over the opposition parties, being able to mobilise "…all 365 days of the year," as he points out. The main question is: if Frelimo is permanently mobilising, what are the peculiarities of such mobilisation in election periods? In other words, how does Frelimo mobilise during elections?

In this chapter, I examine Frelimo's mobilisation during the 2019 Presidential and Legislative election campaign. I present Frelimo strategy, which is based on voters mapping, identification, and control, with violence being part of the control mechanisms. I address violence, focusing on the action of shock groups, showing that Frelimo resort to it due to the weaknesses of its peaceful mobilisation mechanisms at the grassroots, among other things, based upon its party cells.

6.1 Preparation

The party cells in all "places of residence and work"[163] are crucial to Frelimo's organisation and its day-to-day political control. However, given the weakness of these cells, Frelimo resorts to other control mechanisms, including violence perpetrated by shock groups responsible for directly obstructing the work of the opposition parties and deterring potential voters from turning to them. Furthermore, the organisation and functioning of the shock groups demonstrate that violence is institutionalised in Manjacaze, and, like the party cells, they serve a single purpose: to guarantee Frelimo victory, and with it, to build and maintain its hegemony.

6.1.1 Party cells

The party cell " ... is the base organisation of the party,"[164] and "(...) the guarantor of [Frelimo] victory..."[165] Its roles in elections are very clear: "... taking the lead in mobilisation, holding meetings, door to door contacts,"[166] and convincing "(...) people to vote for Frelimo and its candidates..."[167] On the ground, however, the reality is different: few cells are functional, and many of those formally recognised do not exist, as noted by Hilário Bacela, Frelimo Secretary for Organisation and Mobilisation at Zone level: "The truth is that we don't have [many] cells at the base level. [Even] the ones we have do not do their job. This is the reality."[168]

The above interlocutor addressed participants at an ordinary session of one of the district's five Zone Committees on 18 July 2019. At that event, his statement was largely supported by other participants, some of whom called on Frelimo leaders to go and verify the situation on the ground for themselves. The following is an intervention by a 'Locality godfather'[169] at one of the localities in the same zone:

> "Comrades, we are saying that we have 750 cells! Is this true? (...) The cells you are referring to, do they really exist? [Whispers, and a voice in the background is heard

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[163] Frelimo Cell Manual (2010), Chapter V, p.18.

[164] Point I, XII, Cell Manual, p.18.

[165] Point 4, XVII, Cell Manual, p.19.

[166] Point 9, XVII, Cell Manual, p.19.

[167] Point 9, XVII, Cell Manual, p.19.

[168] Juvêncio Muholove, Frelimo Secretary for Organisation and Mobilisation, Intervention at an ordinary session of a Frelimo Zone Committee, Manjacaze, 18 July 2018.

[169] As mentioned in Chapter 5, in some Administrative Posts, for each Locality, there is a godfather who links people from those localities to the zone committees. During the cell revitalization processes, they were sent by the zone committees to integrate the brigades.

saying that it is up to the Verification Committee to confirm this or not] (...) We are comrades here. Let us be serious! I am asking whether we have them or not [very close to me, someone answers, but quietly, saying that there is nothing]. The information that is written there [in reference to the number of cells] was provided by us. Why are these cell people not here with us today? We need the truth. A suggestion for the First Comrade [First Area Secretary]: go out there with a brigade and choose some [select cells at random] to visit. Just go like this: 'Let us go to cell X!' You will see for yourselves! They will look here, there, and everywhere, then they will say 'the cell was here' [some participants laugh]. That is it... There are no such cells! (…) We have to work with the truth, Comrades! Frelimo *hoyê*! [Participants answer in unison: *hoyê*!]."

The poor attendance at party meetings and low payment of dues is widely evoked as evidence of the poor operation, or the absence, of many of the registered cells. In the case of dues, for example, in the same session, one of the participants asked how, in a particular administrative post which had more than 10,000 members, only 100 might have paid their monthly dues: "This shows that there are problems at the grassroots with the cells. If the cells worked, dues would be paid because the cell secretaries add up to more than 3,000 here at this administrative post."[170] He then went further, referring to data from the entire district: "The District speaks of about 50,000 members, but the number of members who pay dues throughout the year does not amount to 10,000. So, the question arises: do we, in fact, have this many members or are these all just ghosts there to pester us?"

Another question came from the godfather quoted above, this time referring to the connection between the number of members in the cells and the low participation in party activities: "Why are these cell members not here with us today?"[171] He then proposed a simple but very illustrative calculation: "If we have 750 cells, as you say, if we count on at least one person from each cell to be present in this party session, wouldn't we have at least 750 people? [Murmurs, many nodding their heads in agreement.]"[172] There were only 50 people at that event, most of whom were civil servants, some without any responsibility within the cells, but the answer to the godfather's question came from another senior party official in that zone, at another meeting. According to her – she had been Frelimo's First Circle Secretary for five years – there is widespread demotivation among 'comrades', who prefer to focus on

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[170] Juvêncio Muholove, Frelimo Secretary for Organisation and Mobilisation, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 June 2018.

[171] Mário Nhandimo, Intervention in a Cell Revitalization Rally, Manjacaze, 12 June 2018.

[172] Formally, each cell is composed of a minimum of three members and a maximum of fifteen.

their daily chores. He starts by making a diagnosis of the situation in the cells, which corroborates that of the other participants mentioned above:

> "When we go out into the field to do our party work, we always call the [cell] secretaries to find out when they hold their biweekly meetings. We make our visits coincide with the dates of the cell meetings. We realised that when we meet the secretaries [because, sometimes, even the secretaries do not show up], they are often alone. We always ask about the rest of the people, and the answer is always the same: They say they can't stop their daily activities to focus on this [party activity] that is worthless. They make it clear that [working for] the Party is useless because there are no salaries. That is the answer we find."[173]

However, according to many interviewees, verification of the existence of fake cells was initiated by a party central directive, which requested not only the numbers but also the names of cell members to help the party to better prepare the election campaign. At the local level, however, there was another discrepancy, which also called into question the credibility of the data on the number of cells, as can be gleaned from the following conversation with Juvêncio Muholove, the Frelimo Secretary for Organisation and Mobilisation quoted above:

> Me: How did you discover that there were fake cells?
> Juvêncio Muholove: It started with a directive from our central party organs. At the [national] headquarters, they asked for concrete data about the cell members, not just the cell numbers. Of course, they would not ask for numbers again because we always update these and send them every six months. They wanted the names of the cells, of the members… So, here at the grassroots level, we also noticed that, during elections, for example, even those in 2004, 2009 and 2014, there was a decline in votes and that the number of members was incompatible with the number of votes. We tried to understand what was happening because we had many members in the cells, but when duty called [meaning the need to vote], these members did not show up. We wondered whether these members existed or if all we had were numbers… [But] other than that, there was also the question of the payment of dues, which was [noticeably] weak at the base, district, and province levels (…). Therefore, there was a need [to conduct] basic work, like a census, to [better understand] what was happening. We concluded that we were not telling the truth (sic) because, even here at the [zone] headquarters, they spoke of 616 cells. But with our work, we only identified 116. Where did these additional 500 cells go? Did they disappear?[174]

It appears, then, that, at the central level, Frelimo leadership is aware of the weakness and/or the non-existence of the cells declared by the bases, which is why it issued the directive,

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[173] Gabito Malô, former First Circle Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 27 November 2018.

[174] Juvêncio Muholove, Frelimo Secretary for Organisation and Mobilisation, Intervention at an ordinary session of a Frelimo Zone Committee, Manjacaze, 18 July 2018. It should be noted however that the numbers they present are discrepant, but, but all underline the weakness and/or non-existence of many of the declared cells.

aiming to verify the channelled information, but also aiming to better prepare the strategy for the campaign and other stages of the electoral process. Yet, as the last interlocutor mentions, Frelimo leadership at the zonal level were also concerned because they had found discrepancies between the support that Frelimo obtained in the previous elections and the number of members that, allegedly, it had in that territory. This is one of the reasons why the Zone Committee decided to carry out the so-called cell revitalisation process. Mr Muholove, however, questions the 'revitalisation' designation and suggests that the correct term would be to 'form' cells[175] since the cells do not exist, or at least no one can identify them: "Perhaps, saying 'revitalise' is not a good way [to designate the process] … because, since we noticed that there is nothing there, to begin with, we are starting from zero… We should really say that we are forming cells. [However,] for the district, we do not say this; we only say 'revitalisation'. But 'revitalisation' means starting with something [that is already there,] (…) going to a cell, which we know already has a secretary, and doing the work. (…) Instead, what happens is that we have nothing at all. I believe this is what our colleagues are finding elsewhere…"[176]

There are two important things to note regarding the cell formation process. The first is that, as well as during electoral periods, cell formation sometimes occurs when there are changes in the local leadership of the party, at the initiative of the new leaders. The latter may make such changes if they experience difficulties identifying and working with existing cells from previous mandates, so they decide to produce their own lists, not necessarily cells, which they themselves can later justify. However, and this is the second note, in both circumstances, the formation of new cells is itself rife with problems since "… they are formed on the run".[177] Cell members and secretaries enlisted by party leaders without their consent, and sometimes without even being present at the 'creation' events: "…. it is my impression that everything will remain the same because it is not that people have joined [the cells]. They are often enlisted."[178]

[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Jorsio Malate, former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.
[178] Gabito Malô, former First Circle Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 27 November 2018.

The party cell 'creation' process, which I had the privilege of attending in at least one Administrative Post, usually begins with the formation of brigades, "composed of a godfather [who comes from the Zone level], in coordination with the head of each locality. This brigade works in all the *povoação* of that locality, integrating school directors that oversee the preparation on the ground for the brigade and work directly with the heads of each *povoação*."[179] When they go to a specific *povoação*, the brigades start by holding public meetings, usually in the Circles, where the speech of the 'godfather' is the main event. The latter always starts by asking those present whether they know Frelimo and its history and proceeds to recount the genesis of the party, highlighting its role in liberating the country and Mozambicans from colonial rule. In fact, he always makes a point of talking at length about the atrocities of the colonial period, doing the same with regard to the Civil War, which he addresses shortly after talking about the country's independence. Finally, he turns his focus to the issue of elections, highlighting the importance of the 'comrades' who are joining the process, while never failing to remind them about the historical role of Frelimo in achieving independence: "Do not forget that Frelimo freed us, brought peace. Frelimo is everything. Frelimo is a father, a mother…"[180]

Cell creation does not take place at these public meetings.[181] In these meetings, mention is only made of the intention to 'revitalize' cells, so that the party can face the challenges of the electoral process. Then, at the end of the meeting, the 'godfather' or another member of the brigade, sometimes the Circle Secretary, delegates this task to a member of the local brigade, usually a school director. In a separate meeting, the latter lists the members of each block (a set of ten houses), designating each of these blocks as a cell: "… then, a cell is that set of 10 houses, where the head of the block is included. The block leader reports to the Cell Secretary if he himself is not the secretary."[182] It is not surprising, therefore, that these area cells are composed not of "… a minimum of three members and a maximum of fifteen members," as stated in point 3, section XV of the cell manual, but sometimes of more than thirty

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[179] Juvêncio Muholove, Frelimo Secretary for Organisation and Mobilisation, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 June 2018.

[180] Mario Nhandimo, Intervention in a Cell Revitalization Rally, Manjacaze, 12 June 2018.

[181] At the beginning of the process, some tried to create cells in those meetings, but as very few people attended, it was difficult. Furthermore, the few participants complained that they had not been advised of the intentions to create cells, putting such pretensions into question.

[182] Jorsio Malate, former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.

members,[183] and are thus dysfunctional. Duverger (1954, p.32) had already warned about the dysfunctionality of such large area cells: "it cannot be doubted that the work of the branches (or area cells) is less effective [than that of the workplace cells]" which he considers "… the real cells…" (Ibid. p.28). In Manjacaze, dysfunctionality can also be attributed to how the cells are created and, above all, to the lack of clarity in defining their members' and leaders' roles. As illustrated by the former OJM leader I mentioned in chapter 5:

> "... members of the cells do not know their roles well because nothing is explained ... For example, last year, we tried to contain the damage and started creating these cells. We just said, 'You become secretary of the organisation; you are first [secretary],' and so on. But what do these roles entail? Nobody explains. So, they end up going 2 or 3 months without even holding a meeting ... What are we going to demand [from these people]? Sometimes we ask for reports, but they do not send them because they are not doing anything. They know nothing, (...) so it's at the cell level that everything is spoiled. If the cells don't work, the Party cannot work..."[184]

The statement that follows, by a First Circle Secretary, also a primary school teacher, sheds light on the selection process, including the problems mentioned above:[185]

> "[It all started when] I was at a seminar in Manjacaze [headquarters]. It was a seminar that taught how the schoolworks. There, I received a call [and was told]: 'You were elected. You are now Secretary of the Circle of X...' I was surprised. I went out and called the school director where I work and explained what I had heard. I told him I got a call from a strange number telling me I had been elected there [in the district]! The boss [meaning the school principal] took that number and called back. They said the same thing to him; that, '*yah*, that man was elected, and his name is already [registered] at the district!' Shortly thereafter, I received a call from Comrade X [mentions one of the top Party leaders in the district]. He says, 'You were elected and starting today, you will take on this commitment.' On my way home, I asked the school Director what all that was about. Do things work like that? The next day, the ZIP[186] coordinator said, 'you must first sign the [contract], you will receive the guidelines later. We know that you don't like these Party things and don't know anything, but you will soon know why it is like that."

Mr Tinito case also shows that the problems that occur in cells extend to the upper levels, namely the zone. However, there is another relevant aspect to highlight in this case: it is

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[183] The sum of the members in the blocks far exceeds the maximum number of members stipulated for each cell and there are even houses that, alone, have more than fifteen adult people. Given that they do not even voluntarily join the cells, the chances of actively participating in cell activities are minimum.

[184] Jorsio Malate, former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.

[185] Tinito Bento, Interview, Manjacaze, 14 November 2018.

[186] Set of schools in an area, normally of an entire village or *povoação*.

surprising that Mr Tinito, a teacher, is not an active member of the party because, as widely confirmed by different interlocutors, it is in the 'institutional cells' that the party and its members are most active, especially in the education sector. "We have cells in the institutions; these are active. It is easy to manage because it is easy to identify who the members are and who is responsible... As for the secretary himself, we can tell whether a secretary is or is not accountable… Cells in the institutions are different from the ones in the neighbourhoods."[187] Subsequent sections address the latter aspect in detail. For now, it is worth pointing out that the greater dynamism of workplace cells, compared to area cells, has been identified in other contexts, and is, thus, not specific to Frelimo in Manjacaze. Duverger (1954, p.28), for example, has shown that, in general, "…area cells must by necessity exist side by side with workplace cells, either to unite isolated workers … or to group the members of the party who do not work in a large undertaking… but area cells never have the same importance [as workplace cells]: the real cell is the workplace cell which unites party members working in the same place".

The question is: given that Party cells are 'the guarantor(s) of [Frelimo] victory', as highlighted at the beginning of this section, and that most area cells are dysfunctional, how does Frelimo win elections? This question was asked to many of the interviewees, and some quickly pointed to the role of the shock groups.

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[187] Juvêncio Muholove, Frelimo Secretary for Organisation and Mobilisation, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 June 2018.

6.1.2 Shock groups: "We beat them until they said 'Long live Frelimo'"[188]

Shock groups are the prominent faces of the violence in electoral processes in Manjacaze and, simultaneously, evidence of Frelimo's high level of political intolerance in that district. As one of its members defines them, "shock group is a group of Frelimo members and supporters, with immediate availability to do everything for the Party."[189] 'Everything' includes controlling, harassing, mobilising and even hitting opposition supporters. The term *'chocar'* (to shock) translates well to the latter role. According to the Portuguese language dictionary, *'chocar'* means "to hit" or "to bump (against)".[190] Shock groups clash and collide with everything they consider to be from the opposition to "... neutralise their action".[191]

The message is clear: "… The opposition must not be given space to undertake its actions, so the group must be 100% ready to operate."[192] The word 'operate' is used by shock group members as a synonym for *'chocar'*: "*Chocar* is to operate. Operating is just that… hitting, crushing everything."[193] There follows a brief excerpt from a speech by one of the First Secretaries responsible for 'revitalising' these groups for the 2019 elections. It refers not only to their roles but also to the need for greater camouflage and a change in designation:

> "… Hit! We want to hit! Shock, for real! Our job is to shock them … Matsangas [in reference to opposition members] can't come in here! Can they come in? [Participants answer in unison] No! If they appear, we will really shock… But, attention, comrades! Frelimo advised us not to call it that anymore [shock groups]. We must soften the language and it really starts with us here in Gaza province. We will change the name and call ourselves 'political commissioners'. Who are we? [Participants respond:] 'Political commissioners!' We are political commissioners. Those in the OJM shock group are 'Youth Political Commissioners'. The OMM shock members are 'OMM Political Commissioners' (sic). Political commissioners ... did you hear me right? But the role hasn't changed [it is still to hit]. We just changed the name a little. They are no longer shock groups, but Political Commissioners..."[194]

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[188] Malita Guibande, Interview, Cambane, 27 February 2018.
[189] Jorsio Malate, former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 18 July 2018.
[190] Dicionário de Português – inglês (2ª ed.), porto Editora, 1998, p.211.
[191] Juvêncio Muholove, Frelimo Secretary for Organisation and Mobilisation, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 June 2018.
[192] Juvêncio Muholove, Frelimo Secretary for Organisation and Mobilisation, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 June 2018.
[193] Joana Mondlane, Interview, Manjacaze, 4 April 2019.
[194] Bastos Nassone, Frelimo Secretary. Extract from his speech at na OMM shock group members's meeting, Manjacaze, 21 November 2018.

While party leaders seek to 'soften the language' by renaming shock group members 'political commissioners' in reaction to increasing complaints about their existence and growing criticism about their performance,[195] the members themselves seem to go the opposite way, adopting an even harsher denomination than before: 'evil group'. The name applies because the group's role is to physically harm opposition members. Some even use the term openly, sometimes boasting, implying that they enjoy impunity. Malita Guibande, a former leader of one of the youth groups, is unequivocal: "Where will [opposition members] complain? [Laughs] All the chiefs are Frelimo members."[196] One of the interviewees explained how she rid herself of a criminal case after being caught covering Renamo pamphlets with Frelimo's'. According to her, this happened during the campaign for the 2018 local elections, when a Renamo member saw her committing that electoral offence and took the case to the police. "At the police station, the commander said he would let the case proceed a little so that Renamo would be happy, and then he would forget about it. But that guy [in reference to the Renamo member who reported her] was insistent. He followed up with the case. My aunt had to intervene. My aunt is a member of the Parliament; you already know how it is ..."[197]

If, in the case of the last interviewee, party and family connections guaranteed her impunity, others go unpunished thanks to the guidance and coordination of the party leaders and the involvement of highly placed people at the local level. In fact, as will become evident from the examples presented below, some party and state leaders and other public officials, especially at the grassroots level, are directly involved in the 'shock', which suggests that the composition of the group is relatively broad and not limited to "drunks, the unemployed and outcasts," which supports the findings of other studies.[198] That said, businesspeople also play a role:

> "When we want to go somewhere, we rely on the cars provided by our businessmen for the days of action [in reference to attacks on members of the opposition] ... But we already have everything well prepared: first, we mobilise our partners, the businesspeople. They provide a fund, which we use for snacks and shirts. We had the shirts made and distributed at the first meeting of the shock group. You equip every group first. So, when the young man returns home with the equipment, he says, 'Hey, I already have a *capulana* [piece of cloth generally worn by women], I already have a

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[195] See, for example, Chaimite and Forquilha (2015); Mabunda (2017).
[196] Jorsio Malate, former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.
[197] Joana Mondlane, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 April 2019.
[198] See Chaimite and Forquilha (2015).

shirt, I already have a cap (...) because I belong to a shock group!' So, [the young man] will invite other young people and the next day, he will return with three or four more young people because they all want t-shirts. When they come, they say, 'We want to do Frelimo's work', but what they really want is the stuff ... businessmen provided the equipment, and that's how we got a lot of young people (sic). Simply put: [if you want] young people, you have to give [them] something..."[199]

The group obtains logistical support from businesspeople, among others, that includes transportation for their incursions and funds for snacks, shirts, and drinks. The last item, though seemingly trivial, is central, as explained by a village chief who is also a shock group member: "... you have to be *well touched* [drunk] to be able to participate effectively [in the attacks] ..."[200] However, there are aspects to do with the motivation of recruits that are absent from the penultimate quote above. Contrary to what can be inferred from that excerpt, not all new members are mobilised with the promise of 't-shirts'. While amenities may play a role for some who describe the days and moments of the incursions as 'free snacks and music', others may seek visibility in the party to obtain scholarships and jobs in the State – or promotions, if they are already public officials. For others still, 'shocking' is a form of 'piece work' since, in some cases, they are only hired for the duration of the electoral campaigns. Finally, some are motivated by the sincere belief that they are rendering a service to the country, defending the liberating Party, blocking the 'Matsangas', and even describe their actions as heroic:

> "I can say there is no gain [vested interest for him] here. I am in this because I am a comrade. I fight for the Party (...) I grew up in the hands of the Party (...) You know, I experienced war, I 'experienced' the destabilisation and I am a witness [to the fact] that these Matsangas killed a lot here. I lost family members myself (...) Another thing, you know, Mondlane, Samora Machel, Josina Machel [renowned national leaders], and other heroes did not want to be heroes. They had the courage and fought for our well-being and were later recognised as heroes. Today we are here; we cannot be afraid to die. I could die in this war [about clashes with opposition members]. Even if I die, my son will know that his father died for this, and he will be proud. He will have the courage to continue the fight..."[201]

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[199] Malita Guibande, Interview, Cambane, 27 February 2018.

[200] Malita Guibande, Interview, Cambane, 27 February 2018.

[201] Malita Guibande, Interview, Cambane, 27 February 2018. The interviewee above spoke shortly after participating in an attack on MDM members and there was still a fear of retaliation. Although they were trying to get away with it, fear of this retaliation was evident, and, to justify his participation, he implied that it was a 'war,' in which he, together with the other members of the shock groups, could justifiably attack. Members of the opposition parties were considered intruders. We will return to these aspects, with examples and more detail.

Shock groups also have two subcategories: the first, based on age, is made up of young people, while the second is based on gender and comprises women. Since each subcategory is created and coordinated by – and therefore subordinate to – a specific organ of the Frelimo party, their designations are attributed accordingly. Therefore, the OJM (Mozambican Youth Organisation) has its own shock group, as does the OMM (Mozambican Women's Organization), which is also known locally as the '*mamanas*' shock group. In the preferred terms of the First Secretary quoted at the beginning of this section, its members are, respectively, OJM Political Commissioners and OMM Political Commissioners. The following is an excerpt from one of the OJM Secretaries' speeches on how to proceed with the constitution of these groups:

> "Well, when I was a leader for the OJM shock group at the zone level, I selected young people from each location. I dismissed those from X [locality's name], as it is very distant, and it is not easy for people to come out here to the headquarters. I used to speak to the heads of each locality and tell them that I needed, for example, twenty young people for each locality. Here, as it is the headquarters, I used to ask for more. It could be 25 or 30. They [the locality heads] coordinated with their *povoação* heads and the secretaries of the circles ... So, I used to bring all these men together, reaching at least 50 young active people here for the zone group ... When the day of action arrives, the Circle Secretary only mobilises and coordinates the logistics, so he doesn't go. I had to do it myself as OJM secretary..."[202]

When the main group leaves, there are other "small groups in each location or village, who only do work there".[203] These are composed of young men from the OJM who are active but are not deployed to the area shock groups and of *mamanas*. Despite being composed of both young people and *mamanas*, "young people [who] stay on the front lines ... [because] they are more flexible ... [and] they do everything, anywhere. [They are the ones] responding to any situation that appears."[204] There are, however, specific moments when the *mamanas* are also called upon to join the group in the Zone, or even the district,[205]when the Party realizes that members of the opposition brigades are relatively numerous. In these circumstances, the *mamanas*' presence helps to increase the headcount (which is of strategic importance when supplanting the opposition in terms of people and equipment; for example, music and vehicles), but they also have specific roles, distinct from those of the OJM. Whereas *mamanas*

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[202] Jorsio Malate, former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Ibid.
[205] They follow the commands of the members of the *estrutura*.

are responsible for the initial provocations and, for example, obstruct speeches by members of the opposition by singing songs and dancing close to these events, young people are involved, above all, in physical confrontations or vandalising opposition property. Here, the former secretary of the OJM explains the different stages of the shock groups' action:

> "*Ya*, the group arrives there [where the opposition is] and starts to dance, talk … but they don't touch [the opposition members]. [Our] group cannot touch that other group, but they can shout, dance, play the drums … but, at the same time, they provoke the other group with insults … They [the opposition] can do either of two things: react or leave the place. When they choose to leave, we follow them until they leave our territory. If they are weak, they will not respond. If they react, then we will beat them up. There are always others waiting to act if they respond, ha ha ha [laughs]."

The following three examples are of shock group action in Manjacaze, and give an account, among other things, of how the groups proceed in cases of political control and in situations where they resort to physical violence and destruction of opposition properties. The same examples also illustrate the involvement of local leaders and other figures in the actions of these groups, but the shock groups also collude with the police and other entities. The first, most recent example, occurred on 28 September 2019, when a group attacked the MDM caravan, led by its president, Daviz Simango, in Bocodane, a village in the locality of Machulane near the Chibonzane Administrative Post. The words are those of a locality chief, directly involved in the blockade:[206]

> "It all started when those from the MDM submitted a letter to the police, saying they were going to hold a rally in Chiguivitane [a *povoação* in the locality of Machulane, in Chibonzane]. But they arrived and stopped at Bocodane [another Machulane *povoação*]. But we already knew they were going to Bocodane, because we have our delegates there, infiltrators of the MDM Party. They informed us … What we did was to prepare a very large entourage to advance to Bocodane before Simango's arrival. One group stayed there [in Bocodane] and another remained at the entrance. They were close to the place where Simango was going to speak. There were only twenty-seven [from the MDM]. What could they do against a large Frelimo group? Ha ha ha [laughs]

> "We stayed nearby and turned on our sound. You know what Frelimo sounds like; they could not take it! (…) When Simango's group arrived, they found our first group [who were at the entrance]. Confusion arose, and our cars were sent back, but ha ha ha [laughs], they didn't know we had another group there on duty to block them. One of the cars fell behind when we gave way because it had no 4WD. So, they thought we

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[206] Teresa Milando, Locality Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 8 October 2019.

were blocking their way. Then, that [MDM] gentleman appeared on TV beating our members in a car. The chief of operations for the Police Command [which also appears in the video broadcast about the incident] demanded that those from the MDM follow the route and return to Chiguivitane. She got away with it and legitimised our action because she said, 'you [MDM] are the ones deviating from the route'."

Another chief, this time from a nearby *povoação*, tells what happened afterwards: "… We beat those [MDM] gentlemen very badly. We beat them until they said, 'Long live Frelimo' and put on [our] Party shirts."[207] He smiled and described what happened with great enthusiasm, giving the impression that he had enjoyed it himself. After all, in his own words, "… it was a big party". According to him, as a leader and part of the second group that was on duty in Bocodane, their action occurred after the departure of Simango's entourage[208] and, therefore, away from the cameras: "We were safer. [On TV, you] saw the MDM beat up [our]… our action wasn't filmed". He says that his group claimed they had lost the keys to one of the cars of the first Frelimo group, which was at the entrance. They attributed responsibility to the MDM, so shock group members went to the MDM delegate's house in Bocodane but,

"Before we arrived, we were at a pub. 'You have to be *well touched* to be able to participate effectively'. Then we went to a different one where the man that had brought Simango had been and demanded the keys. We said, 'You know where the keys are. We want them back!' He said he didn't know but then, cleverly, he said, 'let me in to make a call'. He went to lock himself in the pub. Outside, other MDM members were drinking. We told them, as their colleague ran away, that we wanted the keys from them. Then a fight started. We were many. We beat those men very badly. We beat them up until they said 'Long live Frelimo' and put on the Party t-shirt... When we left, they called the police and, from the *povoação*, they sent a mahindra [police car]. When the mahindra arrived, they asked the victims if they could recognize us, and they said yes. When the police arrived, the chief of x *povoação* warned us and we fled to the bush. They came, they didn't find us, and they left. They threatened us many times, but to this day, they haven't returned. We are still waiting."

The above example involves physical violence. The following one, however, shows how the group exercises political control without resorting to violence. A young member of a shock group was working at one of the hotels in the district[209], where she encountered many visitors. According to her, on 3 April 2019, an MDM man arrived looking for accommodation.

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[207] Malita Guibande, Interview, Cambane, 27 February 2018.
[208] Ibid.
[209] Here I refer to Joana Mondlane, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 April 2019.

As the voter registration process had started, it was common for people who carry out political activities to pass through, so she immediately asked what brought him to the district. The visitor responded evasively to avoid compromising himself. She had to bide her time until he returned to pay the bill. When she asked, "in whose name?" the visitor, still trying to mislead but with little room left to manoeuvre, replied: *"Mov. Dem. de Moçambique"* [not giving the full name]. She continued: "... The guy didn't complete the words, so I said, 'Why don't you say straight out?'" The visitor was forced to concede, but she wanted to dig deeper, and he eventually said that he was there to do political work, unaware that she was a member of a Frelimo shock group. He explained that he was waiting for some people to coordinate a set of activities and that he would then provide training and guidance on how to operate in the field. The hotel employee then turned her attention to the next people in the queue, unaware that the MDM man had already exposed them. She said that she immediately recognised the first two people: "An informal salesman and a gentleman who [had been] my teacher at [primary] school." She said both were exposed and, as a result, would suffer reprisals.

Later, she added, a couple she did not know also arrived, and what happened next is worthy of mention. In front of the hotel lived a young man who was an active member of a Frelimo shock group and an employee of one of the Electoral Management Bodies. Following routine shock group protocol, the hotel employee informed the Frelimo member that there were intruders. The young man did his part: he simulated unpretentious contact with the 'intruders' and remained on duty by the door of his house, loitering there as if he had just stepped out for some fresh air. He later mobilised his family, and they all sat there on duty. The employee then told me that she shared the information 'about the intruder' with Frelimo leadership the following day. She explained what happened next: "The Party took measures… They followed the activities of that man and his group, and they [MDM members] had to change their strategy, working at night ... even so, Frelimo was there". She concluded: "I just know that I did my part and made money."

The last example occurred some years earlier and involves opposition property destruction. The episode occurred in 2004 at the headquarters of the Chibonzane Administrative Post. The victim was an active member of Renamo and often received party delegations involved in

campaign activities. First, a former OJM secretary sent a delegation to the Renamo member's house. Their mission was to convince him to abandon his party and join Frelimo, but he refused, citing freedom of choice. It was then that the delegation informed the district committee:

> "So, we informed the district, and the district said it was going to reinforce the shock group and send transport, and that's what it did… A shock group came from Manjacaze headquarters with transport. There were all the chiefs from Manjacaze headquarters. We found them [Renamo members] there in that house. Some were cooking ... There was a meeting inside. We left for [the *povoação* of] Vamangue, and a group stayed there to control their movements. So, they went out [from their delegation] there ... poor fellows! they didn't have enough cars. They only had one car ... They left. Then, on the same night, it was about 7 o'clock, we were still going around... A young man who was part of the *povoação* group ... ha ha ha [laughs]. He went over to the 'lost' man's house [referring to the opposition member]. He burned everything. He burned it all for good. He [the owner of the house] woke up and saw that it was being burned. He asked... who did it? We said that we didn't know anything [laughs]. We said, 'go complain wherever you want,' [but] where will he go to complain? All these bosses are from Frelimo [laughs]."[210]

Shaken, the victim had no choice but to join Frelimo. Shortly after, our interviewee adds, he addressed the local Area Committee to apologise for being from the opposition and asked to join Frelimo: "He came and said, 'Hey, I see that I am lost. I apologise.' The party called an emergency meeting, and he was integrated into one of the Frelimo brigades that campaigned in the Ponjoane area. With his help, we recovered many lost comrades, and from that time on, Renamo no longer achieved anything here in Chibonzane."[211]

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[210] Ibid.
[211] Ibid.

6.2. Mobilisation strategy

> "Frelimo was well prepared this time. While others spent time and energy on 'crowds', [which included] non-voters and children, we focused only on voters… We knew who was who…" (Teresa Milando, Locality Chief, interview, Manjacaze, 31 October 2019.)

Teresa Milando spoke two weeks after the 2019 general elections, a month after a shock group attacked the caravan of the MDM President.[212] She was one of the attackers, and, in the preparation, she refers to the role of the shock groups but underscores Frelimo's focus on voters, not crowds. In fact, rather than crowds, which are mobilised when 'brigades'[213] visit a *povoação*, or when there are mass activities (for instance, the Filipe Jacinto Nyusi championship in one of the Localities) with public rallies, the core of the Frelimo campaign lies in mapping, identifying, and controlling voters through what this thesis calls a 'strategy of total control'. Such a strategy, as discussed below, implies the selective channelling of campaign resources. For example, the t-shirts, which are scarce, are no longer thrown into the crowds, where some will fall into the hands of non-voters or even opposition voters, but distributed to well-identified voters, to motivate them and guarantee their support. So how did Frelimo identify these voters? Or, to borrow Teresa Milando's words, how did Frelimo know "who was who?"

6.2.1 Total control

The answer to the above question lies in the mobilisation and control structure set up for the campaign period, later adapted for the polling day. In the campaign, this control structure was essentially composed of three figures: the coordinator, the manager, and the mobiliser. Data from the voter card are the basis for assembling such a structure (Figure 9). It contains, for example, the number of the polling station, which is the coordinator's responsibility, the number of voting cabinets, which is the manager's responsibility, and the voter's individual number, assigned to the mobiliser. In other words, while the coordinator is responsible for a

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[212] This attack to the MDM caravan, led by its president, Daviz Simango, was in Bocodane, a village in the Locality of Machulane in Chimbonzane Administrative Post, on was on 28 September 2019.

[213] The Brigades are mobilisation teams, composed of party and state personnel at each level of the *estrutura*, reinforced by others from immediately higher levels. For this purpose, in cascade, the governors and members of the different Party committees are reinforced, starting with the provinces, which have people from the capital; when those from the Province reinforce the Districts, the Districts reinforce the Zones, which correspond to the Administrative Post jurisdictions, and these, in turn, reinforce the Localities. In some Zones, external brigadiers are called 'Godfathers'.

polling station, within that same polling station, there is a group of managers, each responsible for a voting cabin. Each manager has at his disposal a set of mobilisers, who are in direct and regular contact with the voters.

Figure 9: Registration card with the numbers used to design Frelimo strategy

A polling station with four voting cabins would have one Coordinator and four Managers. If it had only one cabin, it would have one Manager. If it had six cabins, it would have six Managers, and so on. In the Manager's case, the number of voters registered on his electoral roll did not matter as long as they were included. He could be in charge, for example, of a maximum of 800 voters, according to the composition of each Electoral Roll. Here are some calculations based on data from Manjacaze.

According to data from the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE), there were 83 polling stations and 204 voting cabins in Manjacaze. Considering the allocation of polling stations to Coordinators and voting cabins to managers, the data suggest that, in Manjacaze, Frelimo had at least 83 Coordinators and 204 Managers. Each manager should have had fifteen mobilisers, meaning there had to be 3,060 in the entire district. This was far from the case, as will be demonstrated below, given that many mobilisers gave up and that each manager was responsible for between six and ten mobilisers. Each mobiliser should guarantee the vote of thirty voters during the entire campaign period, but, in specific locations, this target was adjusted, some requiring each mobiliser to present that number per

week, far exceeding the total number of voters for the entire District, which was 131,617. The party provided copies of the electoral rolls to each mobiliser, containing each voter's numbers and other details. It was then up to the mobilisers to identify the residences of these voters, then to carry out regular monitoring visits and follow this up throughout the campaign period. That work ended on polling day, where the mobiliser, already a member of the polling station (MMV), had to verify or otherwise the participation of each voter he 'mobilised'. This is where the controversial issue of collecting voter card numbers, addressed in the next section, lies. However, as proof of the work of 'mobilisation', each mobiliser had to send daily messages to their manager, setting out the identified voter card numbers, whilst the managers also sent this data daily to the coordinators.

Indeed, the control structure presented above was not a local invention. It came from the central leadership of Frelimo in Maputo, albeit with some adaptations for each context.[214] In the case of Manjacaze, there was also a General Coordinator, usually a head of a Locality, and, in some cases, a Focal Point, who was the First Secretary of the respective Circle or Locality. The Focal Point was hierarchically superior to the General Coordinator, with whom he worked directly in planning campaign activities, reorienting priorities and transmitting directives from higher levels.[215] The General Coordinator, in turn, maintained almost permanent contact with the coordinator, and the coordinator dealt with the Managers and Mobilizers. Here it is also worth drawing a parallel between the figure of Frelimo mobiliser and that of the 'agitator', from the Communist Party in the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), during the 1980s. The work of the agitator, here equated to the mobiliser, was to identify and "...to contact from 20 to 30 voters before the election, provide a political educational talk, and enjoin them to be sure to vote" (Karlins, 1986, p.453). The coincidence is not just in the numbers of voters to be 'mobilised', but also in the functions, which in both cases are of control and pressure during the campaign and on polling day. Here are more details about the 'agitator':

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[214] At the Bilene meeting, on 2 October 2019, the then Frelimo presidential candidate, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, summoned all the coordinators, and only these, with a view to stressing the need to maintain and strengthen the organization and functioning of this 'structure.'

[215] At the above levels, the usual Party organisation was maintained, with a First Secretary of the Zone and another for Organisation and Mobilisation at the same level, responsible for the campaign activities in their territory, but with the support of the 'Godfather,' as mentioned in previous.

"In effect, the agitator is made responsible for 'his' (or 'her') voters and is called to task by the Communist party (agitators usually are party members) or others if the assigned voters should fail to vote. Feeling pressured to fulfil his norm, the agitator transmits pressure to the voters. His message (…) becomes most insistent on election day if the voter fails to show up at the polling place early and is therefore visited at home. If a voter cannot be found, refuses to vote, or turns out to be incapacitated, the pressure remains on the agitator to do something about it. The easiest way is to cast the ballot for the voter, which happens with some regularity" (Ibid.)

Thus, it is up to the 'Agitator', like the mobiliser, to guarantee the vote in favour of the party in power, even if this implies resorting to electoral fraud. This last aspect is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 7, entitled 'The Manipulation Process'. The question still unanswered is: who, in fact, were these mobilisers, but who also were the managers and coordinators? Here, again, the role of the State in strengthening the Party stands out, as also addressed in the previous chapter, now with more emphasis on the education sector.

6.2.2 The 'school' in the system of control

The education sector, especially school directors and teachers, was fundamental to the composition and functioning of the control 'structure' during the 2019 general elections. School directors were coordinators when teachers were managers, and, generally, mobilisers were selected from amongst students and other members of the shock groups. Here, the school hierarchy was transferred, with the director having authority over teachers and the latter over students and/or other members of the shock group. It should be noted that, in general, polling stations are in schools, which seems to have been considered in the party's organisation, as Frelimo sought to allocate coordinators and teachers in the same schools where they worked. Here is the explanation of a Frelimo, former First Secretary of a Circle, also a teacher, when asked why Frelimo relies on teachers:

"It is not because they are the best politicians, as some say. The teacher is a slave ... It is as if he was a slave to the Party, and [it all happens] because of the salary. The peasants do not accept working without earning anything. So, Frelimo takes advantage of the teachers, saying that Frelimo is paying their salaries… They say we have a job because of Frelimo and that the teacher must work and rely on his own salary to travel and attend Party meetings and still pay dues. Peasants do not accept this. My mobilisers [also peasants, thus, without state salaries] did not accept going to Party meetings, especially in X [She mentions the headquarters of one of the

> Administrative Posts], but for me, there was no other way.[216] I couldn't skip it. It meant that my job was for the Party and that I had to deal with Party issues with my own salary."[217]

The education sector is instrumentalized, and within this, so are teachers, as mentioned by the interlocutor above, but the process is broader: it covers all civil servants, who, a priori, are considered Frelimo members: "… every civil servant here is a Frelimo member. Don't doubt that."[218] It is true that there are peculiarities, as I demonstrate in Chapter 8, about 'resistance in Manjacaze,' but the party always seeks to emphasise this connection, made explicit in a Frelimo song, also underlining the impossibility of any candidate or Party challenging Frelimo and its candidates. The reason, also very explicit in the song, is that Frelimo owns the State and, with it, the teachers, and directors, in addition to the youth of the OJM and women of the OMM, all of whom are key to its hegemony:[219]

> *Unga mu gwenta Nyusi Wena?* (Can you beat Nyusi [Frelimo presidential candidate] by yourself?)
> *Nada! (No way!*) (Answer in unison)
> *Ni Nfumo wa yena?* (With his State?)
> *Nada! (No way!)*
> *Ni va teacher va yena?* (With his teachers?)
> *Nada! (No way!)*
> *Ni va directori va yena?* (With his directors?)
> *Nada! (No way!)*
> *Ni va ma jovem ya yena?* (*With his youth?*)
> *Nada! (No way!)*
> *Ni va mamani va yena?* (*With his women?*)
> *Nada! (No way!)*
> *Eh! Nada! Nada! Nada!* (*No way! No way! No way!*) (*Repeated many times,* exchanging only the candidate's name for the Party's)

Still, regarding the teachers, one of the factors that makes them the most visible faces among Frelimo supports in rural areas is the fact that they compose what Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan (2014) call the high-density sector of the state; that is, those more represented,

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[216] Many mobilisers did not have a formal link with the State. They were motivated by promises of inclusion as Members of Voting *Mesa* (MMV), where they could also receive state subsidies and be able to continue exercising their voter control activities.

[217] Gabito Malô, former Frelimo First Circle Secretary, interview, Manjacaze, 27 November 2018.

[218] Samuel Massango, School Director, Interview, Manjacaze, 29 June 2018.

[219] Interestingly, the time I registered the song, it was sung by a teacher, and, among the members of the delegation, there were so many other teachers, including directors. It was a campaign event coordinated by the Head of Locality and it took place at a health center, on a state ceremony, on 25 September 2019.

compared to the others, sometimes almost non-existent at the local level.[220] Some interlocutors also evoke the prestige and influence of teachers in those communities, their communication skills, but, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, they also have their personal interests, which include career progression and other benefits associated with their positions. However, many become involved because, as the party always reminds them, they feel they owe Frelimo gratitude for being teachers and, in the case of the school directors, also for their leading positions. Here is a short quotation from a director of a primary school in Chidenguele: "We are here thanks to Frelimo. I was able to study thanks to Frelimo. Others did not succeed … The job too is thanks to Frelimo. If I didn't have [this job], I don't know where I would be now (…) Another advantage of being a Frelimo member is this [director's] leadership position I hold now. It is thanks to Frelimo's trust."[221]

Frelimo itself recognises the strategic role of teachers, including the relative ease with which they can be controlled: "in elections, our greatest resources are the teachers, but also the students. As Juvêncio Muholove, Frelimo' Secretary for Organisation and Mobilisation at a zone level, himself a teacher, made it clear: "What helps us, in fact, is the school and the students… Directors [in particular] are our employees [meaning Frelimo employees], so we can monitor them."[222] But the director quoted above is even more explicit about his political functions: "… [a] school director is a true politician. He must be present at all [Frelimo] meetings…"[223] However, the link between the teachers and Frelimo also has implications for the opposition, which consequently faces immense difficulties in recruiting and working with school personnel. Notably, this is what led an essential part of Renamo, MDM delegates and MMV to withdraw from the 2019 elections, after their names were publicly disclosed, and their superiors, among them teachers and school directors, pressured them to give up, otherwise, they would be sanctioned in schools and/or classrooms.

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[220] Data from Manjacaze, for example, indicate that education sector employees and agents represent about 74% of total district employees, when there are entire locations that do not even have a single police officers and others that have only one for about 15 thousand inhabitants ().

[221] Clésio Mutani, School Director, Interview, Manjacaze, 27 June 2018.

[222] Juvêncio Muholove, Frelimo Secretary for Organisation and Mobilisation, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 June 2018.

[223] Samuel Massango, School Director, Interview, Manjacaze, 29 June 2018.

Furthermore, classes and other academic activities are of marginal importance during election periods. The teachers involved, like the students, refrain from attending or, in the case of teachers, when they do attend, that attendance is intermittent: "… When campaign time arrives, there is no time to make plans [for classes] because, for the most part, the director is involved in the campaign,"[224] lamented one of the directors. Then he added, "… we are obliged (…) because it is known that this is the year of the elections, and the director cannot assume an EP1 class [first cycle in primary school, from grade one to grade five]. He can only try to work twenty-four hours [a week]." These adjustments help teachers and students to focus more on political activities, with absences not even being marked if the absentees are involved in Frelimo activities, as discussed in the previous chapter. It is important to remember here that some teachers, for example, are entirely exempt from their work obligations, some beyond just the electoral period, as is the case for several First Zone Secretaries.[225] Therefore, the party comes first, as demonstrated above, but how does Frelimo mobilise during a campaign? This question is addressed next, starting with an analysis of the role of the party manifesto in this process.

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[224] Messias Xadreque, School Director, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 April 2019.
[225] According to Juvêncio Muholove, one of the Organisation and Mobilisation Secretaries, the exemption of some Party leaders from their teaching activities, especially outside the elections is a confidential matter, but they still receive state salaries. I realized, however, that it does not happen in all Administrative Posts. In some, they still teach, but have fewer classes.

6.3 The uselessness of the manifesto!

Recent analyses show that electoral manifestos in Mozambique are just wish lists, without concrete measures for their implementation (Cahen, 2020), and that the parties themselves do not use them for mobilisation (Nuvunga, 2021; Vaz & Nhanale, 2012). This section addresses the 'uselessness of the manifesto' in the latter sense – that is, as documents ignored by the parties themselves during electoral mobilisation – but also highlights that the Frelimo campaign, in Manjacaze more specifically, is dominated by other dynamics and themes, all alien to its manifesto. This includes the centrality of mapping, identifying, and controlling voters, as previously demonstrated, and above all, the recurrent evocation of Frelimo's historical role in the liberation war and its protection of the population against Renamo attacks whenever it seeks to convince the electorate to vote. Moreover, regarding mobilisation, Frelimo still presents itself as already hegemonic, founding that presentation on its invincibility. The concurrent message to those intending to support the opposition is that to do so would be a mere waste of their vote. The latter will also be developed in Chapter 7, while Chapter 8 shows how this hegemony is challenged, resisted, and negotiated.

It is worth emphasising, first, that the Frelimo mobilisation process is affected by the weak preparation of the mobilisers themselves, with few having any specific training at the grassroots level. Mr Gumende Tair, a Frelimo mobiliser, explains:

> "There was no training at all. We had a few meetings with the managers, where they told us that we had to mobilise; to go and convince people to vote because this is the future of each one of us ... We had to obey their guidelines. We respect them because they are like parents to us. When they bring information from our superiors, we have to obey. We show respect so that they won't say that there are impolite people in area x..."[226]

At meetings, and at training sessions, for those lucky enough to receive them, the contents of the manifesto were not addressed, and few had a copy of the document. On 24 September 2019, for example, in the middle of the electoral campaign, during a campaign debriefing meeting in one of the *povoações* of Chidenguele, the first copies of the manifesto were distributed. Like all other campaign material, including t-shirts, caps and scarves, copies of

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[226] Gumende Tair, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 October 2019.

the manifestos were scarce because, as Obadias Guilende, a party 'focal point' at a Locality level, said, there was a need to be selective: "Give it to the coordinators, managers and then to the mobilisers. Those from the OMM, OJM and other members of the shock groups that received them must be integrated into the group of mobilisers."[227] Guilende's explanation came after the mobilisers complained about their alleged exclusion from the distribution of campaign materials while some who were not directly involved in the campaign had benefitted. Given the scarcity of the material, the recommendation was that those who had received the material without being part of the control structure should be integrated, so that the materials could be used for campaign activities.

Regarding the manifestos, although none of the mobilisers at the meeting received them, their complaints showed that they were not particularly interested in them but were rather more interested in the t-shirts and caps which would allow them to be easily identified as Frelimo mobilisers. Some managers received copies of the manifesto, and the reaction of one of them after receiving it was illustrative of the level of importance he attributed to that document. Sitting down with his copy, he looked at the cover, shook his head and started to smile. When I asked what he thought of the document, he replied: "There is much work here. Who will read this?"[228] Three days later, in an interview about his work within the party 'structure', and mobilisation more specifically, I asked about the usefulness of the manifesto, including his reaction when he received it. His answer was:

> "Well, I needed that document because I'm a manager... not because I'm going to read or use it. Who needs to hear what's in the manifesto? Here I just need to talk about local things; remind people of the Matsanga war; talk about 'the glorious' [referring to Frelimo], about Mondlane... that's why, that day, when you asked me about the manifesto, I said I wasn't going to read it. Nobody reads. See, we have been mobilising for some time. I only received the manifesto on the 23rd... the mobiliser is already working. They [the mobilisers] are sending the information we need."[229]

The information the manager refers to is specifically about voter card numbers or, as some interpreted it, the voter cards themselves. As explained earlier, it was recommended that mobilisers send the voter card numbers they collected daily to their manager, and these

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[227] Obadias Guilende, Frelimo First Secretary of the Locality, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 September 2019.
[228] Baptista Dengo, Frelimo Manager, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 de Setembro de 2019.
[229] Baptista Dengo, Frelimo Manager, Interview, Manjacaze, 26 de Setembro de 2019.

numbers and/or cards were evidence of the work they had carried out. Indeed, the collection of voter card numbers began earlier, in March 2018, during the first phase of the electoral registration process, a few before the municipal elections in that same year, but continued until the end of the election campaign for the 15 October 2019 general elections. During this first phase, the collection was carried out by the secretaries of Circles and Cells, then, during the election campaign, the task was entrusted to the mobilisers. In both cases, however, instructions came from above, as one of the former OJM leaders in Manjacaze explains:

> "We were at one of the [Committee's] sections of the district when the First Comrade [Frelimo Secretary in Manjacaze] stood up and said, 'when you are collecting voter numbers, you should say, *eh*... [With these numbers,] we want to guarantee the registration of our members in the CNE (National Elections Commission) because if our candidates do not have signatures, they will not be registered in the CNE. So [tell them] that is the main objective: we are guaranteeing the registration of our candidates'. That is what they used to say. They could approach someone and say, 'Sir, you are our member; we are asking for your voter card to secure the number for our candidate to run. Without that number, he will not meet the conditions [for registration]."[230]

However, the fact that the number collection continued, even after the end of candidate registration in the CNE on 16 July 2019, is evidence of the falsity of that argument. In fact, as mentioned earlier, numbers were collected until 12 October 2019, when the campaign ended, just three days before polling day. Collection of these numbers stood out as one of the main activities of the mobilisers, as can be seen from the words of Faustino Tune, a very active mobiliser, who was asked to define his mobilisation role: "to ask for votes and get that number [voter card number]".[231] He went on, explaining how he was chosen: "Well, on the day they selected the number collectors [e.g. mobilisers], I was not there. I did not know about the meeting. I was later told [by the manager], 'there is a job of collecting numbers, talking to people to convince them to vote for Frelimo.' I accepted..."[232]

Mr Tair calls himself a 'number collector', emphasising what he, like other interlocutors, considered to be the mobiliser's primary function: collecting voter card numbers. His words, however, also illustrate the deficiencies in the selection process of the mobilisers themselves,

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[230] Jorsio Malate, former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.
[231] Faustino Tune, Frelimo mobiliser, Interview, Manjacaze, 22 October 2019.
[232] Faustino Tune, Frelimo mobiliser, Interview, Manjacaze, 22 October 2019.

which, as in the case of other party leadership figures (discussed in Section 6.1.1), sometimes occurs in their absence. Now, because training, when it occurs, is also deficient, the transmission of information about their work reaches the number collectors in a very distorted way, generating tensions, even among the 'comrades'. In fact, some mobilisers and secretaries told voters "... the bosses sent us out to get the numbers (sic)"[233], or said that the sole purpose of collecting the numbers was "... to help you locate the table on voting day,"[234] while others went further, requesting not just the numbers, but the voter cards themselves. This approach yielded scant results as it was met with many voters' refusal to cooperate, citing reasons that ranged from not understanding the purpose of Frelimo's innovation to the practical impossibility of parting with what, for many, was their only available form of identification, especially since those who requested the cards did not specify how long they would need them for. Another reason for refusing to cooperate was because some simply were not registered for the electoral process and could not say so openly because it could put them at risk of being classified as 'others.' Lastly, there were those who had already been relegated to the 'others' category or, at the least, were opposition sympathisers, but like the aforementioned non-registered potential voters, they feared reprisals, so would not show their numbers.

However, for those who handed over their card, the 'mobilisation' progressed to the next step, which was to simulate the voting experience for the card holder. This consisted of showing them an image of the candidate and the symbol of the party, so that they would know where on the voting slip to mark their 'x' on polling day. Again, Faustino Tune explains:

> "As I said before, it works like this: we enter the house and say that we are Frelimo mobilisers ... As soon as we arrive, we ask for their cards. If they accept, we must explain that, to vote, one must do so for candidate number 1, for the drum and corn [Frelimo symbols], and for our President. As soon as you arrive [at the polling station], you should mark it with an X, see? We make sure to explain everything well."[235]

Card number collection was, without doubt, one of the most privileged roles in the door-to-door campaigns of the mobilisation process, but there were also interpersonal contact activities in markets, churches, football championships or when there were external brigade

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[233] Ibid.

[234] Faustino Tune, Frelimo mobiliser, Interview, Manjacaze, 22 October 2019.

[235] Faustino Tune, Frelimo mobiliser, Interview, Manjacaze, 22 October 2019.

visits. The mobilisers were followed during those activities to observe their actions. It was noted that they also exploited citizens' lack of information, emphasising Frelimo's position as a party-state, to put pressure on them. The extract that follows is from a conversation with Gumende Tair, another mobiliser mentioned at the beginning of this subsection.

> Me: How did you convince people to vote?
> Gumende Tair: Oh, we say, 'Look! If you are Mozambican, you have to know how to choose whom you will want to deal with in the future because, for example, you may have children here at home or you may have children one day. In the future, your children will have problems [if you don't vote]. They will need to deal with school documents; some are minors, and others may want to work ... one day, the government can see it on computers, and they won't get [jobs or documents]. It will be discovered that in year x, you did not vote ... [and] they will have problems.' So, people get the impression that that is true, but that is our way. It is a strategy during our mobilisation work.[236]

Voting is secret and not mandatory in Mozambique, but the mobilisers mentioned by Gumende imply the opposite, emphasising that if people do not vote, 'they could be discovered' and 'they could have problems' – a form of pressure like that of the agitators in the then USSR, as mentioned in Section 6.2.1 which dealt with 'total control'. The mobilisers also mentioned difficulties that potential voters or dependents might face when attempting to access State documents. This pressure is widely used, especially during the voter registration phase. However, it was also observed that these mobilisation speeches were only made when the person targeted was not receptive, for example refusing to hand over their voter card'. Otherwise, the mobilisation ended with the collection of the number and/or the card itself, or with instruction on how to vote. The speech that follows is from a young man of about twenty, who questioned the mobiliser, who was just under twenty-five, and according to whom everything belonged to Frelimo: schools, hospitals, soccer fields, the land. The mobiliser explained, echoing a well-known Frelimo phrase, 'Frelimo owns the land and men'. The young man's reaction was: "you are a liar! Schools have nothing to do with Frelimo, madam! It belongs to all of us. Better be well informed."[237]

The young man above showed that he could distinguish the party from the State, which goes against the grain in Manjacaze, considering that local political socialisation instils in people's

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[236] Gumente Tair, Interview, 25 October 2019.
[237] S.N., young man, response to a Frelimo mobiliser, Manjacaze, 5 October 2019.

minds that the Party is the State and vice-versa (cf., Chapter 4). During the mobilisation campaigns, however, somewhat surprisingly, there were many other similar episodes, including with people who questioned the mobilisers, showing that they were not wholly compliant with that same party-state (cf., Chapter 8). The weak capacities of many of the mobilisers also opened space for more questions and, at times, confrontations with those they intended to mobilise. On one occasion, on 5 October 2019, while the Filipe Jacinto Nyusi football championship was taking place, an elderly man who later identified himself as a former combatant, apparently dissatisfied with Frelimo, dismissed the group of three mobilisers who approached him shortly after the match. After the demonstrated the voting process and he repeatedly questioned why they thought it was worth voting for Frelimo and not for the other candidates since they were unable to present plausible arguments, he said: "Better leave. You don't know anything about Frelimo."[238] In similar situations, when confronted, the immediate response of the mobilisers was to evoke Frelimo as a liberation party and, soon after, Renamo as a murderer and destroyer. Here is a short extract from the speech of the mobiliser above, trying to convince the young man who called her 'a liar':

> "But do you know that Frelimo brought independence? If it brought independence, all that was done afterwards was done by Frelimo. We didn't have a school with the settler; we couldn't go to the hospital anyway ... Your parents suffered a lot. Ask them... Those you want to vote for killed many people here. They cut off ears and noses, and they are the ones that reduced the gains that Frelimo achieved. Vote for your 'matsangas' [referring to Renamo] and you will see!"[239]

The same mobiliser went further, underlining that voting for the opposition was useless since the opposition stood no chance of competing against Frelimo, but on this occasion, as in all other mobilisations observed, none of the mobilisers evoked even one of the four main pillars of the Frelimo manifesto, namely: the consolidation of national unity, peace, national reconciliation and democracy; consolidation of the democratic rule of law, decentralisation and governance ethics; promotion of sustainable economic development and social justice; and regional and international cooperation. On the contrary, from the last speech above, it can be noted that the theme of reconciliation, for example (part of pillar 1), is quite distant from Frelimo vocabulary in that district, which instead emphasises episodes of the civil war

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[238] S.N, Elder man, response to a Frelimo Mobiliser, Manjacaze, 20 September 2019.
[239] Amélia Ubisse, Frelimo Mobiliser, Manjacaze, 20 September 2019.

and aims to demonise Renamo and all opposition. Incidentally, there are two peculiarities to highlight in the mobilisation discourse.

The first is a generational aspect, as there is a notable difference in content and delivery depending on whether the discourse is being communicated to young people, adults, or the elderly. Contact is initiated in much the same way with all potential voters, regardless of age – a formal introduction, immediately followed by a request for a voter card number – however, what follows for young people is a litany of Frelimo deeds with an emphasis on water, energy, schools, and peace, whereas the conversation with adults and the elderly more often turns to reminders of their independence and of civil war. For young people, however, the latter themes were only brought up in cases where they requested justifications from the mobilisers, as shown in the examples above.

The second peculiarity concerns similarities between the discourses of the mobilisers in the door-to-door and interpersonal campaigns and those of the godfathers at the rallies. Indeed, when meeting with young people, the godfathers also highlight the issue of provisions and access to services, while meetings with adults and the elderly focus on the demonisation of Renamo. In fact, in the latter case, their speeches unfold in the same order: first, a reminder of the evils perpetrated by colonists, followed by praise for the courage of Frelimo members in rising against them, and finally, a retelling of the horrors of the civil war, attributed to Renamo and the opposition. The emphasis is that such an apparent coincidence occurred, even though many mobilisers did not undergo specific training. This highlights the existence of other forums for transmitting this knowledge, namely, through political socialisation, which was addressed in chapter 4.

In short: in Manjacaze, Frelimo mobilisation is less about convincing the electorate to vote, but when this is done, the focus is on issues associated with the dynamics of wars, where Frelimo is presented as the country's liberator, and defender of the population, whilst Renamo and the entire opposition are described as destroyers and murderers, among other things. In this sense, politics in Manjacaze appears to be a continuation of war by other means, inversely paraphrasing Clausewitz, as Brito (2010) also does. This situation contradicts the aim of national reconciliation set out in the Frelimo manifesto itself. Incidentally, it is simply ignored, with the campaign focusing mainly on collecting voter numbers and/or cards.

Chapter 7: 'Work freely!' understanding fraud in Manjacaze

Having analysed how Frelimo mobilises during the electoral campaign in Chapter 6, this chapter analysis fraud on polling day. The expression 'work freely,' widely evoked by the different Members of the Voting Table (*Membro de Mesa de Votação*, MMV) and other direct participants in electoral fraud interviewed during this research, translates well to Frelimo's ease, arrogance, and control of the elections. Given that fraud is part of electoral authoritarianism (Sartori, 1976; Schedler, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002), but is also evidence of the weakness of those who resort to it (Hermet et al., 1978; Smyth, 2021), showing how it contributes to Frelimo's hegemony also exposes the weaknesses of such hegemony, and of the regime itself, even at the heartland of Frelimo, also the epicentre of the asymmetric authoritarianism in the country.[240] I argue that Frelimo's hegemony, like the supermajorities that support it, is partly a product of fraud, not necessarily a reflection of the level of support of the citizens of Manjacaze to Frelimo, some not even compliant with it. I start by addressing the role of the key actors of the fraud, highlighting the figure of the President and the Secretary in each polling station; then, in the second section, I focus on their manipulation strategies and, in the third, I reflect on the magnitude of the fraud.

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[240] As explained in chapter 1, I use the expression 'asymmetric authoritarianism', in the sense of Lyons & Verjee (2022, p.2), to refer to discrepancies in the dynamics of authoritarianism, even within the same country, province, district and other territorial units.

7.1 The actors: "The president and the secretary do the work"[241]

Each polling station has a *mesa* (table) with a staff of seven people, also called Members of the Voting Table (*Membros de Mesa de Votação*, MMV): the president, the vice-president, the secretary and four tellers. The first, second and third tellers are, respectively, from Frelimo, Renamo and the MDM, the largest parties in the country and the only ones represented in Parliament. The fourth, like the president, the vice-president, and the Secretary, are elected through a public tender, between supposedly independent candidates. Their independence, however, is widely questionable since the interviewees themselves, especially the presidents, consider that they occupy their positions thanks to Frelimo. Josefa's case is illustrative.

Josefa is 24 years old. It was his first time as an MMV, and he started as president of a *mesa*. Since 2015, he had been a member of the Mozambican Youth Organisation (OJM), a Frelimo body, but, according to him, when he first applied to be an MMV he did not use his party credentials, applying instead using what he called a "normal application" process,[242] (a public tender), "…because [I] was no longer active in the OJM." He feared not having the party's support for his admission. However, during his interview, the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (*Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral*, STAE) staff inquired about his party affiliation: "I went there, I had an interview. When they asked [if I was from the party], I explained my situation, and they said I should wait until they talked to my superiors [in the party]. I waited for two weeks. They called me and said I should go to the STAE because they had already confirmed that I was a party member… They confirmed this with the secretary of my neighbourhood ..."

Josefa was surprised by his appointment as president. "I didn't count on being president, secretary, or vice president. My application was a simple one," he says. However, as Jorsio, a member of the Manjacaze District Committee and former OJM leader, explains, this does not happen by chance:

> "Our party coordinates with the STAE. Then, for the selection of presidents, the STAE chooses from a list sent by the party district committee. This list is made up of 140

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[241] Margarida Chiziane, Frelimo Delegate, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 October 2019.

[242] Josefa Macassa, President of *Mesa*, Interview, Xai-Xai, 29 October 2019.

members.[243] So, the party says, 'we want these 140 as presidents of *mesa*... the party just pass it on [to STAE] ...' how can STAE refuse? STAE selects the president from the list Frelimo sends. Then, the selected presidents will know what their missions are."[244]

Jorsio, who has also been president of a *mesa*, went on to explain that sometimes it happens that presidents are not chosen from Frelimo lists, but in such circumstances, STAE resorts to other mechanisms to verify whether the candidate is from the party, as in the case of Josefa, in which they appealed to the secretary of his neighbourhood. For Josefa, it was clear regarding the 'mission,' which Jorsio refers to: "they placed me there to guarantee the party's victory... It was just a question of guaranteeing victory."[245] According to him, the way in which that victory would be guaranteed was explained by and within the workings of the party. "They said I had to start participating in party meetings... and [that's where] they dictated those manoeuvers [of fraud] and explained what would happen in the field," he explains, specifying that they had been prevented that would find multiple registrations of the same elector on the same register book and non-registered voters that would go there to vote. About the latter, he added: "During the [STAE] training, they said that non-registered voters do not have the right to vote, but in our party meetings, they told us to allow them to vote... [They said that] we should annotate the name and number of people who had not come to vote and replace them with those who were there... Those that vote for Frelimo should always occupy the primary places."

However, they also receive 'instructions' from inside the STAE itself, as Jorsio reveals:

> "... for example, the STAE training ends today. So, the brigades will start... But, for some time, the STAE will meet with all the presidents, only with the presidents. The journalists have no access. No one enters. Only the STAE is there with the presidents. They say, 'hey, we are comrades here. We must deal with issues of comrades, not STAE issues. You work at the comrades' polling stations. The Frelimo party entrusted you. If you fail, everything will be wrong.' [They say], 'You must do this, this, and this... do you hear? Go to the field and work. There, you will pick up other comrades who will come from the committee areas to help you with your work.' So, they leave the STAE knowing that, in place X, they will find so-and-so at the table. This is our structure. When they arrive, they introduce themselves to the president and get to work..."[246]

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[243] Here I changed the number because it corresponds to the number of *mesa* in a specific Administrative Post. Without changing, I can easily lead to the identification of the interviewee.

[244] Jorsio Malate, Former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.

[245] Josefa Macassa, President of *Mesa*, Interview, Xai-Xai, 29 October 2019.

[246] Jorsio Malate, Former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.

Jorsio also explains that STAE agents themselves may alert the MMVs if their *mesa* is subject to inspection. This is because inspection teams are mixed, comprising members from different opposition parties and civil society organisations. Thus, the purpose of the alert is to prevent the fraud and its perpetrators from being spotted:

> "The STAE does the following: when it is made aware of a specific inspection group, it can find out whether there are people from other parties among that inspection group. If that is the case, STAE agents can [be contacted to raise the alarm]. A car with X and Y license plate is already on its way there. So, you must be careful because it is full of 'others.' But when they arrive, they will only stay for 10 or 15 minutes and then leave. During those 15 minutes, the group [of MMVs] will firmly stick to the formal work [that is expected of them], but when the inspection group leaves...! We go back to doing our 'usual work', and nothing else!"[247]

In the extracts above, there is also an explanation of the audacity of the different actors involved in defrauding the electoral processes. Josefa, again: "We were given guarantees. They said we were supposed to be at ease. We were not to worry about opposition delegates, supervisors… We were supposed to be at ease. So, we worked based on that."[248] Here, the role of presidents, as well as secretaries, is fundamental. They are the ones who guarantee that there are no discrepancies between the number of votes cast and those that appear in the registration books when ballot boxes are stuffed. The term used for these processes is 'unloading.' That is, announcing and guaranteeing the registration of the number of votes deposited in the ballot box: "We also did the unloading in the registers book, so that nothing would fail…"[249] Margarida, a Frelimo Delegate[250] who also actively participated in the 'work' on polling day, offers a more detailed explanation of how the unloading process occurs:

> Margarida: We were able to do [the fraud] at will... While the president did [the unloading of bulletins], the secretary had to dictate the numbers to us. We also had to write in our register books.
> Me: Dictate numbers... which numbers? I need to understand this well.
> Margarida: Yes, the president could put in 50 [bulletins], then he would talk to the secretary. The secretary is the one who tells us that he put in 50, and we also had to cross it out there [in the register books].
> Me: So, the secretary... [the interviewee interrupts to answer]
> Margarida: Yes. They work together.
> Me: OK, OK...

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[247] Jorsio Malate, Former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.
[248] Josefa Macassa, President of *Mesa*, Interview, Xai-Xai, 29 October 2019.
[249] Josefa Macassa, President of *Mesa*, Interview, Xai-Xai, 29 October 2019.
[250] Margarida Chiziane, Frelimo Delegate, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 October 2019.

> Margarida: With the president...
> Me: OK
> Margarida: The president and the secretary do the work.
> Me: OK
> Margarida: We worked very well indeed [laughs].

Thus, the coordination between the president and the secretary, who, as explained above, 'do the work', aims to ensure no discrepancy between the number of bulletins 'unloaded' and those listed in the register books. Sometimes, the names of voters marked in this 'unloading' are not considered, which is why there are recurrent cases in which, intending to vote, a specific voter registered at a *mesa* where the unloading has already taken place finds that someone has already voted in his name. These cases are widely reported in different elections (cf., for example, Hanlon & Fox, 2006; Hanlon et al., 2016), but they result from the 'unloading' process explained here. However, these unloadings are also facilitated by the existence of multiple registrations of the same elector in the same register book, as Josefa reported when, during the STAE training, he was warned about the possible anomalies he would encounter on polling day. Indeed, on 24 September 2019, during a debriefing meeting of the electoral campaign mentioned in the previous chapter, I myself heard a Frelimo First Secretary at the Locality level explaining what to do with the duplicated names in the register books: "Let's use this to our advantage. Did you hear? I don't need to go into details. You know what you must do."[251] He explicitly alluded to electoral fraud and was responding to a concern of his mobilisers about the difficulties they faced in locating many of the electors who appeared in the register books they received. Still, the question is: if the opposition is represented within the *mesa*, how is it possible to 'do the fraud at will', as Margarida says?

This question is addressed in the section that follows, about 'manipulation strategies,' which also clarifies the role of 'the actors' of electoral fraud, including those of the president and the secretaries mentioned above.

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[251] Obadias Guilende, Frelimo First Secretary, Intervention at a meeting with Frelimo mobilizers, Manjacaze 24 September 2019.

7.2 Manipulation strategies

On polling day, the manipulation of electoral results occurs mainly in three moments: during the voting process, when, for example, some voters vote two or more times, usually followed by the 'unloadings,' as presented in the previous section; during the counting and tabulation of results, where opposition ballot papers are withdrawn or invalidated, null votes are validated, and blank ballot papers are filled in; after the count, when the results sheets (*editais*) are also changed. Josefa, the president referenced above, addressed part of these strategies when he stressed in the excerpt above that "they told us not to worry about those [opposition MMVs and delegates] because the party leaders said: 'they are yours'. Work at ease!"[252] Another short conversion with Josefa:

> Josefa: All the blank bulletins were marked and put in the ballot box.
> Me: OK... how?
> Josefa: We just had to guarantee [Frelimo] victory.
> Me: Yes, but how?
> Josefa: It was to guarantee victory. That was our job. So, we validated the blank bulletins. We ticked them all off and put them in the urn.
> Me: Okay, okay.
> Josefa: Also, for Frelimo to have a bigger advantage, we took it [the votes] from the [opposition] parties.
> Me: I did not understand that part. How did that go?
> Josefa: We told the tellers... specifically the girl from the Renamo party... We told them to go out for lunch. During that period [when she was away] ... You know how girls are. They waste so much time... In the meantime, we guaranteed victory.

Josefa is not clear enough about the process of invalidating opposition votes, which, according to other interlocutors referred to later in this chapter, generally occurs at the end, during the counting process, and in some cases involves distracting opposition members with food (cf., Section 7.1.2). However, he does share details of how he, the vice-president, and the secretary each voted at two different *mesas* and, at each, they voted twice, a total of four votes for each of them:

> Me: But was no opposition member (MMV or delegate) there?
> Josefa: It was just us – the vice-president, me, and the secretary.[253] I voted at two polling stations.
> Me: OK.

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[252] Josefa Macassa, President of *Mesa*, Interview, Xai-Xai, 29 October 2019.
[253] 'Just us' here does not mean that there were no others, including the opposition, but it referred to those who committed the fraud: the president, the vice president, and the secretary.

> Josefa: But I doubled the votes and the bulletins.
> Me: How so?
> Josefa: I duplicated my own bulletins. The vice president and the secretary of the polling station did the same.
> Me: But how did you do it?
> Josefa: I took out the bulletins and gave to the vice president and the secretary. They arranged them well and came to drop into the ballot box.

It was not just the president, the vice president and the secretary who voted multiple times, others did too, and Josefa confided that the evidence was easy to see on their fingers that were marked with indelible ink to show that they had already voted. However, despite this evidence, they were not prevented from voting again: "yes, they only painted this part here [pointing to the underside of the finger]. Then they came back and put it in again [voted]…."[254] replied Josefa, when asked how he came to that conclusion. Thus, from Josefa's account, ballot box stuffing through the addition of extra ballot papers to the ballot box stands out as the main mechanism for manipulating electoral results on polling day, and this is supported by other interlocutors, although they also refer to another form of ballot box stuffing: the inflation of voters in the result sheets. The following subsection continues to explain the ballot box stuffing processes. The expression "even the ghosts must vote"[255], from one of Frelimo's First Secretaries in Manjacaze, refers to this.

7.2.1 "Even ghosts must vote…": ballot box stuffing

According to data from the electoral registration, carried out first in 2018, then updated and expanded in 2019,[256] Manjacaze registered 131,617 voters against the 129,142 that the CNE (*Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, National Election Comission) set as a target for that electoral cycle. Despite exceeding the CNE target, these numbers are problematic, as in fact are all data from the electoral registration in Gaza province.[257] The biggest problems stem from two main sources. First, the number of registered voters corresponds to around 70% of the total population of Manjacaze, the estimate for which for 2019 was 190,922 people (INE, 2010),

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[254] Josefa Macassa, President of *Mesa*, Interview, Xai-Xai, 29 October 2019.
[255] Bastos Nassone, Frelimo First Secretary, Extract from his speech at an OMM shock group members' meeting, Manjacaze, 21 November 2018.
[256] The electoral registration occurred in two phases: in 2018, in all the 53 districts with municipalities, then, in 2019 in all other districts, but continued in those started in 2018.
[257] On these data from Gaza, see Francisco (2019a, 2019b) and CIP (2019a, 2019b). About fraud in Mozambique, see Hanlon (2006).

suggesting that around 70% of the population of Manjacaze were at least eighteen years old, the minimum age for the vote in Mozambique. However, data from the INE, the entity that produces the reference statistics for electoral projections, contradicts CNE figures since it estimated the voting age population (PIE) of the entire Gaza province at 57.4%, which is above the national average of 53.2%. Second, alongside the contradictions in the PIE estimates, for 2019, the INE projected a total of 82,646 citizens in Manjacaze, but the CNE set that figure at 129,142, thus 156% of the INE reference data. The target reached by the CNE went further, standing at 131,617, corresponding to 102% of its own projections and 159% of the INE projections. The fundamental questions are: where did the CNE numbers come from? How can the discrepancies between CNE and INE data be explained? Why are 'ghost voters' concentrated in Gaza, Frelimo's heartland?

In response to this, the CNE and the INE found themselves on a collision course, since the former was adamant and guaranteed the reliability of its data, while the latter underlined the exaggerated inflation of those numbers, going so far as to mention that the targets reached by the CNE would only be possible in 2040, after the holding of four more general elections. Other analyses indicated that CNE data were products of manipulation (Francisco, 2019a, 2019b; CIP, 2019a, 2019b[258]), possible in Gaza precisely "because it is a Frelimo heartland, with co-opted/ electoral agents and weak or even non-existent opposition" (CIP, 2019b, p.2). Renamo demanded an audit of the census, and the CIP was willing to finance it, giving assurances that it would not compromise the electoral calendar. To that end, the CNE needed to share the electoral registration database, which by law is a public document, but the CNE did not do this, and there was no audit. The campaign and voting took place in an environment of tension and distrust, associated, among other things, with the high number of ghost voters – at least 48,971 in Manjacaze, out of over 300,000 in the entire Gaza province.

How was it possible to prove that these voters exist? Not only the CNE, but Frelimo itself, were under pressure. The latter, both because Gaza is its heartland and there were strong suspicions that mega fraud was planned in its favour, whilst the elections in general, but in Gaza more particularly, were under heavy scrutiny by opposition parties and national and international observers. This pressure also weighed on local leaders, who were responsible

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[258] CIP stands for *Centro de Integridade Publica (Center for Public Integrity)*, a CSO in Mozambique.

for coordinating and guaranteeing Frelimo's victory. These leaders, alongside others, were concerned about the voter registration numbers, which they considered exaggerated. "They exaggerated too much,"[259] commented Paulo Jesse, administrative post chief and senior Frelimo member in Manjacaze, who added that "manipulation like that is only done up there,"[260] implying that it was impossible for such an inflation of voter numbers to be made at the district level. Then he provided a highly illustrative example of the exaggeration that was insufficiently explained in the aggregated data: "Look! Chidenguele has 60,000 inhabitants, but they registered 55,000 voters. Is it possible? They failed... anyone... even an illiterate, knows that that was exaggerated."[261] In fact, a greater disaggregation of the voter registration data reveals even more worrying situations, with some administrative posts, but also localities and *povoações*, having more than 90% of the voting age population. Chidenguele is just one example whose figures Frelimo leaders themselves recognise as exaggerated. How then is it possible to ensure the reliability of the polling results, bearing in mind the problems already identified with the electoral registration?

The solution was for the supposed ghosts to vote, and this idea recurred in the speeches of different Frelimo leaders throughout the electoral process. Bastos Nassone, for example, one of Frelimo's First Secretaries in Manjacaze, speaking at a meeting to revitalise women's shock groups in Chibonzane on 21 November 2018 after the first phase of electoral registration, said that "even ghosts must vote in these elections".[262] He repeated this message in all subsequent meetings, both during the revitalisation of the shock groups and with the party cells. A closely allied version of the message replaced 'ghosts' with 'dead', and according to Paulo Jesse, the Administrative Post chief quoted above, Conceita Surtane, then Minister of Education and head of Frelimo's Central Assistance Brigade to Gaza, mentioned it during a campaign rally held at the headquarters of Dengoine village in Chidenguele administrative post on 8 October 2019. According to him, "at the Dengoine meeting, the minister said that even the dead must

[259] Paulo Jesse, Administrative Post Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 16 October 2019.
[260] Ibid.
[261] Ibid.
[262] Bastos Nassone, Frelimo First Secretary, Extract from his speech at an OMM shock group members' meeting, Manjacaze, 21 November 2018.

vote, but President Nyusi is the one who really messed up when he said that Gaza would fix this. It was wrong to say that."[263]

To legitimise Manjacaze's numbers, it was not necessary to reach 100% participation rates, although this occurred in some *mesas*, as will be demonstrated in Section 7.3; considering the history of high abstention in that district, which was 64% in 2004 (cf., Table Chapter 1), votes close to 50% would be sufficient. On this occasion, the final results indicated that at least 44% of registered voters in that district voted, but one question remains: how did they achieve that 44%, given the alleged existence of ghost voters? This can only have been through massive ballot box stuffing, to which the numbers and/or cards collected during the electoral registration and election campaigns were fundamental.

The cards and/or the numbers collected facilitated the identification and monitoring of voters during the campaign (cf., Chapter 6), but thanks to this monitoring, it also made it possible to know who would potentially participate in the polling, and to estimate abstentionists and the 'ghost' voters, in addition to working out the 'unloading' numbers to be performed at each *mesa*. Jorsio Malate, a Frelimo District Committee member in Manjacaze, former OJM leader and president of the *mesa*, gave a detailed explanation, which shows how polling day fraud is planned well in advance and with the help of voter card numbers. According to him, without those numbers, it would be impossible to reach a participation rate of 100%, as happened in some polling stations:

> Jorsio: It is like this, Mr Chaimite; it is like this: we reach 100% [of participation] from the moment we mobilise the population to extract that number from the voter registration card. The thing starts from there. We just need that number there; that is enough.
>
> Me: Yes, but how does it work? I have observed elections here in Manjacaze, but I realise that, at each location, things work differently. How is it here in your area?
>
> Jorsio: It is like this… I have worked at one of the polling stations because my party – Frelimo – trusted me…. it is like this: one of us … picks up just the register book, and vote…. We already have those numbers there! Hahaha [laughs]. So, we use those numbers to mark them as having already voted, even though people did not show up.
>
> Then we will say that Post X [indicates the name of the administrative post] on table X had 1,040 votes when there were only 40. Of these, 1,000 are in favour of Frelimo... Let's say we got 100%. Well, those 1,000 did not even show up. That's the strategy we

[263] Paulo Jesse, Administrative Post Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 16 October 2019.

use because, in fact, given the weakness [poor turnout] of our young people [who do not participate], we can never have 100%."[264]

In fact, as stated by Zelma Marina, MMV, teacher and Frelimo member, who will be quoted at length in Section 7.3, "the numbers helped because we kept the addresses and the contacts [of the card owners], and [with them] it was easy to control people".[265] To guarantee the effective functioning of this control and, consequently, of the entire fraud strategy, the elements of the *estrutura* set up during the campaign were transferred to polling day. Thus, the coordinators, managers and mobilizers were distributed by the different boards as MMVs and delegates, while the general coordinator should receive, verify, and report the data he received from the MMVs to his superiors in the Zone, but did so from outside one of the polling centers since he was not part of the MMVs. The MMVs and delegates were allocated to the same polling centres they worked during the election campaign, many of which were in schools, and in these, to the same *mesas* from which the registration books these MMVs used for mobilisation were extracted. This allocation allowed them to better identify the voters who were part of their lists, to contact them to go to the polls or, if impossible, because many simply did not exist, to use their names for the 'unloadings' which accompanied the ballot box stuffing during the polling process. There were also party delegates, who, more specifically, had a registration matrix showing the names of the voters, where they wrote down those who turned up at the polls and the information about the 'unloadings' that, periodically,[266] they shared with the general coordinator, located in the vicinity of the largest polling centre of the locality. The coordinator, in turn, sent information to the Zone, and from there to the district and so on. The image below shows one of these general coordinators, located just five metres from a polling centre, with a matrix in his hands.

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[264] Jorsio Malate, Former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.
[265] Zelma Marina, Teacher and MMV, Interview, Manjacaze, 4 November 2019.
[266] They should share data and report at least three times: at 8am, 11am, and 5pm.

Figure 10: A general coordinator adding data to the control matrix during polling day in Manjacaze

The general coordinator, received information from his delegates at each *mesa*, not only at the polling centre where he was based but from the entire locality. Although informally, he had free access to the polling centre, in the case observed, only during counting and just before the results were posted did he walk around each *mesa* and talk to the presidents and their delegates. Before that, during polling, he limited himself to receiving the information sent to him, making appropriate notes, and forwarding data to his superiors. He also passed on to his 'subordinates' relevant guidelines from these superiors. However, his mission was still to find solutions to eliminate obstacles that arose during polling day. On one of these occasions, he was informed that, in another polling centre, a Renamo delegate suspected fraud, and he summoned an 'observer' and sent him to said polling centre, allegedly to facilitate 'the work of the party.'

It is worth noting that not all managers and mobilisers managed to be integrated into the *mesas* as MMVs or delegates. However, the party had a solution for these cases, at least in some polling centres: they were informally allocated a space close to a polling centre so that

they could still control the electors they 'mobilised'. Figure 12 below shows the moment when a Frelimo First Secretary of a locality met with some of these 'other controllers' while polling was happening nearby.

Figure 11: Voting Process   **Figure 12:** Frelimo meeting inside the pooling centre

The said First Secretary, known as the 'focal point' during the elections, circulated amongst all of his polling centres, observed, and guided his members, and was always in contact with the general coordinator. In the image on the right, he questions why the controllers were about 10 metres from the polling stations, which, he felt, made it difficult for them to fully exercise their duties, which is why he recommended that they move closer space.

In short, echoing Josefa's words, it can be said that Frelimo was indeed 'at ease' on polling day, and still 'at ease', it committed fraud, with the emphasis on ballot box stuffing which, from the reports of the study participants, stands out as the main mechanism of fraud on polling day. This was thanks to the control Frelimo had over the entire polling process in Manjacaze, facilitated by the numbers and/or cards it collected during the registration and electoral campaign, which allowed not only the identification of existing voters but also the ghosts and the potential abstentions, in addition to allowing estimation of the number of 'unloadings' to be made at the *mesas*. For this purpose, Frelimo also had the MMVs, delegates and 'controllers outside the *mesas'*, all part of the 'mobilisation' team in the electoral campaign. However, as shown below, Frelimo was at ease for two other reasons: on the one hand, because of the weak organisation of the opposition, whose serious logistical problems even included a lack of basic items such as food for their delegates, and on the other hand,

because Frelimo also resorted to using 'money' to bribe and co-opt opposition members. First, the question of money.

7.2.2 Money at polling stations

"In these elections, there was a lot of money at the *mesas*... This [Frelimo] victory was due to money".[267] This was a comment by Paulo Jesse, Administrative Post chief and a senior Frelimo member in Manjacaze. He answered my question when I asked how he evaluated the elections a day after polling. He was visibly happy with the results but also relieved that the process had ended, as the elections had paralysed activities in the local administration, he explained. He also expressed concern with the amount of money that circulated during the elections, given that the State, and he himself as a chief, has always said that there was no money to pay civil servants: "How am I going to explain to my staff that the state does not have a budget for their career progression? Many teachers have their career progress stagnant because we say we have no money... This will give us a lot of noise [trouble] ...."[268] His concern was not unfounded. Most of those who worked for Frelimo in the elections were civil servants, particularly teachers who make up the 'high-density sector' at the local level (cf., Chapter 6).

How did the money circulate? How much was paid to whom, and in what way? Back to the role of the presidents at the polling stations. Josefa, who was mentioned in the previous section, explains that, for his *mesa*, he received 10,000 *meticals* (166,7\$[269]), paid in two tranches: the first one the day before polling, on 14 October 2019, and the second on polling day itself. The dialogue:

> Josefa: They gave us 10,000 *meticais* for bribes.
> Me: OK.
> Josefa: It was for bribery. I do not know about the others, but I heard that some received 1,000 (16,7\$) or 500 (8,3\$).
> Me: Can you explain it better?
> Josefa: You see, on the 14th, we arrived on the site at 11 am, but there was a shortage of materials. They said we were supposed to set up a meeting with the driver.

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[267] Paulo Jesse, Administrative Post Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 16 October 2019.
[268] Ibid.
[269] The average exchange rate is 1 dollar to 60 *meticais*. So, in this first dialogue, to facilitate the understanding of the value of the amounts, I also put the equivalent in dollars, but not in the subsequent parts, where the values can be estimated from those that I present here.

Me: OK, OK...

Josefa: The vice president and the first teller were not there. They said they would solve it. We waited and the car only came around 12 pm.

Me: Was this on the 14th?

Josefa: Yes, yes. It was on the 14th. That is when they gave us the money. First, they gave us 5,000 *meticais* (83,3$). Then, in the morning, before we started work, they held a meeting and said that we had to give a certain amount to the secretary and the second and third tellers [from Renamo and MDM, respectively]. They said we should keep an eye on the supervisors and delegates, but without being afraid of them... we should give them what they asked for.

Me: OK. Let me understand it better: they gave you 5,000 on the 14th and another 5,000 on the 15th, early in the morning?

Josefa: Yes. It was like that.

Me: But you spoke of a meeting at which they gave you this amount. At what moment did you have a meeting, and then the other two meetings since one was at midnight and the other at 7 am?

Josefa: At night, when we were checking the material. They called me because we have direct communication. They would give the signal, and I would leave and then I would call the others. Then, in the morning, before we started cleaning up, a car arrived to drop off delegates. That is when they called and gave me the rest of the money.[270]

In terms of the amount distributed, the president agreed with the vice-president and the secretary, and each of the three received at least 2,000 *meticals* (29$). A curious fact is that the opposition members, supposedly the main targets of the bribes, received the most negligible amounts, including one who received nothing at all. This had to do with their weaknesses in general, which affected their bargaining power:

Josefa: I got about 2,000 meticais (33,3$) and gave the vice president and the secretary each 2,000.

Me: And the others?

Josefa: I only gave the others 100 (1,5$) each for cell phone credit.

Me: Wait a minute! There was 10,000 in total. You [he interrupts me to explain].

Josefa: It was 2,000 and something for each. I gave the vice 2,000. The Secretary also got 2,000.

Me: Who else? There was a Renamo and an MDM teller...

Josefa: As it happens, the MDM teller left with nothing. The one from Renamo only received 200 (3,3$).[271]

Josefa kept most of the money for himself and shared a significant part of the remaining cash among his party colleagues, giving some opposition members only a small portion of it. In

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[270] Josefa Macassa, President of *Mesa*, Interview, Xai-Xai, 29 October 2019.
[271] In addition to the 1,5 for airtime. In fact, the MDM teller received the 100 for airtime and meal, but no other amount, as the others did.

contrast, others received only cell phone credit. However, in making such decisions, he was helped and guided by the vice president and the secretary, who were older and had more experience with elections, he says. According to Josefa, they were the ones who told him not to allocate anything to other MMVs and delegates and only to give 200 *meticais* (3,3$) to those who were more persistent, as was the case with the Renamo teller. The MDM teller, explains Josefa, even asked to be included in the division, but he knew nothing about the total amount available; he was only paid a price of a single meal: "The one from MDM even commented that there was a young man from Renamo that was given 1,500 meticais (25$) and questioned why we did not give anything to the MDM member. I said, 'I don't know….' So, I told him, 'Go there for lunch, and I'll pay the bill.'" It appears, however, that Josefa was also paid by the party, to the tune of 1,500 meticais, in addition to 1,000 meticais of cell phone credit: "…The 3,700 [from the STAE], plus the 1,500 from the party. They also said that they would have another 1,000 for credit… They said that this amount was for our sacrifice for the party. It was a treat…."[272]

Bribing a Renamo mobiliser

Gerson, 22 years old, is another MMV from a different polling station. He first mobilised for Renamo during the election campaign, but after Frelimo enticed him, he became a Frelimo MMV. Frelimo promised him 3,500 *meticais* (58,3$)*,* the amount STAE paid to all the MMVs, but he ended up receiving about 8,500 meticais (141,7$), 5000 (83,3$) of which was added to facilitate fraud:

> Gerson: They had promised to give me a bit of cash. I do not want to lie to you: I got it.
> Me: How much?
> Gerson: Well, as they knew I was from the opposition, they said: 'In addition to those 3,000 and such [about the 3,500 paid by the STAE], we will give you 5,000 meticais.'
> Me: Did they give the 5,000?
> Gerson: Yes, they did. At least they gave me mine.
> Me: Was it in addition to the 3,000?
> Gerson: In addition to the 3,000.
> Me: But who delivers this amount?
> Gerson: It is the president. It is the president, but also… When the president takes the money, it does not happen when everyone can see it here. There are times when he

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gives you a signal. He says, '*hi*, ... get out, go to the toilet.' You go there, and he follows you to the toilet. When he gets there, you come out. There, you pretend you are greeting each other... You pass on your things [money], and he goes into the toilet.
Me: But is this for everyone, or was it just for you?
Gerson: For me, at least, that's how it went.
Me: Everyone has their cake, but… [Gerson interrupts to answer].
Gerson: The person in charge is always the President.[273]

According to Gerson, the fact that he was seen as a Renamo active member made him a privileged target for enticement and one of the best paid. The 5,000 meticais (83,3$) he received is much higher than the amount most other bribed opposition MMVs and delegates received. Most reported receiving only 200 *meticais* (3,3$), 25 times less than Gerson. As he explains, due to the complete absence of opposition delegates and MMVs at his *mesa*, "… it was a party; it was a Frelimo total party".[274] I will return to the details of this 'party' at Gerson's *mesa*. Next, another report of bribery from Benigna, a Frelimo mobiliser who became an MDM delegate.

'Infiltrated' MDM delegates, helping to bribe

Benigna is about 50 years old and had previously held Frelimo leadership positions in the locality where she lives. During the election campaign, she was a Frelimo mobiliser, but on polling day, she became an MDM delegate. She pointed out that it was money that initially motivated her to work for the MDM: "Hey, my son! I wanted money because money makes the world go round... When you show up with the money, you can be from Renamo, MDM... whoever comes... I want money, my son. Money talks."[275] It all began when the MDM delegate[276] in her locality requested her ID to register her to work for the MDM at one of the polling stations. The MDM delegate knew that her work for Frelimo during the elections was restricted to mobilisation only and that, unlike other mobilisers, who became MMVs and therefore worked on polling day, she would not have that opportunity due, among other

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[273] Gerson Chemane, Renamo Mobiliser and Frelimo MMV, Interview, Manjacaze, 27 October 2019.
[274] Gerson Chemane, Renamo Mobiliser and Frelimo MMV, Interview, Manjacaze, 27 October 2019.
[275] Benigna Ndzofo, Frelimo Mobiliser and MDM Delegate, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 October 2019.
[276] Not to be confused with the delegate who appears at the tables, as was the case with Benigna. In the MDM, the term is also used to designate its highest representative at the locality level.

things, to her low-level of schooling.[277] Her version of how it all started is as follows: "It happened like this... When that young man came [referring to the MDM delegate], he said: 'give me IDs so you can have some [cash].' Well! I took my electoral card[278] and gave it to him. I thought he could do nothing with it because the [registration] days had already passed.' However, 'on the 14th, at 9 pm, he returned and gave me a badge. I had it on the 14th, at night. When he handed it to me, he said I should work as a delegate the next day. Well, I woke up in the morning and went to the school [the polling centre] he told me to go to. I arrived and showed my credentials, and they said: 'you are going to work in X [another *mesa* in the same polling centre]'. So, I left and went there."[279]

Benigna underwent no training with the MDM, and when she was mobilised, she was simply told that she could earn money; and that is what she did. Indeed, she earned money without exercising any oversight for the party that mobilised her. Benigna was not the only Frelimo mobiliser recruited as an MDM delegate in that village, for in the same polling centre where Benigna worked, there was also one other. However, as she explains, in past elections, other 'comrades' were there for the opposition parties as delegates and MMVs, also for money, she says, but being there, they end up helping their own party, facilitating fraud. Here are Benigna's words about her own case:

> "Nothing was spoiled. I did not vote for MDM. I voted for my party, Frelimo. There are witnesses. [She names three people who were also at the same polling station, including Margarida, the Frelimo delegate mentioned in the previous section]. As soon as I arrived, they saw me and were afraid.[280] It was a surprise [seeing her as MDM] but they arranged a conversation with me separately, and I said, 'I'm from Frelimo. Let's work at ease, as we wish...'"[281]

From the above explanation, it is clear why sometimes, in the counting process and on the result sheets (*editais*), there are no opposition votes, not even from their supposed

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[277] To be an MMV, they required grade 7, when Benigna only had grade 4. For Delegates, however, there is no requirement, depending, above all, on party choices and alliances. In her case, she had been passed over in Frelimo because of disagreements with part of the local leadership of that party.

[278] People use voter cards as ID in these contexts, the reason why they adhere more in the registration processes, contrary to the polling day.

[279] Benigna Ndzofo, Frelimo Mobiliser and MDM Delegate, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 October 2019.

[280] I noticed that, when there is an opposition member at a table, be it MMV or delegate, there is a relative agitation and discomfort on the part of the members and, above all, Frelimo leaders, who then try at all costs to find solutions to get rid of that figure, sometimes using bribery.

[281] Benigna Ndzofo, Frelimo Mobiliser and MDM Delegate, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 October 2019.

representatives. This occurs because, sometimes, the supposed opposition members are in fact Frelimo members disguised as opposition members, who not only do not vote for the opposition themselves, but also contribute to the occurrence of electoral fraud. Benigna did not vote for the MDM, the party she represented at the polling station. Moreover, she helped to deceive the Renamo delegate present at that *mesa*. In the account that follows, Benigna is even more precise about the amounts paid and her role in guaranteeing that the fraud occurred 'at will', as Margarida previously mentioned.

> Me: How did it happen? I want to know this story. You represented MDM, but there was someone there from Renamo too. How was 'the work' done there?
> Benigna: First, they tried to persuade me to get out, truth be told...
> Me: Why? Who tried to persuade you?
> Benigna: It was the president of the *mesa*… He said, 'we see that you are from the other party, but 'we are Frelimo' … We cannot abandon our nature because of you (sic), from the 'other side.' I said that I was there to help… You see, things, my son, they are difficult… they are difficult. Then I said, 'talk to that one from Renamo'. They wanted to give me money for 'soft drinks' [i.e., bribe], but I said I do not want money. That other one was given 200 *meticais*.
> Me: Okay. And you, didn't you receive the 'soft drink'?
> Benigna: I refused it saying, 'I do not want any soft drinks. I am a Frelimo supporter; how do you want to give me soft drinks?' I did not want... you can ask Margarida. We were together... I even helped with that girl [from Renamo]. She wanted to complicate things, and I said, 'Girl! It is the same thing. Even if you are angry here, it is the same thing. Can't you see that Frelimo is the majority? You are alone here.'
> Me: OK, OK...
> Benigna: I told her, 'Where will you go?' She got angry, then cooled down. She received 200 meticais.
> Me: 200?
> Benigna: Yes, there were 200... It was a girl. They gave her 200 meticais, and that was it; we let Frelimo do what they wanted to do.[282]

Margarida, whom Benigna mentions in the account above, and has already been mentioned in the previous sections, was part of the same *mesa* as Benigna. She was a Frelimo delegate and corroborated most of the information Benigna reported. Margarida was surprised to see Benigna as the MDM representative at her *mesa.* They had worked together on Frelimo mobilisation until the last day of the election campaign, three days earlier. However, when Benigna arrived, and Margarida approached her to ask for an explanation, "Benigna said she just wanted money. Nothing else from that party." Margarida informed the president that

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[282] Ibid.

they could count on Benigna but that they should get rid of the Renamo delegate with whom they had not yet been in contact. That is what the president did, and, as Margarida says, he had Benigna's support, which Beninga had also guaranteed. That is when they paid the 200 *meticais* (3,3$) to the Renamo delegate to 'work at will.' There are, however, two other aspects to highlight in Benigna's speech. The first of these, which also emerged in the conversation with Gerson (the Renamo mobiliser who was later a Frelimo MMV), and Josefa (the president of the *mesa* and a Frelimo member), has to do with Frelimo's anticipated 'hegemony' discourse and is expressed using terms such as 'it's not worth it' to even resist or block fraud, among other things. This puts pressure on even the opposition representatives, who ultimately give in, sometimes receiving trifles in return and thus becoming accomplices to the fraud. The second element is the weakness of the opposition parties, which, as the case of Benigna shows, recruit on the eve of polling and fail to prepare their delegates to carry out their activities well. In the following section, there is more evidence of these opposition weaknesses, which leave their delegates and MMVs at the mercy of enticement through apparently banal mechanisms, such as food.

7.2.3 Food to bribe and distract the opposition

The vulnerability of opposition MMVs and delegates on polling day was also due to serious logistical problems within their parties. To illustrate this, we begin by addressing an apparently banal issue with serious implications on polling day: food availability for opposition staff. Indeed, as will become evident, there were clear differences between Frelimo's organisational capacity and that of the opposition: in addition to the guarantee of meals for all its delegates and even MMVs, the latter already supplied by STAE, at each *mesa* Frelimo had two delegates, who could take breaks and replace each other, thus ensuring full-time supervision of each *mesa.* Renamo and the MDM, in turn, were sometimes unable even to place a single delegate at the *mesa*, the same happening with the MMVs, and when they did, some spent the whole day without even a single meal. There were *mesas* at which, in addition to the MMVs chosen through a public tender, only Frelimo was represented, thus without either MMVs or delegates from Renamo, MDM or any other opposition party. This, for example, was the case at the *mesa* where Gerson, the young Renamo mobiliser who later

became Frelimo's MMV, was stationed. As he pointed out, "…it was a total Frelimo party,"[283] which, according to Margarida, was committed 'at will,' as I have shown.

Frelimo took advantage of these opposition weaknesses and used 'food' in at least two main ways: on the one hand, it was a 'bargaining currency' guaranteeing the collusion of some MMVs and opposition delegates to carry out fraud, as was the case with the MDM delegate Josefa cited in the previous section. On the other hand, 'mealtimes' and the meals themselves were used as a distraction to make room, for example, for ballot box stuffing. Almost all of the MMVs and delegates interviewed referenced these mealtimes. Here are just two reports to illustrate this observation: the first by Verônica, a Frelimo member, also a teacher, who worked as a First teller, the second, shorter, by Jorsio, who is quoted in previous sections. Jorsio is a member of the Manjacaze District Committee and a former OJM leader.

Zelma was assigned to a polling station located in the school where she taught. She was at home, as she repeated many times throughout the conversation, which was located just in front of the school, about 7 metres away. This was fundamental to the strategy designed to disengage MMVs and opposition delegates. She says that she was not only concerned with those at her *mesa*, but with the entire polling centre, with six *mesas*. The president of her *mesa* entrusted her with the mission:

> Zelma: So, on the first day [14 October], I invited all those women [MMVs]... They asked me to share food with them... Given the fact that I am a teacher here and have residency and they do not know anyone... The whole brigade asked me to take responsibility [for opposition members]. They came here to bathe in my residence, eat food...
> Me: When you say the entire brigade asked you, what was the task precisely?
> Zelma: Well, I can say that the president gave me the mission.
> Me: Ok. He wanted you to do what?
> Zelma: At the other *mesas*, they asked for water, tea... but I always paid much attention to the personnel of my *mesa*; to the people who worked directly with me. They came here to take a shower. I prepared food for them and showed them everything inside my house [this was on 14 October, when they first arrived]. The next day [polling day], the president said he wanted breakfast. I said, 'Let us ask the Renamo teller'. At this point, she knew my residence well because I had introduced her to everyone there. I said we had better send her with another teller [the Fourth teller]. They prepared breakfast for us. That is how I cleared the way: I sent that girl to the kitchen, and we stayed there doing the work...

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[283] Gerson Chemane, Renamo Mobiliser and Frelimo MMV, Interview, Manjacaze, 27 October 2019.

Earlier, long before polling day, Jorsio had explained this Frelimo tactic, used mainly at lunchtime, around noon, and further facilitated by the fact that "the opposition sends people who have no vision [i.e., poorly prepared]."[284] His words: "…We, in Frelimo, have a tactic. We send those from the opposition away. They send people who have no vision. We send them away at lunchtime. We say, 'let's go to lunch. The police are there but just to protect the kits. So, we take advantage of this period to pick up the register book, take out the bulletins and vote."[285] The interviewee then clarifies that the 'tactic' is sometimes used at other stages of the electoral process, including during the tabulation, and counting of results, when MMVs and delegates are hungry and exhausted after a long workday.

Figure 13: Food distribution among Frelimo members on polling day

I witnessed a situation where a Renamo delegate, shortly before counting and tabulating the results at around 7 pm, left with a police officer to look for something to eat. The police officer was one of the two assigned to the polling centre and, being familiar with the neighbourhood, he had volunteered to accompany the Renamo delegate. When they came back after about

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[284] Jorsio Malate, former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.
[285] Ibid.

45 minutes, the counting had already taken place, and he had no option but to accept the results handed to him. It is noteworthy that Renamo had no other delegate to replace him when he left to look for food, and, in this mesa, MDM had no delegate, and there was no other opposition MMV. In other words, they were all Frelimo members, and were able to commit fraud 'at will'.

During the polling process, the Renamo delegate mentioned above was visibly tired and constantly complained of hunger. He was also distracted by the police officer who kept giving him cigarettes. Still, he was persistent and remained at the *mesa* until just before the vote count when the episode recounted above took place. His tiredness was due to having walked almost 10km to work at the polling centre the previous morning, coupled with the fact that he had not even managed to find a comfortable place to sleep, having arrived at the locality's headquarters at midnight along with the other opposition delegates. The community had been informed of the Renamo delegates' arrival, and many had been instructed not to accommodate them. Margarida, the Frelimo delegate mentioned above, tells of how she treated a Renamo delegate who arrived at her house at around 2 am:

> "[At our *mesa*] there was a Renamo delegate... All the Renamo delegates who came to our polling centre arrived at X [locality name] shortly after 1 am. They had been advised to look for the polling centres themselves. One even arrived at my house [50 metres from the school that hosted the polling centre]. It was 2 am. She knocked at the door, but I kept quiet. I did not say anything. After almost two more hours, she knocked at the door again, and I said nothing. She left and went to knock at my neighbours. They told her there were no rooms, but they showed her the school. It was around 3 am... [The next day,] that girl was sleeping when we were 'working'. She said that she had arrived at 2 am..."[286]

Renamo leadership in Gaza recognises the logistical problems mentioned above. Regarding food, Arnaldo Manhique, Renamo's provincial delegate, gives the example of a breakfast that few received: "it only arrived at 11 am for some, and others did not have any meals at all".[287] Manhique also reveals that, due to difficulties, decisions made centrally within the party, and even the obstruction of electoral bodies, entire districts were deprived of delegates and MMVs. Such was the case in the districts of Chicualacuala, Mapai and Mabalane. These are also the districts in which Renamo invests the least, allegedly because the effort would not

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[286] Margarida Chiziane, Frelimo Delegate, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 October 2019.

[287] Arnaldo Manhique, Renamo Delegate in Gaza, interview, Xai-Xai, 27 October 2019.

pay off since each of them only has one mandate for Parliament. "Our party has a decentralisation problem. We have a mandate, for example, in the province delegation, but we deliberately did not campaign in Mabalane, Mapai and Chicualacuala because our leaders decided that we shouldn't go there and compete for a mandate,"[288] he says. Manhique considers this a miscalculation, because "...the centralisation of votes counts a lot for the election of the province list" and "[working in these places] also gives strength to our members and supporters there. Now that the process is over, nobody visits them. So, they are easily corrupted, and they give up the party very easily unless someone goes there to motivate them. We need to invest more..."[289] Coincidence or not, all these districts recorded high participation rates, all above 90%, with almost 100% of the votes favouring Frelimo.

Mr Manhique also recognises that MMVs are easier to manipulate than delegates, which was noticeable on polling day. He explains this distinction based on two things, the first of which is the greater exposure of the MMVs to pressure from Frelimo due to the STAE training sessions. The second has to do with the MMV's relatively poor experience, some of them students, whom the teachers, broadly Frelimo supporters, can easily pressure and influence: "what happened is that the MMVs were put in the fraud scheme still during their training at STAE... they agreed to show up on the day of signing the contracts, be paid and go back home. They were told to go home and come back at the end to receive the other part of the agreed amount."[290] Indeed, although little substantiated, Mr Manhique's allegations also emerged in the conversation with Jorsio, the Frelimo district committee member and former OJM leader. Jorsio, whose extract associated with manipulations at STAE is presented in Section 7.1, was specifically referring to presidents, but his explanations also show that MMVs are co-opted whilst they are still undergoing STAE training. But Mr Manhique has another explanation for the greater ease of handling MMVs and, therefore, relative difficulty with the delegates:

> "Many of the MMVs we recruit come because of the subsidy paid by STAE. Some are members and supporters, and we have no difficulties recruiting them because they have the STAE subsidy. Sometimes, we even had a larger number than we needed, and we had to reduce it. Indeed, this was not the situation in Mabalane, Mapai, Chicualacuala and Chigubo, where the numbers were below those desired, but it was due to the level of schooling. Many who applied did not have the 7th grade required

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[288] Ibid.

[289] Ibid

[290] Arnaldo Manhique, Renamo Delegate in Gaza, interview, Xai-Xai, 27 October 2019.

> to become an MMV… many of these have no experience. They are students and the teachers easily pressure them to give up and to commit those tricks that we already know about... The case of the delegates is different. They don't need to have 7th grade; we just trust them. They are more committed to the party, and many are even candidates for the Provincial Assembly, the Parliament and that is enough to motivate them, despite having less means than the MMVs..."[291]

In short, on the one hand, Frelimo's supremacy, in terms of human and financial resources, allowed it to feel 'at ease' on polling day, even contributing to creating conditions for electoral fraud. On the other hand, logistical problems by the opposition facilitated the 'work' of Frelimo fraud. As has been shown, opposition representatives were bought and distracted by food and for derisory amounts such as 100 *meticais* (1.7$) for phone credit. The next section reflects on the magnitude of the fraud.

7.3 **The magnitude of the fraud: "If we hadn't done it, things would have been so bad"**

Despite the difficulties of proving electoral fraud (Sartori, 1976; Brito, 2008), the few detailed studies on the phenomenon in Mozambique (cf., for example, Hanlon & Fox, 2006; Brito, 2008; Hanlon & Ahlback, 2016) show that it "did take place and that it was significant" (Hanlon & Fox, 2006, p.27), and even suggest clues to identify its existence. Paradoxically, parts of these studies also argue that fraud does not affect the final results, allegedly "because of the landslide victory by the ruling party, Frelimo, ..." (ibid., p.2), the same argument used by the electoral bodies and the Constitutional Council to validate election results in the country.[292] I resort to reports from the perpetrators of fraud, some supported by the result sheets themselves, in addition to observations made during the electoral process, to suggest that, due to its magnitude, electoral fraud not only impacts the results but is also central to the production and reproduction of Frelimo hegemony in Manjacaze. The comment "If we hadn't done that, things would have been so bad," from Margarida, the Frelimo delegate and one of the perpetrators of the fraud I have been quoting, reflects the recognition of the centrality of electoral fraud to Frelimo's hegemony, and for the supermajorities that support it. Margarida's detailed account shows that, at least at her *mesa*, Frelimo's landslide victory was

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[291] Ibid.

[292] See, for example, *Acordão* n°21/CC/2014, 29 December, and *Acórdão* no 25/CC/2019, 22 December.

largely a product of fraud. As she explains, less than 80 people cast their votes, but on the results sheets, they "... managed to get [up to] 435 [bulletins]"[293]:

> Margarida: At 11 a.m., we started to 'work' because, hey... there were no voters. If we had waited, our *mesa* would not have gone well.
> Me: Ok
> Margarida: When I checked, I realised fewer than 80 eligible voters had shown up.
> Me: Very few.
> Margarida: Yes, that book had 444 [registered voters].
> Me: OK.
> Margarida: But we managed to get [up to] 435.
> Me: OK.
> Margarida: Frelimo got 408.
> Me: And the others?
> Margarida: MDM got 12 and Renamo got 8.
> Me: If you had not done that – [she interrupts to respond].
> Margarida: Aah... It would be bad! If we hadn't done that, things would have been so bad.

The percentage of votes cast fraudulently is extremely high, corresponding to about 80% of the total votes counted. This means that the actual participation at Margarida's *mesa* was just 18%, well below the reported 98%. Benigna, the Frelimo mobiliser who, on polling day, was an MDM delegate, corroborates the details Margarida reports. She worked at the same *mesa* as Margarida, and according to her, as explained in previous sections, to produce those *poor numbers*[294] they had first to rid themselves of the Renamo delegate, and to do this they paid her 200 *meticals* [$3,3].

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[293] Margarida Chiziane, Frelimo Delegate, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 October 2019.
[294] I am using Jerven's (2013) terms. For Jerven, "... numbers have power to both misinform and inform... they can tell us less than we would like to think about [them]" (2013, p.2).

Figure 14: Results Sheets (*Editais*) at Margarida and Benigna's *mesa*

Benigna added that she had to personally intervene when the Renamo delegate refused to collaborate in the fraud. To convince her, Benigna told her it was not worth refusing because Frelimo members were the majority, and they would win anyway: "I said, 'girl, nothing will change. Even if you get angry, things [will stay] the same. You can see that the majority are Frelimo representatives, and you are alone here…' haha [laughs], 'You, see?'"[295]

The argument that 'it's not worth it', which Margarida used to convince the Renamo delegate, also stands out in the account by Gerson, the Renamo mobiliser who later became a Frelimo teller. He also points out that he gave in to pressure and colluded in the fraud because he realised "there was no [other] way" since Frelimo representatives were in the majority:

> "Even though I know it is unfair, there was no way. It hurts me, but I could do nothing because I was the only opposition sympathiser, and there were ten from Frelimo. They always come out winning… So, I controlled myself and left it that way. Even the President was amazed because he expected me to react differently…"[296]

Gerson later received 5,000 *meticais* [$70] as a bribe, as previously reported, and he described what happened at his *mesa* as "a total party…" because, he says, there were no opposition representatives, even though he had been a Renamo mobiliser himself, albeit corrupted on polling day! Regarding the number of ballots 'filled', however, he spoke of about 65%: "At my polling station, the [real] participation rate was at around 25%, but [in the results tab] it was at about 90% [laughs]."[297]

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[295] Benigna Ndzofo, Frelimo Mobiliser and MDM Delegate, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 October 2019
[296] Gerson Chemane, Renamo Mobiliser and Frelimo MMV, Interview, Manjacaze, 27 October 2019.
[297] Ibid.

From Benigna and Gerson's reports, it can be seen that part of Frelimo's strategy, also a product and producer of the supermajorities, consists of instilling in real or potential opponents, but also in voters in general, the message of Frelimo's invincibility, expressed as the feeling that "it's not worth standing against it." This contributes to the supermajorities at the core of Frelimo's hegemony, to the extent that, feeling incapable of changing the scenario and/or defeating Frelimo, some give in, sometimes colluding with fraud, as in the case of Gerson and the Renamo delegate referenced by Benigna. However, the implications of these supermajorities and the fraud itself are even greater since, based on them, some also trivialise the vote, which they consider to be useless. In this last sense, it is worth mentioning Jacinto Langa, a teacher who, in a brief conversation along with two other teachers on 15 October 2019 (polling day), expressed himself in the following terms: "I didn't want to vote today. If I hadn't gone to ... [mentions the name of the headquarters of the administrative post where he was registered], I would not have gone to vote today. The problem is that I went there with the school director [he mentioned the name of the director of the school where he works]."[298] Said director, clearly exercising his control, but also because he felt pressured by the party, had just stopped by the condominium where the teachers lived to check their fingers, having insisted that they should go to vote because, as he stressed, he did not want problems with the party. Mr Jacinto then went further, saying: "it should be possible to sell votes. If it were possible, I would sell mine."[299] This issue of the 'uselessness of the vote' will be addressed more fully in Chapter 8, Section 8.3, on electoral abstention.

Still, regarding the magnitude of the fraud, a report by Zelma Marina, a teacher who was a Frelimo Teller, is also quite illustrative:

> Zelma: ... of the 404 there [on the electoral roll], fewer than 20 showed up to vote.
> Me: I noticed. You had to work hard to reach 100%. I remember that we even talked about this work on the same day.
> Zelma: Yes, it did not reach 100%, because when the number of registered voters is not equal to those who show up and cast their votes, we cannot say that it is 100%, correct?
> Me: Yes.
> Zelma: Our work was based on the 412 registered voters we had in our register book. We left eight … but we also had special votes.
> Me: OK, MMV votes?

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[298] Jacinto Langa, Teacher, intervention in a conversation, Manjacaze, 15 October 2018.
[299] Ibid.

Zelma: Yes, six MMVs, plus 2 delegates. So, eight special votes…
Me: But the police officer voted there too, I remember.
Zelma: Uncle X [mentions a male police officer's name] voted there. The other police officer did not vote there. It was Uncle X [the male police officer]. There were two police officers... so the number of voters was close to the number we had in our registration book. We just left eight.[300]

Figure 15: Result sheet (*edital*) at Verônica's *mesa*.

At Zelma's *mesa*, electoral participation reached 98% of registered voters. However, as she explained, less than 20 of the 404 polled were real votes, corresponding to just 5% of real participation. Thus, according to Zelma's report, the numbers she mentions corroborate those contained in the result sheet above, around 93% of the votes counted in the ballot box were products of ballot box stuffing. I myself observed elections at Zelma's polling station and noted that her *mesa* had very few voters, prompting surprise at the numbers in the result sheet posted. This resulted from massive ballot box stuffing, consistent with that reported by other interlocutors in other *mesas*. Finally, just one more example, a detail from Josefa, the President I quoted extensively in previous sections:

> Josefa: We had about 400 voters on our electoral roll.
> Me: OK.
> Josefa: But only a hundred and such showed up. We had to fill all the others in ourselves.
> Me: OK.
> Josefa: We had to fill all that in.
> Me: In the end, how many did you reach?
> Josefa: It was 390... 390.
> Me: Did you reach 100%?

[300] Zelma Marina, Teacher and MMV, Interview, Manjacaze, 4 November 2019.

> Josefa: No, we did not. There were 394.
> Me: OK.
> Josefa: It is a lot of work to fill that in.[301]

Thus, at Josefa's *mesa*, only 25% of registered voters (around 100 votes) actually voted, but with ballot box stuffing they achieved more than 98%, corresponding to 394 valid votes. There are even more spectacular cases involving both ballot box stuffing and Frelimo's 'easy' to commit fraud. Take, for example, the *mesa* in which, having distracted Renamo MMVs and delegates with food, an inexperienced president simply added ballot papers to the ballot box, without first ticking them in favour of Frelimo, as intended. The aim of the director of the school in which the polling centre was located, who was neither an MMV nor a delegate, was to find solutions that would enable him to return the deposited ballot papers and have them filled out. This, however, was impossible because during counting some observers remained at the *mesa* for many hours. With no alternative, after 3 am, they were forced to post the result sheet for the *mesa* which reported many blank votes.

To conclude, as this chapter has shown, fraud is massive in Manjacaze, and due to its magnitude, it significantly impacts the electoral results and, specifically, the supermajorities that sustain Frelimo's (image of) hegemony, even in its heartland. This hegemony, like the supermajorities, is thus a product of electoral fraud. However, it is worth emphasising that fraud occurs 'at will', as Margarida pointed out, and to return to the expression in the title of this chapter, those who perpetrate it 'work freely'. 'Work', in this context, is equivalent to 'stealing' or 'committing fraud', and consists of ballot box stuffing, mainly by voting multiple times, withdrawing, and invalidating opposition votes, validating null votes, and filling out blank votes, all in favour of Frelimo. This happened because Frelimo could control the entire voting process based on the control structure it had transferred from the election campaign to polling day.

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[301] Josefa Macassa, President of *Mesa*, Interview, Xai-Xai, 29 October 2019.

PART IV

BLURRING THE HEGEMONY: RESISTANCE AND NEGOTIATION

Chapter 8 'We no longer participate!' Resisting Frelimo in its own heartland?

> "Look! As we share our concerns and make our demands, but they [the leaders] do not respond… The best way to strike is to refuse to participate in their meetings when they come from the province, the district and even from there [at the Administrative Post] … They want us to vote, but we can choose not to participate […] the point now is 'we no longer participate!' So, they will understand that we are really angry."[302]

Rito, quoted above, was speaking at a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) in the village of Cambane, about 25km from Manjacaze headquarters. Eight young people were in attendance. Two days earlier, some of these youngsters had boycotted a community meeting, alleging tiredness and lack of interest because, as Jorge, another participant in the same FGD explained, "they don't listen to us."[303] They not only refused to participate in the meeting but also tried to obstruct it, staying nearby, making a noise, under the pretext of playing volleyball. This boycott and the FGD took place just two weeks after the 15 October 2019 general elections. In these elections, still in Cambane, an even larger group openly challenged Frelimo, first refusing to participate in its campaign, then, amongst other actions, joining and voting for the opposition. How can we understand these episodes that unfolded in Manjacaze, the Frelimo heartland?

I approach them as forms of protest or, in Scott's terms (1985, 1990), acts of resistance,[304] here defined as the refusal, sometimes explicit, of certain individuals or groups to comply with orders, rules and decisions from the party-state, despite an awareness of the risks incurred, especially during elections. First I address the most covert or subtle acts and gradually move on to the more daring and open ones that present a higher risk for those involved. Scott (1990) names these, respectively, hidden, and public transcripts. I connect them to Hirschman's (1970) 'exit, voice and loyalty' mechanisms, and end the chapter with a reflection on electoral abstention, highlighting its peculiarities in the context of Manjacaze, which is a typical example of hegemonic authoritarianism, the reason why electoral abstention is a form

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[302] Rito Brito, Intervention in a FGD with young people from Cambane, Manjacaze, 2 November 2019.

[303] Jorge Mondlane, Intervention in a FGD with young people from Cambane, Manjacaze, 2 November 2019.

[304] It is worth noting that from here on, I will use the terms protest and resistance interchangeably but to refer to the sense of resistance, in Scott's terms, which I make explicit here.

of protest, but counterproductive, I argue. The overall argument is that even in its heartland, Frelimo hegemony, like any other hegemony, is constantly contested and negotiated, and this is more intense in electoral periods, moments in which power is not only wielded by Frelimo but is equally exercised by citizens, creating spaces for people to force concessions from the party.

8.1 Everyday resistance

I consider 'everyday resistance' to be the hidden or disguised acts that people resort to in their daily lives to undermine power or domination (Vinthagen & Johansson, 2020,) or, in Scott's terms, a mechanism "… intended either to mitigate or deny claims" (Scott, 1985, p.290) made by those in power or to advance the resisters' claims. These acts or mechanisms are hidden in that "…they take place 'offstage', beyond direct observation by powerholders" (Scott, 1990, p.4), but when there is direct contact, either the identity of the protester or the content of the message can remain implicit. "The key characteristic of everyday resistance is the 'pervasive disguise'", write Vinthagen and Johansson (2013. p.7), while James Scott specifies, highlighting the ambiguity of the message: "instead of a clear message delivered by a disguised messenger, an ambiguous message is delivered by clearly identified messengers" (1989, p.54-55). Thus, the everyday forms of resistance are also ambiguous voice mechanisms, like the protests and other tactics that will be discussed later in this chapter, but even more subtle and disguised.

While these forms of resistance are not new in Mozambique or even in Manjacaze, depending on the context, they assume specific characteristics. Eduardo Mondlane, for example, a hero and the architect of national unity in Mozambique, writing about 'The Struggle for Mozambique', shortly before the country's independence in 1975, used the expression 'popular resistance' to address the same acts referred to here as 'everyday resistance': "This revulsion... often expressed in songs, dances, even carvings – traditional forms of expression which the coloniser does not understand, and through which he can thus be secretly ridiculed, denounced and threatened" (1970, p.103). He gave examples of chope songs, one of which is reproduced in full below:

> We are still angry; it's always the same story
> The oldest daughters must pay the tax
> Natanele tells the white man to leave him alone

> Natanele tells the white man to leave me be
> You, the elders, must discuss our affairs
> For the man the whites appointed is the son of a nobody
> The Chope have lost the right to their own land
> Let me tell you about it… (Mondlane, 1970, p.103)

In this song, sung in the Chope language, which Portuguese settlers did not understand, the Chope express displeasure at their exploitation and evoke their rights as landowners, a claim they could not make openly, given the repression of the regime. Episodes featuring the use of the Chope language were also observed throughout this research, particularly in Chidenguele Administrative Post, where it is mainly used to express dissatisfaction with leaders, most of whom are Changana, the second largest ethnic group in the region. The following account is from a former Chidenguele Administrative Post chief, where Chope people predominate:

> "Let's suppose you set up a meeting and say: 'I don't know how to speak Chope. I know that Chope people also speak Changana. So, let's use Changana … ' You will not have any answer in Chope. They may not tell, but among them, they say, 'If you don't understand our language, we won't speak to you, even if that implies not raising our concerns. They will continue speaking in their own language….' In some meetings, some even said they didn't want their language to be marginalised, but the Chopes speak Changana well; they just don't want to. They can even talk to each other, but when there is something confidential, they immediately change to Chope. …. Suddenly, some leave, saying they are going to the toilet and do not return. Others follow, and so on. It is because they do not agree with what you are talking about, and the subject may be intriguing for them… so they leave … it's a way of showing that [they don't agree with you]."[305]

Thus, in addition to the language used when interacting with leaders, the very act of walking out of a meetings is itself a way of protesting and showing resistance, for it demonstrates a refusal to comply with the leader's orders, rules, and decisions, even though those who walk out run the risk of being labelled 'others' (cf., Chapter 5). These walk-outs are the boycotts explicitly mentioned by various interlocutors as the most common form of resistance in Manjacaze. I examine them as ambiguous in that, even if the actors are known, their message is not always explicit, and even if, sometimes, the message is clear, the messengers are not disclosed. As will become apparent, the 'chiefs' themselves, key actors of the '*estrutura*', (cf. Chapter 5), also resist, but first I deal with the acts of resistance by community members.

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[305] Gervasio Guimarães, Former Administrative Post Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 8 April 2018.

8.1.1 Boycotting public events

The boycotts referred to here are broader in scope, targeting meetings that are convened to receive entities from the levels of Administrative Post, district, province, and 'the nation', as visitors from the country's capital are locally named.[306] Even these big events take place within the villages and *povoações*, which requires their leaders and community members to mobilise in coordination with entities from higher levels. All the leaders involved must guarantee crowds at these events, otherwise they are considered incompetent, jeopardising their leadership positions. As Américo Jossias, one of the administrative post chiefs during the Chalala Cashew Festival on 15 December 2018 commented: "We are evaluated [according to the size of the] crowds…, but that doesn't mean that we don't inform the communities. People don't adhere".[307] He was talking with Benjamim Manhique, a Frelimo secretary, and António Gonzalo, another 'chief' and technician from the same administrative post. In response, Benjamim stressed that it was not the first time that the festival had been organised in Chalala and that the chief at that time had been unable to mobilise the population for the most recent event. He then added: "We gave him a negative rating…"[308] In turn, António referred to an alternative that had not been explored by the head of the host Administrative Post, one that could change the scenario. He suggested that, if massive adhesion could not be achieved at the host location, they could bring people from other locations in the district to the venue. This is known as 'importing people': "I spoke to the people here asking why they didn't talk to us about importing people from Manjacaze headquarters [for/to the event]."[309]

Primary school pupils, many minors, are 'imported' to provide a 'dignified reception' to visitors. They are exempt from classes, as it also happens to teachers, while other civil servants are also relieved of their duties in the State. Some of these are assigned specific tasks in preparing events, including transporting equipment (e.g., tables, chairs, plates), setting up stands, food preparation, cleaning, and so on. However, the goal is mainly to increase the number of participants, which is why Mateus Mbila, one of the interlocutors I quoted at

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[306] I do not focus on daily 'gatherings,' many of which are run by chiefs of villages, secretaries, traditional and community leaders, although they are important parts of local administrative political life, but also poorly attended, even though they are called 'community meetings,' presupposing massive mobilisations.

[307] Américo jossias, Administrative Post Chief, Conversation, Chalala, 15 December 2018.

[308] Benjamim Manhique, Frelimo Secretary for Mobilisation and organisation, Intervention in a conversation, Chalala, 15 December 2018.

[309] António Gonzalo, Administrative Post Technician, Conversation, Chalala, 15 December 2018.

length in previous chapters, called these "crowds forced by the state,"[310] adding that, even when forced, people tend to resist and abstain from participating: "... absence at popular meetings is the people's anger. People resist... They organise these meetings, but there's no one there. They find a handful of people, also forced by the state."[311]

António Gonzalo, one of the three interlocutors in the conversation, which took place in Chalala during the Cashew Festival, referred to the malaise demonstrated by the boycotts: "it is time for us to change. We must be realistic and realise that something is not right... times have changed. We must be realistic."[312] He went further, emphasising that these boycotts illustrate non-compliance, no matter how much people are coerced. In this vein, it is worth recalling the case of the boycott carried out by the youth of Cambane, presented at the beginning of the chapter. As explained, the audacity of those young people was bold: not only did they refuse to participate in the 'community meeting', but more importantly, they obstructed it by remaining in proximity and making a noise on the pretence of playing volleyball. This is one of the most daring cases and will be revisited later, but it is also illustrative of the malaise José evoked. However, another leader, this time one of the circle secretaries, was more explicit about how they interpret the boycotts: "when the Zone Secretary comes from the Administrative Post, or even the District or Circle Secretaries, not many people participate. In the zone, people do not go. They are not with us."[313]

Not being 'with us' is akin to being 'other', a 'non-comrade', an 'opposition member' or a 'sympathiser', with various implications, ranging from isolation to being denied access to various state services on a daily basis and even risking violence during elections (cf. Chapter 5). These are risks that were mentioned by all interlocutors, making it clear that they are aware of them when they adopt boycotting as a way of expressing their indignation. Although, because of these risks, boycotts may take on a relatively ambiguous expression, since despite being easily identifiable forms of protest, their motives often remain implicit. There are, in fact, exceptions, to which we will return later, but those who boycott or, euphemistically, "do not participate" in public events resort to a variety of arguments to disguise the real causes:

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[310] Mateus Mbila, Interview, Manjacaze, 26 October 2019.
[311] Mateus Mbila, Interview, Manjacaze, 26 October 2019.
[312] António Gonzalo, Administrative Post Technician, Conversation, Chalala, 15 December 2018.
[313] Jojo Mondlane, Interview, Manjacaze, 30 October 2019.

absence from the village, locality or post; trips to the *machamba* (field crops); illness; heat, cold or rain, and so on. In practice, they boycott events because they are tired of the false promises of the party-state:

> "You can play *Ngoma*,[314] nobody will show up. The head of the Administrative Post can come, but no one will show up then... people are tired of hearing the same things... every month, there are meetings. People are tired. Even food, if you always eat the same, you get tired. What is always repeated tires... they say: 'enough! Let us do our things'."[315]

'Tiredness' and fatigue are not merely consequences of the meetings' frequency, as the last interlocutor suggests, but, above all, because concerns are seldom, if ever, answered. Rito, the young man from Cambane quoted at the beginning of this chapter, was more explicit about the reasons for this weariness: "...they like to promise things, but they don't deliver... we share our concerns and make our demands, and they [the leaders] do not respond...".[316]

Jorge, a participant in the same FGD, went a step further:

> "Here's the deal: we don't want to listen anymore, even if they come to mobilise; we no longer want a meeting; we no longer want anything to do with the Government; we are fine the way we are. It's over! When they come here; ... we don't want them here anymore. We will get on with our lives."[317]

Local leaders, however, have few options: while, on the one hand, they must be able to guarantee large crowds, on the other, they are faced with the herculean task of motivating people to participate despite their alleged 'fatigue'. Local leaders insist that inhabitants participate and always raise their concerns by talking to them or writing letters. These are two options widely explored by citizens, but with some peculiarities. As will be shown in Section 8.2.1, in the case of Chicuatsu, Marimane and Vamangue, the letters are placed under the local chiefs' house doors while other copies bearing multiple signatures are also sent directly to the higher authorities, especially at district level. Julião Cossa, the head of the secretariat mentioned in the previous section, addressed the issue of the letters, along with that of the books and boxes used for casting suggestions and complaints, both additional formal mechanisms established to improve public services provision: "... the letters, if they

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[314] *Batuque* is Drum. It is locally used to call people to attend meetings.
[315] Zélio Brito, Interview, Manjacaze, 1 November 2019.
[316] Rito Brito, Intervention in a FGD with young people from Cambane, Manjacaze, 2 November 2019.
[317] Jorge Mondlane, Intervention in a FGD with young people from Cambane, Manjacaze, 2 November 2019.

have no signature, are not valid. But there was something else – the books and the boxes for casting suggestions and complaints. When I got here [at the administrative post] there were some. The box disappeared; I don't know how. The book still exists, but no one fills it. People are afraid because they must identify themselves in the book ... There is still a box in the district, but people also do not resort to it because they think the reply is not speedy. They prefer to write and put it under the leader's door..."[318]

The other alternative is to speak out, expose criticism and protest in meetings or even address complaints to the local leaders, as they themselves recommend, but the interviewees claim that, as with the letters written to leaders, it is not very fruitful: "Look, when there is a spectacle and fun, it gets full. When leaders come, people say, 'no, it's not useful'. It just wastes time. That's because, when the person open up and speaks, nothing comes of it..."[319]. Conversely, others who feel more intimidated, given the context of political and social control widely referenced in the previous chapters, opt for silence: the simple act of not expressing oneself when asked to do so by one's leaders. This also occurs in other circumstances and contexts, as can be noted in this excerpt from a conversation with Fausto Tune, a young man from Chidenguele, who, during the election campaign, was a Frelimo mobiliser:

> "Here it is different from the city because when they [in the city] disagree with a certain thing, they get together and go on strike [openly]. I always see this… even on the radio. They talk about a strike at site X and the governors show up wanting to know why it is happening… In the cities, they are united, march, and show that they are not happy. But here, we don't, we keep quiet. We can even meet here and comment on a subject, but only among ourselves. But when the chiefs arrive, we are afraid to speak up because we think we could find ourselves in jail. Listen! People are afraid to speak the truth because of this. They do not say anything; they just shut up, even when there are issues."[320]

Silence can express fear, be a strategy for self-protection, or be a sign of disengagement. However, some people may not be afraid, but choose to remain silent as a challenge to authority, hence the ambiguity of silence as a form of protest: "silence is at best ambiguous: it can mean many things. It may mean: … I'm isolated… or even perfectly satisfied with things. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to perceive which of these categories [is expressed by

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[318] Julião Cossa, Administrative Post Technicien, Interview, Manjacaze, 13 April 2019.
[319] Beto Massango, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 October 2019.
[320] Fausto Tune, Interview, Manjacaze, 22 October 2019.

silence]" (Ramelet, 2020, p.7-8). However, Fausto later explained that fear, which results in silence, is inculcated by the chiefs themselves, who always try to keep the memories of repression alive, a strategy used to block any acts classified as rebellious in those contexts: "some chief says 'you will go to jail if you disobey...' They scare people, many of whom think that, if they go to jail, their family members will suffer. So, they do not speak; they do not express themselves."[321] Later on, the same interviewee, Fausto, gave an example of what happened when the price of bread increased in his village, comparing it with the type of reaction that, according to him, is typical of cities: "There was a time when the cost of bread rose to six meticals ... it was in March [2019]. Before, the price was five meticais [about 0,1 cent of a dollar)]. They went on strike there [in the city] when bread prices rose, but here ... [laughs] they just did not buy it. People were afraid to ask what was going on and why the price had gone up. They just left the bread and ate cassava ... the owners ended up lowering the price. But what causes people in the city to go on strike is that they do not grow cassava. They only rely on bread..."[322]

In short, despite being relatively ambiguous, silence derived from fear is one of the forms of protest in Manjacaze. It may be less impactful than holding a placard, blocking the streets or openly moving to the opposition, but it is one of the few resources available in the repertoire of Manjacaze people, given the political and social control to which they are subjected. The most common form of protest, however, is the boycotting of public events, with serious implications for the local *estrutura* responsible for guaranteeing crowds for these events. However, as shown below, just like other community members, *estrutura* members in general are not very compliant with the party-state they represent, at least in the backstage. We turn next to the protest mechanisms of one of the elements of the *estrutura*, the chiefs.

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[321] Fausto Tune, Interview, Manjacaze, 22 October 2019.
[322] Ibid.

8.1.2 When local state officers protest: "I no longer kill my chickens for them [the party superiors]"

In public, the 'chiefs', a generic term used here to refer to state officials as they are perceived in the different villages of Manjacaze (cf. Chapter 5), are largely compliant. However, backstage, and quite surreptitiously, some contest, contradict and subvert the orders, rules and decisions of the party-state they represent. This section begins by framing the disobedience around the very act of sharing basic information with me in this research. Indeed, some of these leaders, challenging directly the explicit orders of their superiors, exposed and shared with this study various materials on the inner workings of the local party-state. Seemingly banal, this attitude denotes great courage because, if discovered, they run the risk of being cast out as 'others', with all the implications presented in the previous sections and of which they are fully aware, namely marginalisation and/or isolation and even physical and property/patrimonial violence (cf. Chapter 5). However, the leaders felt their transgressions were justified because they believed these expressions of their indignation might reach 'higher levels'. They knew that the findings would be written down and published: "maybe they will listen to us this way... It's important for people to know what's going on here. We're suffering too much at the loca level .. I was once a student. I know you're going to write this and publish it..."[323]

Julião, who has already held different leadership positions in Manjacaze, is now assigned to an Administrative Post as head of the secretariat. As he explains, the head of that Administrative Post, who had already authorised this research, including the release of supportive documents, told his subordinates not to collaborate, by blocking access to material and refusing to making themselves available for the interviews. This was allegedly because "... it can serve the opposition. The chief [of the Administrative Post] said: 'you see, this is an electoral period. We cannot even trust our own shadows. This one is with us, but he could be [working for] the other side [referring to the opposition]."[324] However, Julião, like other chiefs, found various subterfuges to circumvent these obstacles, suggesting that the conversations and interviews took place on weekends when the head of the Administrative

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[323] Julião Cossa, Administrative Post Technicien, Interview, Manjacaze, 13 April 2019.
[324] Julião Cossa, Administrative Post Technicien, Interview, Manjacaze, 13 April 2019.

Post was absent. Other suggestions included hosting the interviews at their houses, scheduling meetings outside Manjacaze or even at my accomodation in the evening. When inviting me to their offices, they would be sure to specify the days and hours when the heads of the Administrative Posts would not be there. As Belito commented in the first conversation held at his house:

> "It was good that you suggested interviewing me at home. If the chief sees us talking there [at the administrative post], he will want to know why I am disobeying, and you know how it is here in Gaza! [Referring to punishment] …. He told us not to speak, but I understand your work. I was a student myself…"[325]

It so happens, however, that even the aforementioned head of the Administrative Post was not totally compliant, at least in private. On several occasions, he expressed his frustration and even alluded to concerted action between himself and other local leaders aimed at boycotting the presence and the activities of other senior leaders. One relevant occasion was on 27 March 2019. We had embarked on yet another 'investigative ride',[326] on the way to Manjacaze headquarters. He began by saying that there were many things that he would like to express and even write about. However, he did not feel at ease to do it openly because he was still part of the system and had to live within it:[327] "when I get out of here and take my family along, you are going to *show me how to do it* [referring to procedures for publication] ... here I have my livelihood".[328] Then, he made critical comments regarding local governance and addressed the issue of decentralisation, which he described as dysfunctional, since, according to him, "those [top leaders] only care about their things, not about what is happening here with us [at the local level]".[329]

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[325] Julião Cossa, Administrative Post Technicien, Interview, Manjacaze, 13 April 2019.

[326] Here the administrative post chief I am referring to is Américo Jossias. As I explained in Chapter 3, investigative rides were the conversations/interviews I did while leading the community leaders to their destinations.

[327] As I explained in chapter 5, being critical towards the regime is one of the ways to be identified as the opposition.

[328] It was not the first time that he approached me on the issue. Sometimes, he would call me to talk, highlighting that he could provide me with any information he needed, as long as he did not record and quote him, and that was how our conversations went down. On one occasion, when I asked him to allow me to record, he said, 'so now I'm going to speak as a politician', implying that I wouldn't go into details and would only address convenient issues.

[329] Américo Jossias, Conversation, Manjacaze, 27 March 2019.

He was reacting to the news we were listening to on the radio about a parliamentary debate on the draft of the decentralisation law, focusing on elections for members of the Provincial Assembly. He continued: "That is all a joke. They are still taking care of their stuff. We are still not even being considered." He hypothesised that the situation could improve from 2024 when the districts become electoral constituencies and financial units. Later on, he referred to the question that gives this section its title. According to him, he and other local leaders felt wronged by the politicians from outside the district, specifically those who live in the capital, who, he explained, take advantage of and exploit 'the locals', especially during electoral periods. In his own words: "We, the Administrative Post Chiefs (APC), also want to strike. We are tired of these politicians and MPs who live good lives there [in Maputo] and come here to upset us. Chief X [referring to another APC], for example, is also firm and we are all [the APCs] in agreement to block them here. I will no longer kill my chickens for them ... it is not worth it."[330]

He referred to the different delegations from the district, province or the capital, whose visits become more frequent during election periods. He explained that it was up to the local leaders to accommodate the visitors, giving up their homes, some their own, but also by guaranteeing their meals and even moments of leisure. A short excerpt from a conversation with Gervásio Guimarães, a former 'chief' from another Administrative Post:

> Gervásio Guimarães (GG): The idea is to give a good impression ... [that is why] you must please the chief. All this, so that you can remain in charge ... the group [of visitors] has to say, "You have welcomed us very well". Just because you gave them wine, not because they evaluate your work ... but if they come today, eat well, and have a bottle of wine, the following month, they come back. Do you see! With this wine, you sacrifice a cement bag or two ... but it is an investment to be well seen. I am an old bird; I cannot do that.
> Me: Can you explain it better? How does it happen?
> GG: Here is an example: there was a visit. Those kids working as assistants had gone through Administrative Post X [another post], knowing they would come here later. They said, "Chief, there [at the other AP] … there was a big party on the last day." They were putting pressure on me. I knew that the big boss [referring to the administrator] drank, so they warned me. They said, "we were fine there, so get ready here". When the day came, I got Coca-Cola – a two-litre bottle. After eating half the dish, they started talking to each other, and I listened. They asked each other: "What's going on?

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[330] Américo Jossias, Conversation, Manjacaze, 27 March 2019.

Didn't you tell Chief X [referring to the interviewee]? We do not see 'boiled water' here [referring to alcohol]." I intervened, saying I had nothing, and they were upset."[331]

Regarding the chiefs' strike that Américo Jossias, the other administrative post chief, referred to, Mr Guimarães made it clear that mobilisations by chiefs are recurrent, but few join in. Fearing reprisals, they end up protesting in isolation, each in their own way. He alluded to an episode in which he was involved that, according to him, served to discipline the leaders, even though he recognised the limits of its impact. That episode is referred to here as the 'protest of the lamps', as he called it:

"I always told them: I do not have electricity, food or lamps [which] all burned… they diverted the amount that was meant for the rehabilitation of the [official] residence and said nothing. I said OK ... I had already reached my limit and had already decided that I would not spend any more money on State activities; 'I will not pay one cent more...' ... there was a meeting and they had to do it at my [official] residence and I accepted and pretended I did not know anything. The only lamp I had was from the toilet, and my room is right next to it ... So, the administrator asked about lamps. I said there were no lamps. The first Zone Secretary had to find a solution. He went away to get three lamps and put a wire in the living room, another in the kitchen, and another in the bedroom and threatened me by saying, 'let's put it on balance sheet', but I said I did not care. I had a lot of positive evaluations... I told them that I do not deal with financial issues, and they went to get more lamps because the administrator would spend the night at the house. They sent twelve lamps ... but they got to know me that day. I taught them a lesson...[332]

In the case of the last interviewee, as in the previous one, the message and the intention are clear: to 'teach a lesson' and 'not to be intimidated when others become upset', respectively. The target parties are, therefore, 'others'; the leaders, the 'superiors' of the Party and the State, who either harass them or do not respond to their concerns and are consequently unwelcome in their jurisdiction, which is why, in the most open cases, the chiefs seek to drive home their message. Such messages are more easily understood by the aggrieved group – in this case, by the APCs, who even plan them together, as mentioned in the first example – than by the message recipients, who need to decipher them. When these groups communicate their messages more explicitly, the disobedience becomes more open, with all the associated, already recognised risks of demotion from leadership and marginalisation and even exclusion in the medium and long term. However, despite the subtlety of the messages, they can still

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[331] Gervasio Guimarães, Former Administrative Post Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 8 April 2018.
[332] Gervasio Guimarães, Former Administrative Post Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 8 April 2018.

have an impact, for example, distancing 'superiors' from those territories or pressuring them to make concessions.

There are, however, examples of more daring challenges, though still relatively ambiguous. Such is the case of a person who oversaw a Health Centre at an Administrative Post and refused to form party cells at said Post.[333] He claims to be an active Frelimo member, but refers to the law which, as he explains, prevents such practices as part of the state apparatus. In his own words:

> "They say that it is mandatory to form party cells here at the Health Centre – form a cell and pay dues ... I do not know if this is ethical, but I heard about an article [of the law] that says that in no public institution should these cells be formed and no civil servant should wear a party shirt in state institutions, or even *capulana*.[334] This is not allowed. But we were told to form cells here. I was against it; I did not accept it then and do not accept it now because each one of us is part of a cell at home..."[335]

Unsurprisingly, given the Manjacaze context, he was threatened with disciplinary processes and transfers. However, according to António Gonzalo, another employee of the administrative post, neither of these has yet occurred because there is still a lack of personnel to replace him. This case illustrates that, in fact, not acting according to Frelimo guidelines has serious implications in Manjacaze. Marta, a 30-year-old primary school teacher, quoted again in later chapters, also addresses this aspect: "... if one does not accept something that the ruling party said, it becomes a reason to believe that person is from the opposition, and that is enough to suffer [reprisals]".[336] Marta gave the example of her father, who was classified as a member of the opposition because he refused to give up his car for the Frelimo election campaigns. However, implications are even greater for the 'chiefs', such as Brando, precisely because of their role in the *estrutura* because they are part of the structure entrusted with exercising control over other citizens. These threats, however, are a constant

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[333] At the level of administrative posts, there are no sectors. The title is attributed by the interviewer to all health centres located in the referred Administrative Post.

[334] A *capulana* is a type of a sarong worn primarily in Mozambique but also in other areas of south-eastern Africa. "It is a length of material about 2 metres by 1 metre. It can either be used as a wrap-around skirt, dress or can become a baby carrier on the back. It is considered a complete piece of clothing." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capulana (Accessed on 22 February 2022).

[335] Brando Brave, Interview, Manjacaze, 17 April 2019.

[336] Marta Nhantumbo, Interview, Manjacaze, 3 November 2019.

presence for everyone, and so are reminders of the consequences that may befall those who do not comply with party-state orders, decisions, and claims.

In summary, any act of 'disobedience' to Frelimo orders, decisions or claims in Manjacaze is a form of resistance. Even if they do not have explicit political objectives, including breaking the link with the party-state, these acts may be interpreted as such. The author of any resistance is fully aware of the consequences, even before taking action. The implications are worse for members of the *estrutura*, responsible for ensuring compliance with party-state orders and decisions. However, despite the risks, some also protest, albeit even more obscurely, denoting their own weak compliance with the party-state in its heartland. Now I reflect on the most daring acts of resistance in Manjacaze, some of which are openly committed.

8.2 From 'voice' to 'exit': challenging the party-state

The episodes in the two previous sections, addressed as 'everyday forms of resistance', in Scott's (1985, 1990) terms, denote that protest is carried out internally, within Frelimo itself, without jeopardising its authority. These are cases of 'voice' limited by 'loyalty' to the party. The ones that follow are more daring and carry more risk, also because they occur in an electoral context, crucial moments for incumbent self-reproduction of power in electoral authorianisms (Schedler, 2002), but also used by the voters themselves to force more concessions, sometimes culminating in 'exit'.[337] I begin with a series of protests organised in different villages of Manjacaze, all political action – "voice is political action par excellence" (Hirscham, 1970, p.30), but still ambiguous, within the party-state, without questioning the loyalty to said party:[338] "Voice here is defined as any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, … through various types of actions and protests, including those that are meant to mobilise public opinion" (ibid.). I then present episodes of people who, after being Frelimo members or not, alone or in groups, begin at a specific moment to identify openly with opposition parties. These are cases of 'exit,' defined by Hirscham (1970) as situations in which discontent is expressed by desertion from an organisation.

8.2.1 "No vote without electricity": just 'voice'?
31 August 2019. First day of the general election campaign. Early in the morning, it was already hectic in Chicuatso, a *povoação* located 7km from the Chibonzane headquarters. Right at the entrance to that *povoação*, a placard had been hung, threatening to boycott elections if electricity was not provided to Chicuatso people: "No vote without electricity in Chiquatso,"[339] it read. The message was clear; it was a moment of 'political electricity',[340] as nothing similar had happened in that *povoação*, at least not with the same boldness.

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[337] An important note, regarding the issue of risk, here associated with 'challenge': a given act, being 'voice' or 'exit', is approached as being bolder, and therefore riskier, the greater the probability of the perpetrator being considered 'other', and, consequently, subject to the most severe reprisals, with emphasis on violence, especially in electoral periods, and marginalization and/or isolation in daily life. Exit cases are therefore more challenging.

[338] The ambiguity has to do with the message or Messenger not being explicit, as Scott (1989, p.54-55) writes: "instead of a clear message delivered by a disguised messenger, an ambiguous message is delivered by clearly identified messengers." In the same vein, Vinthagen & Johansson (2013. p.7) clarify: "the key characteristic of everyday resistance is the 'pervasive disguise."

[339] I found that people Chicuatso, Chicuatsu, Xicuatsu, Xicuatso. I use the latter, as in the official documents in Chimbonzane.

[340] Scott (1990) defines 'political electricity' as situations in which, for the first time, what was previously in the domain of infrapolitics, of hidden transcripts, becomes public.

'Someone' had decided to publicly reveal what had long been whispered, far the knowledge of party leaders, or at least beyond their hearing: to access basic services, it was necessary to pressure those leaders to provide those services. It was unprecedented.

Figure 16: Placard hanged in Chicuatso during the protests.

Chicuatso is a relatively small *Povoação*, with just over 2,000 inhabitants. Thus, per se, the threat would not be sufficient to jeopardise Frelimo victory, even in the locality to which Chicuatso belongs. Yet, due to its boldness, such an action was taken very seriously, both by the local leaders, who saw their authority confronted, and by the 'superiors' from the district and the province, who feared that such acts could be replicated in other areas, leading to a greater impact, and compromising Frelimo's image of hegemony in its heartland. But who had dared to speak on behalf of all Chicuatso people? Chibonzane and Manjacaze leaders needed immediate answers.

Chicuatso leaders were tasked with identifying the ringleaders unless they also wanted to be implicated. Here is a comment from one of them:

> "We just saw it in the morning. We do not know who wrote it. We only saw 'no vote without electricity'. The locality chief said, 'you, as a leader, know about it. You know who wrote it. If not, you will take it down, and the person will show up. They will appear, and you will punish them...' [but] nobody spoke. Nobody said who the person was."[341]

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[341] Malimo Fred, Local leader, Interview, 12 April 2019.

The placard was to be withdrawn immediately, and the matter dealt with urgently and locally. Proceeding swiftly, it was hoped, would preserve the image of being completely compliant in Chicuatso, like in Chibonzane, and the entire district and province, and therefore of their unwavering support for the party-state. Chibonzane leaders dissuaded any attempt by outsiders, such as myself, to gather information about what had happened, much less to gain access to the placard, which had been thrown into the woods.[342] The argument was that it was a meaningless event orchestrated by drunk and inconsequential people and was not worth delving further into. In vain! Despite no one claiming authorship of the placard, at least not publicly, all interlocutors, including some local leaders, said that the content reflected what they wanted. When I asked some about their position on the matter, they even made a point of repeating the placard message: "no [one] votes without electricity," further explaining that the episode had been part of yet another stage in the ongoing dispute between them and the party-state, one that had begun shortly before through letters and other public manifestations as detailed below.

In March 2019, a month before the start of the voter registration process, first scheduled for 1 April but later postponed to 15 April, a group of community members wrote a letter and sent it to the Administrative Post and the district. In both institutions, the letter was slipped under the main door. Its content was similar to that of the placard, in which voting was pronounced conditional on the provision of electricity, but this time, the authors were asserting their rights, as explained by one of the local leaders:[343]

> "It was a short letter, saying that 'we from the village of Chiquatso, are asking for electricity. Electricity is our right, but we are not granted [this right] when we are obliged to [obey] the will of the State. So, we are saying [on behalf of] the Chiquatso community that there is no vote this year [without electricity] … ' It was written just like that. They even said they would not vote before being provided with electricity."

The first reaction came from the district. The administrator contacted the head of Chibonzane and told him to reach out to the District Planning and Infrastructure Service Director so they could respond to the community's demands and claims. Both, in turn, contacted the EDM (Electricity of Mozambique) District Director, whom they invited to meet with the people of

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[342] The photo posted above was taken in the bush, hidden, with grass on top. This was only possible with the help of some local people, including leaders, who also identified with the protests.
[343] Teresa Milando, Locality Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 4 April 2019.

Chicuatso. They scheduled the meeting for 19 March at 2 pm, but community members, were left waiting until at least 5 pm, without any information. The leaders then cancelled the meeting, claiming their transport vehicle had been damaged, which was not true. As one interviewee stated: "They disrespected that community. The head of the Administrative Post ... called me and told us to find a way out. He said to use our strategies; we could lie, saying that the car broke down, and that is what we told the community. Community members asked where the car had broken down so they could go to help and pick them up because [they said] 'we left our affairs to be here'."[344]

Protests followed later that same day and into the night. People from Chicuatso took to the street and blocked the main road, which connects Chibonzane headquarters and the villages of Macedzene, Vamangue, Marimane, amongst others: "Some bought beer for young people to be motivated. They closed the road with logs. They wanted to burn a *Chapa* [semi-collective passenger transport] that tried to pass through. The village chief had to leave the place, fearing attacks, and went home ... They claimed that [the chiefs] had abused them."[345] According to one of the participants, apparently one of the main mobilisers, "the idea with the strike was to make them start respecting us".[346] The same interviewee then added: "those who did not want to go on strike could face the consequences: the strikers could remove the roofs from their houses so that they could be busy doing something while others were striking. That was meant to force us to join them. They told [us]: if you do not want to go, at least you are supposed to be rebuilding your house."

When pressed for more information, Teresa said: "[still] in the heat of the strike, the [district] chiefs set a popular meeting for the 20th, at 9:00 am".[347] At the meeting, the aforementioned 'chiefs' explained that they needed the community to identify a place for an electric power plant and to enlist the families interested in having electricity, highlighting that they need six hundred households, but that it would be easier if they were concentrated in a hamlets, which

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[344] Teresa Milando, Locality Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 4 April 2019.
[345] Teresa Milando, Locality Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 4 April 2019.
[346] Larso Beny, interview, Manjacaze, 11 April 2019.
[347] Teresa Milando, Locality Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 4 April 2019.

was not the case.[348] Thus, only the first requirement was met, and the issue remained pending until the election campaign period, which is why, in a new attempt, the residents displayed their placard.

However, the Chiquatso events were inspired by a larger protest organised shortly before by their neighbours in the villages of Vamangue, Macedzene, Mambango and Marimane, the latter in the locality of Ponjoane, still in Chimbonzane. People from these four *povoações* had come together and, like those of Chicuatso, had taken advantage of the electoral period, specifically the beginning of the first phase of the electoral registration process, in 2018. First, they also wrote a letter "... saying that they wanted the government to provide basic services… they wanted electricity, maintenance of the main road and the addition of an eighth grade at their local school".[349] At the time, protesters prevented the Vamangue povoação chief from registering. Then, "they filled a truck with people and went to the house of the head of the Administrative Post, where they confronted him with their claims and said 'you are going to take it to your superiors …. they said that they were not going to register, that the Government forgot them, and that every service provision stopped [at the headquarters of the Administrative Post] in Chibonzane'."[350]

In response, different brigades at various levels were established within the party, the State and the CNE (National Electoral Commission), and the Frelimo Zone Committee was sent to Vamangue, which is central to the communities involved, to organise a rally, which brigades from the party, the State and the CNE were created at different levels. First, the Frelimo Zone Committee went to Vamangue, the centre of all communities, and organised a rally, but it was unsuccessful. A CNE district team followed, along with some senior officials from the district who tried to convince people to register, explaining that the vote had nothing to do with their claims, but this was also to no avail; Protesters said, "... we know that today they are insisting that we obtain the voter card, so that tomorrow they can pressure us to vote. So, if we start by preventing the voter card [from being obtained today], it means that tomorrow they will

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[348] Unlike Cambane, for example, which is a village, with more concentrated and organized houses and streets, Chicuatso is a *povoação (Hamlet)*, and so, people are dispersed.
[349] Teresa Milando, Locality Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 4 April 2019.
[350] Ibid.

not have the strength to come and tell us to vote because we are going to say that we do not vote because we do not have a voter card."[351]

Only after the arrival of a provincial brigade headed by the First Secretary of Frelimo at that level could the protesters be dissuaded, but not without compromise. The First Secretary promised to intervene in the road issue, which happened immediately, so some protesters decided to step back and register. Other promises from the First Secretary included addressing the school and electricity problems, the first of which had been minimised by introducing an eighth-grade distance teaching system, a solution deemed insufficient by parents who would have preferred a new classroom. The electricity issue is pending to this day, as are the ensuing tensions. But the gains achieved through these protests inspired the populations of other areas to adopt the same practices, leading to what happened in Chicuatso, as explained above.

In summary, while on the one hand, the cases presented here show that several communities have protested and/or resisted the orders and decisions of the party-state in Manjacaze and have mobilised in larger groups and clear cases of voice even within Frelimo, on the other hand, election periods stand out as moments of power for citizens as well. In other words, in elections, power is not only wielded by the ruling party but is equally exercised by citizens, creating spaces for negotiation with the former (which are scarce outside electoral periods). Some negotiate within Frelimo itself without questioning its leadership and are thus examples of the voice/protest mechanism represented by the placard in the title – "no vote without electricity…" which is also a negotiation tactic. However, others negotiate from outside, as independents or as members of the opposition (though often undeclared), contesting the leadership of that party. Still, others who are initially party members choose to leave during this negotiation process (or as a result), some openly contesting its leadership, as shown in the next section.

8.2.2 *'Just to scare Frelimo': when exit plays out*
Among the cases of 'exit', that of Cambane, which was briefly referred to in the introduction to this chapter, is of particular note. In practice, it eventually evolved into an 'exit' case, but

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[351] Teresa Milando, Locality Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 4 April 2019.

it began as a 'voice,' when a group of young people and *mamanas*[352] from that village sought answers from the authorities to a set of their community demands and concerns. The list included the opening of the health centre, already built by a villager; the power supply for Chiguivitane Secondary School; expansion of the water supply in the village; improvement of the access road to the village; and sponsorship for youth recreational activities in the form of sports balls and equipment. These issues were raised with the then Governor of the Province of Gaza, Stela Pinto Novo Zeca, at a public meeting held in Cambane in mid-April 2019 while the voter registration process was underway. In response, the Governor supplied the 'usual patter': "ok, I'll send it to my superiors."[353]

Five months went by and still there was no sign of feedback from the Governor, which is why, during the electoral campaign period in September 2019 the group decided to take action yet again, this time adopting a pressure strategy: threatening not to participate in the Frelimo campaign should their concerns remain unaddressed. The group informed the village chief of their intentions, requesting the presence of the Administrative Post chief, hoping that he could answer the questions they had asked the Governor. Instead, the head of Chibonzane was sent, and was confronted with the same list of concerns, but echoing the Governor, he was non-committal in tone, offering merely to pass the demands on to his 'superiors': "he said: 'I will not promise anything; I personally will not be able to do it. What I am going to do is to take this document to my superiors.'"[354] By this time, the *mamanas* had already retreated from their intention to pressurise the party-state, but the young people in the group were steadfast in their resolve and decided to follow through on their threat not only to boycott the Frelimo electoral campaign, as they had previously committed to do, but also to join and campaign for the opposition parties. The following brief excerpt presents the reasons behind the young people's decision: "we decided that we should not campaign for Frelimo because it does not deliver what it promises. We realised that they have no interest in us. Look! We still have no answers to our demands, even today."[355] Confusion had set in.

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[352] '*Mamanas*,' a term derived from 'mother' - mom, refers to women in general and adults more specifically.
[353] Rito Brito, Interview, Manjacaze, 1 November 2019.
[354] Rito Brito, Interview, Manjacaze, 1 November 2019.
[355] Ibid.

And so, during the electoral campaign, some of these young people joined the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), the country's third-largest political force, and participated in the mobilisation for this party. It was then that Frelimo tried to contact them, promising to address their concerns and offering two sports balls and a few T-shirts, a strategy which seemed to work at least partially, given that some of the protesters not only backed down but returned to Frelimo, although most stayed with the MDM: "They came again. They came and said they were going to do this and that ... some went back to Frelimo, while we stayed with MDM, also campaigning... what we wanted in that campaign period was equipment."[356] Since most young people refused to stand down, the head of the Chibonzane Administrative Post was forced to return to Cambane to personally intervene in the case, but his efforts were in vain: "[We said] take those T-shirts and go give them to the *mamanas*. We don't want them. He [the Frelimo Secretary] called the head of Chibonzane and reported what happened. The head of the Chibonzane post came personally, made an appointment with us, and we told him the same thing: that we were not going to take the shirts."[357] The challenge was clear.

The First Secretary of Frelimo in Cambane Circle found himself caught in a complex web, as, in addition to his role in the party, he was the soccer coach of some of the young men behind the arm twisting. He had to make choices, which he did, and it weighed heavily on the weaker side – that of the protesters; he informed the young people that he would be taking Frelimo's side, and must cease to be their coach. According to one local leader in Cambane, "he said to the young people: 'it is not possible for me to continue training you. I cannot be your coach because my superiors may be suspicious, because you are known. Everyone knows that you are with another party. You even wear T-shirts and campaign for MDM; so, it is not possible for me to be with you.'"[358]

The young men held firm. They continued their political activities for MDM and set a remarkable precedent against Frelimo in that village. As many interlocutors have said, the opposition parties had never secured such victory in Cambane. However, far beyond their immediate interests, which included obtaining equipment and balls for their recreational

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[356] Jorge Mondlane, Intervention in a FGD with young people from Cambane, Manjacaze, 2 November 2019.

[357] Rito Brito, Intervention in a FGD with young people from Cambane, Manjacaze, 2 November 2019.

[358] Gito Mondlane, Intervention in a FGD with young people from Cambane, Manjacaze, 2 November 2019.

activities, the group members pointed out that they also wanted to 'scare Frelimo' and show that they were free and ready to make other choices if they so desired: "Frelimo always promised, but they never accomplish[ed]. We changed the party. We joined another party to scare those [from Frelimo]. [We wanted] to see what they could do if we did not do what they told us to do [because] they are used to being alone here in rural areas. They were also scared when they saw the other party's T-shirts."[359] This was an open challenge to the party-State, organised by a group, but there are cases of individual challenges, like that of Marta, a 30-year-old girl living in Manjacaze headquarters.

At the time of the research, Marta was a primary school teacher.[360] As she explained, she has always been a Renamo supporter, but fearing reprisals and, above all, difficulties in finding employment, she had to hide the fact for a long time: "I did not show up in the past, it was because of fear, because I was going to suffer here; I might spend five years looking for a job... that is just how it was. [But] after I got a job, there was no reason to worry."[361]

Nonetheless, having found employment, other reasons arose, and fear prevailed. She continues: "being there [working], I saw colleagues complaining. They complained about Party meetings ... but they said they had no choice because Frelimo members might say 'oh, he is not with us; she is not ours'. So, it was an obligation ... people [would comply] even if they did not want to, for fear of seeing a bait put on them, risking slipping and a fall..." She confesses that she tried to take a chance when she saw a teacher running as a Renamo candidate for the Municipality of Manjacaze, but fear once again prevailed. Later on, the same teacher invited her to work as a Member of a Polling Station (MMV), something that would change her story:

> "He [the Renamo teacher and candidate] needed people to be members of the polling stations. He invited me and I accepted and submitted my documents. This is where it all started: [after undergoing training] the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) published lists of such MMV candidates and those who had entered via political parties had their names revealed. It was clear: A is from X political party, B is from Y, and so on. It was all posted in a public space. I had no way of hiding ... people kept calling me and saying 'Marta, what did you do? Have you gone crazy?

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[359] Rito Brito, Interview, Manjacaze, 1 November 2019.
[360] I found out later that she changed her job.
[361] Marta Nhantumbo, Interview, Manjacaze, 3 November 2019

What happened? You risk losing your job ... everyone already knew. So, I had no choice then."[362]

Her friends and family members tried to dissuade her. Her uncle, who is part of the leadership structure in Manjacaze, also intervened: "First, he isolated me a little but then he understood that he should talk to me. He came to me and said: 'I was completely disappointed… I have not been well since I was informed [that you are from the opposition]. I was devastated.' Then he said that I was grown up and could choose whatever I wanted, that he could not force me to belong to Frelimo. But he made it very clear that I was in the mud. He said: 'as a parent, I cannot help telling you that you are in the mud. I cannot help showing you the correct path, but the last decision must be yours."[363]

The interviewee interpreted her uncle's words as a form of blackmail and, just as she had done in other situations where she was questioned about her political options, she invoked her freedom of choice, embodied in the Constitution, which, she says, she always quotes: "in number 2, Article 53 of the Constitution, it is written that we have the right and freedom of association. So, I always tell people that. I even took a screenshot of that passage and shared it with a group of teachers on WhatsApp. One of the teachers said, 'that may well be, but it is only something that is written in books, [in practice] you are at serious risk here. You may even lose your job.'" This was true in her case, at least in terms of the context in which she was exposed, where intolerance of opposition members is enormous.

However, motivated as much by the principle of exercising their freedom of choice as by a desire for change in the political scenario, many other interlocutors justified their adherence to the opposition, which exposed them to many risks: "... I wanted to see changes. With Frelimo it is always the same ...,"[364] said Mr Bravo Job, an 83-year-old man from Cambane. According to him, like Marta, he had always been a Renamo sympathiser but had been forced to hide. However, in 2019, after seeing the young men challenge Frelimo, he decided to come out and, like them, join MDM, and even wear MDM T-shirts. Mr Santos, another elderly man referred to in Chapter 7, is yet another example, although with a different outcome. Unlike Mr Job, Marta and the Cambane youth, who remained in the opposition, despite suffering a great deal of harassment, Mr Santos finally joined Frelimo. At first, he had also refused,

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[362] Ibid.
[363] Ibid.
[364] Bravo Job, Interview, Manjacaze, 2 November 2019.

claiming to be exercising his rights, even as Frelimo members were insistently mobilising him. However, when shock group members set part of his house on fire, and he was forcibly isolated from his community, he eventually succumbed and joined Frelimo. According to Jorsio, the former OJM secretary, Mr Santos even went as far as to apologise for being in the opposition: "he came and said, hey, I see that I am lost, I apologise".[365] An emergency Party rally was arranged in order for him to apologise publicly for supporting the opposition!

There is no shortage of examples, but the ones presented above show that cases of 'exit', per se, are open challenges to the Party-state and riskier for those who adopt them. Marta's case, for example, also illustrates how pressure can be exerted, if not always directed by the Party itself, then through friends and family members who somehow ultimately do the Party's bidding. This is known as 'power by anticipated coercion' – a situation in which the action of a certain individual is influenced by the threat of the reaction of another (for example a patron or anyone else who has power over that individual), even if said patron does not mobilise his power (Smith, 1997; Kabeer, 2006). Next, I reflect on electoral abstention, a daring challenge to the party-state but still ambiguous. It is located between voice and exit mechanisms, but generally, with the implications for the latter.

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[365] Jorsio Malate, former OJM Secretary, Interview, Manjacaze, 6 February 2019.

8.3 'Those who didn't vote, just helped us': the abstention trap

As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis (Chapter 1), despite being part of Frelimo's heartland, a site of its supermajorities (cf., also Chapter 7), Manjacaze is a markedly abstentionist district, surpassing even the abstention rates for Gaza, the province to which it belongs (Table 3).

Table 3: Electoral Abstention in Manjacaze, Gaza and Mozambique

Local/Year	Results (%)						Average
	2019	**2014**	**2009**	**2004**	**1999**	**1994**	
Manjacaze	56	49	41	64	26	10	41
Gaza	38	45	38	52	19	10	34
Mozambique	51	52	56	64	34	12	44

Source: Author's compilation based on data from CNE, IESE and CIP

The table above shows that, in the six general elections held in the country, the average abstention rate in Manjacaze was 41%, above 34% in Gaza and closer to the national average, which is 44%. In 2004, however, Manjacaze recorded a record 64% abstention rate, and more recently, in 2019, the second highest record at 56%, when, in both periods, Gaza reported 52% and 38%, respectively.

With few exceptions, the studies on electoral abstention in Mozambique (Brito, 1995; Serra, 1998; Mazula, 2006) are broad, based on aggregated data (Brito, 1995; Serra, 1998; Francisco 2008), and in part reported in a purely quantitative way (Brito, 2016), ignoring important local dynamics that are useful for understanding the phenomenon. In general, these studies underscore the institutional and individual factors behind electoral abstention,[366] including, for the first group of authors, aspects related to the organisation and functioning of the Electoral Management Bodies (OGE) and political parties (Brito et al., 2005; Brito, 2007; Do

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[366] For more details about Institutional and individual factors behind abstention, see Sinnot (2003).

Rosário, 2013; Chaimite & Forquilha, 2015a, 2015b; Chaimite, 2016). These aspects include, for example, the weak quality of civic education campaigns (Pereira & Nhanale, 2014), problems with the distribution of registration and voting booths (Fumo, 2015; António et al., 2015) and lack of trust in the OGE and political parties themselves (Brito et al., 2005; Mazula et al., 2006; Brito, 2007). The second group considers a set of resources, including education, information, and socioeconomic status (Brito, 1995; Lundin, 1995; Brito, 2016), but also highlights the instrumental dimension of voting, namely the perception of its usefulness and its ability to influence public policies (Chaimite & Forquilha, 2015). Here, for the case of Manjacaze, I explore this instrumental dimension of voting, showing that electoral abstention in this district is partly a form of resistance against Frelimo hegemony, but counterproductive. Why? First, the uselessness of voting.

Section 7.3 of the previous chapter shows how electoral fraud trivialised the vote, as illustrated by the quotation from Jacinto Langa, a secondary school teacher who felt it might even be better if he were able to sell his vote since it appears from his response that nothing is gained from that vote, other than an endorsement of Frelimo's inevitable victory. The same interlocutor also added that he would not vote if he was not subject to political control. Josefa, the president of a *mesa*, quoted at length in the same chapter, pointed out that his friends criticised him for voting, asking, "why did you do that?"[367]: "some friends, when I showed my painted finger [a sign of having already voted], they asked: 'why did you do that? It is in vain to get your finger dirty... the one who will govern will be the same. Go vote for what?'" Then he added: "the majority of those people close to me did not vote." Josefa went further, explaining that, due to his experience in that election, as one of the protagonists of electoral fraud, he saw no use in voting, and he would no longer participate in elections if it were not for the chance to make money as he did in 2019. Still, because of money, Filipe, another interlocutor, a Frelimo mobiliser, showed his disappointment with Frelimo:

> "I no longer participate. I am not motivated... Even a dog, if you go hunting with him, later you give him some bones, and you, his owner, eat meat. We hunted; they won,

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[367] Josefa Macassa, President of *Mesa*, Interview, Xai-Xai, 29 October 2019.

but they didn't give us anything! Neither flesh nor bone. Not even 50 cents... if they had given 100 or 150 meticals, we could say that at least we had bones."[368]

The reason for Filipe's anger with Frelimo is money. According to him, Frelimo did not pay for his mobilisation work,[369] contrary to his expectations. For him and the other interlocutors mentioned above, one notes the importance of money in electoral processes in Manjacaze, including for fraud, as shown in Chapter 7. Benigna, the Frelimo mobiliser who became an MDM delegate on polling day, is an example of this. She said, "I [just] wanted money because money makes the world go round... When you show up with the money, you can be from Renamo, MDM... whoever comes... I want money, my son. Money talks."[370] Her words are similar to those of Filipe, who also denotes his weak attachment to any of the parties, even Frelimo, the one he supports (cf. Chapter 4), and the clientelist tie behind such support. In Filipe's words: "I work to buy bread, regardless of the party. MDM, Renamo... whatever... I just need money. The problem is that other parties don't come here. Only Frelimo comes, so I cannot deny it."[371] Given this relevance of money, Frelimo, which is a party-state, and as such, has better resources, uses them to obtain greater advantage and to weaken opposition parties, also resorting to fraud which is essential to the production and maintenance of its (image of) hegemony (cf. Chapter 5 and Chapter 7).

Meanwhile, still on abstention, it is worth returning to the voter card number collection issue, also addressed in the previous chapter. Its influence on abstention stems from the fact that, for some voter's card collection is equal to casting their vote for Frelimo, and is the reason why they consider it unnecessary to go to the polls, as Paulo reports: "as soon as they register our names and numbers, we already know that we are voting for Frelimo. Even if you decide to go on polling day, it no longer has an impact. They already took the document."[372] Thus, perception of the connection between voter card/number collection and fraud is fundamental to perception of the vote as useless, leading to abstention. This was also pointed

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[368] Fausto Tune, Frelimo mobiliser, Interview, Manjacaze, 22 October 2019.
[369] Fausto is part of the group of mobilisers who did not manage to qualify as an MMV or a delegate. So he was not entitled to received state subsidies paid to the latter.
[370] Benigna Ndzofo, Frelimo Mobiliser and MDM Delegate, Interview, Manjacaze, 23 October 2019.
[371] Fausto Tune, Intervention on an FGD with young people, Manjacaze, 28 July 2018.
[372] Rito Brito, interview, Manjacaze, 1 November 2019.

out by Gumende Tair, another Frelimo mobiliser: "When they collect that number, victory is guaranteed. Do you think it's still worth voting? Ha ha ha (laughs)."[373]

Another relevant dimension to this reflection, also addressed by Tune, is associated with voter numbers and/or cards, namely the obligation to vote. According to him:

> "They say voting is a right, but we have no choice; it's an obligation. During the electoral registration process, they urge everyone to go. Those who don't go may have problems. They will ask for a voter card when seeking any service. If you don't have one, they won't receive you…. So, we are afraid. Papa's order is to be fulfilled. It may be bitter, but for a son, it's sweet. Lie or not, everything is true."[374]

As can be seen from the last extract above, because of political control in general and voting control in particular (cf. Chapter 7), optional voting, as required by law in the country,[375] becomes mandatory in Manjacaze (Chaimite & Forquilha, 2015), since the control mechanisms allow both the coercion of voters to attend the polls and the identification of abstentionists. It is clear from Tune's response that the penalties include exclusion from access to basic State services, but if one is catalogued as an 'other' (that is, an opposition supporter), can be even more severe and may even include physical abuse (cf. Chapter 7). In this context, with minor exceptions, it can be said that voting stands out as an "act of allegiance to the regime" (Karlins, 1986, p.452), given the risks associated with it, as happens in other non-competitive contexts. Abstention takes on a protest character, a political act par excellence (Hermet et al., 1978), which reveals, among other things, the rejection of the political offer presented to voters (Nay, 2011; Gaxie, 1979). In this vein, Hermet et al. (1978, p.12) write:

> "When the government gives no opportunity to express an opposing view, withholding one's vote may be a challenge to those in power. This is true when abstentions are on a very large scale and clearly concentrated in certain regions or sectors of society. In these circumstances, … abstentions can be interpreted as political significant…"

Francisco (2008, p.1) interprets this political meaning of voluntary abstention, albeit more broadly, for the country in general, as a reflection of "…disillusionment, fatigue and denial of

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[373] Gumende Tair, Frelimo Mobiliser, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 October 2019.
[374] Gumende Tair, Frelimo Mobilser, Interview, Manjacaze, 25 October 2019.
[375] The article 135 of the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique (CRM, and law 2/2019, of 31 May, which amends and republic law 8/2013, of 17 February, dispose that voting is free and secret and that no one can be forced to reveal who they voted for.

a positive vote, not just to one party or another, but to the whole system." This finding, if valid for the country, has its peculiarities in Manjacaze since, with the opposition being almost insignificant in this location, at least if we consider the election result numbers, it presents itself as part of the epicenter of the asymetric hegemonic authoritarianism in the country, with more severe implications for any dissent. In this sense, echoing the writings of Karlins (1986, p.457), on non-competitive contexts, in general, it can be said that in Manjacaze, "nonvoting is in fact a more political act than voting" since it "...involves more effort than casting a ballot" (ibid., p.465). On the other hand, abstention is the voter's 'strike' in the very heartland of Frelimo, as Fausto, the Frelimo mobiliser mentioned above, stresses: "That is what strikes are: not voting. See that before we formed long queues, but not this year. It was just a matter of arriving and entering. People did not go to vote. It was the people's strike..."[376] Contextualising his statements, Fausto adds, "During the campaign, people said: if rice went up, what should I vote for? Even now, they say, 'we told you so. You stopped going to cultivate peanuts and wasted time with the campaign. Did you receive anything? Hahaha.' They say: 'you helped others, now you suffer'. We have nothing to say but shut up and just agree."[377]

Thus, if the mere threat of not voting is an affront to Frelimo, putting it into practice is even more bold. Community members did threaten Frelimo in Chicuatso, as in Macedzene, Vamangue and Marimane (see Section 8.2.1), but as electoral data from Manjacaze show, many others go a step further, resulting in massive abstention in all elections. Again, in the sense of Karlins (1986, p.465), this abstention is "a first step toward challenging other facets of the regime's claim for the monopoly of political thought, word, and activity," jeopardising the image of unanimity and full compliance that the Manjacaze supermajorities broadcast. However, despite impacting negatively on the legitimacy of successive Frelimo governments themselves (cf., Brito, 2007, 2013, 2016; Francisco, 2008), electoral abstention has a limited effect on Frelimo supermajorities and can even be counterproductive. Here lies the abstention trap highlighted in the title of this subsection.

The abstention trap stems from the fact that, even if the abstentionists intend to weaken or block Frelimo's supermajorities in Manjacaze, the effect is the opposite. By abstaining from voting, they facilitate ballot box stuffing, since by leaving a space by their name in the

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[376] Fausto Tune, Frelimo mobiliser, Interview, Manjacaze, 22 October 2019.
[377] Fausto Tune, Frelimo mobiliser, Interview, Manjacaze, 22 October 2019.

registration book they remove one of the obstacles to fraud, which, as explained at length in Chapter 7, is achieved through the filling of multiple ballot papers followed by 'unloadings' in the registration books. Two comments by Obadias Guilende, First Secretary of Frelimo in one of the localities in Manjacaze, and a focal point during the 2019 general elections, help to explain this abstention trap better. In the first, on 14 October 2019, a day before polling, he addressed a group of three secondary school teachers talking about the elections. Some indicated that they would not vote, citing the distance and lack of transportation, among other things, as reasons. De-dramatising the potential abstention, Obadias Guilende said, "whoever does not vote had better know that he/she has voted Frelimo,"[378] suggesting that the spaces for the abstainers would be filled with votes in favour of Frelimo. He was more specific in his second comment, on 15 October 2019, after the closing of the polls, when again a group of five teachers and two neighbours from their condominium commented on incidents in the voting process. There was an abstentionist among them who was scolded throughout the conversation, allegedly because it would bring problems for his superiors, but again Obadias Guilende downplayed this case of abstention, saying: "those who did not vote just helped us".[379] He explained later that the act of abstention denoted that the abstainer was already not a firm supporter of the party, and as such, if he/she had joined the poll, there was a probability that they would not have voted for Frelimo, so according to Obadias Guilende, it was better that they did not vote. Thus, as in the previous case, it was seen as a facilitation of Frelimo's victory, this time without having to invalidate more opposition votes, as happens during vote counting (cf. Chapter 7).

In short, part of the abstention is resistance, in this case a 'voice' mechanism that is even more challenging and, given Manjacaze's context of asymmetric authoritarianism, risks that are similar to those of 'exit,' namely exclusion and, in some cases, physical and patrimonial violence. This protest affects the legitimacy of the instituted powers insofar as it exposes the reality of their weak support. Moreover, the fact that they sustain themselves, not necessarily with said support, but based on various manipulation mechanisms, including electoral fraud per se, reveals those weaknesses (cf., Hermet et al., 1978; Smyth, 2021), even in the Party's heartland. However, the impact of abstention on the supermajorities, central to Frelimo's

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[378] Obadias Guilende, Frelimo First Secretary, Conversation, Manjacaze, 14 October 2019.
[379] Ibid.

image of hegemony in Manjacaze, is quite limited, if not counterproductive, since abstaining voters not only fail to prevent the production of said supermajorities but, on the contrary, they facilitate it. This happens because, as explained in the previous paragraph, 'someone' ultimately casts vote on behalf of the abstentionists, which is why, rather than worrying about abstention, Frelimo in Manjacaze invested in the prior identification of potential voters, abstainers, and in estimating the 'ghosts,' and this was strategic to ballot box stuffing. Finally, it is worth referring again to Smyth's (2021) recent study on Russia, for whom "... vote totals and incumbent victories mask almost constant change in regime strategies to contain opposition and maintain social support". This suggests a further study to understand the dynamics behind these 'totals' and, in the case of Manjacaze, of Frelimo's supermajorities.

Chapter 9 Conclusion: Negotiating Authoritarianism?

I started this thesis evoking La Boétie's paradox of voluntary servitude (1974). This paradox led me to Gaza in southern Mozambique, which though Frelimo's main heartland, is one of the poorest provinces in the country. I have investigated the sources of mass support for Frelimo in Gaza as part of a broader study of the dynamics behind the construction and maintenance of authoritarianism, a growing phenomenon in Mozambique (Pitcher 2020; V-Dem 2020; The Economist 2022), Africa (Yates 2021; Okino 2021; Campbell & Quinn 2021) and the world (Bermeo 2016; Mechkova *et al*. 2017; Wood 2017; Glasius 2018; Waldner & Lust 2018; Lührmann & Lindberg 2019; Cassani & Tomini 2019; Hyde 2020; Haggard & Kaufman 2021; Gaventa 2022). Guided by a frame of authoritarian institutionalism, I applied ethnographic tools to examine Frelimo's power over the people of its own heartland.

In this concluding chapter, I present an argument that builds from the findings from each of the different parts of Frelimo's hegemonic institution that I have examined, chapter by chapter, throughout the thesis. I reflect on how hegemonic authoritarianism is maintained and resisted by negotiation as much as by force. I argue for the significance and contributions of the thesis and make suggestions for future research.

9.1 How does Frelimo construct and maintain its hegemony in Manjacaze?

Frelimo hegemony is constructed continuously in the Party's daily relationship with the people, and it intensifies in elections and at other moments when the authoritarian institution is affirmed. It is built and rebuilt from both people's support and Frelimo's coercion and manipulation.

Support for Frelimo has two major dimensions: on the one hand, it is a product of people identifying with the party, having enduring attachment to it, resulting in an "effective bond or sense of loyalty" (Greens & Baltes, 2017, p.3), and on the other hand, by default. Support by default comes about as a result of opposition to another party, in this case Renamo. Although in the literature, the default situation I evoke is considered part of party identification, built in childhood, through socialisation, I argue that it needs to be distinguished from support by identification. Frelimo enjoys both types of support. In the context of Manjacaze, the legacy of wars has structured such attachment and detachment. Frelimo was the liberator of the country from colonialism and is perceived as the protector of

the population during the civil war. Renamo is perceived as responsible for the atrocities of the civil war, and this perception, predominant in adults and the elderly, is also inculcated in other generations since it forms an important part of Frelimo's political socialisation of the people of Manjacaze.

Beyond the sources of support are the sources of sufferance, whereby people experience coercion and manipulation. The Party-State operates as a coloniser which has captured the state, the party taking advantage of its privileged access to State resources to feed patronage and clientelism networks, fundamental for maintaining and reinforcing its hegemony. In this process, civil servants are both patrons and clients: clients in their relationship with the party, to which they must show gratitude for holding their jobs; patrons when they interact with citizens, who come to understand public services as Frelimo favours. Behind this clientelist relationship there is a belief that obtaining certain benefits is dependent on showing loyalty to the ruling party, as McGregor & Chatiza (2020) also observed in Zimbabwe. This perspective views citizenship not as an inherent entitlement but rather as a gift or something that needs to be earned, which, according to Dorman (2014), is a viewpoint widely shared across Africa. In Mozambique, more specifically, this perspective aligns with the analyses of Hagmann & Péclard (2010), which emphasize that the ruling Frelimo stands out as the only arena through which access to and negotiation with the State occur. Sumich (2010, p.679), however, places Frelimo as "one of the primary 'arenas of negotiation' in Mozambique by channelling various demands and interests through its internal structures." However, from the case of Manjacaze, this thesis demonstrated that Frelimo itself is part of the actors in the negotiations (cf. section 9.2), and that elections stand out as the primary arena for the said negotiation (cf. section 9.1.2), as Levitsky & Way (2002) also demonstrated elsewhere. Indeed, in elections, as well as outside of them, Frelimo rarely neglects to remind civil servants and citizens that they must always honour the party, and if they do not, there are consequences. These messages are internalised and reproduced in offices, households, and communities. In this way, Frelimo is able to exert power by anticipated coercion, i.e., internalized threat of a reaction of one actor over another, even if that threat is not always presented explicitly (cf. Smith, 1997; Kabeer, 2006). Reproduced over time, spanning different generations, through socialisation, this "power by anticipated coercion" becomes normalized and trivialized, a phenomenon that, in the case of Uganda, Vokes & Wilkins (2016) addressed as ´embeddedness´ of the bases of the

ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) and President Musseveni in Ugandan political culture. In Uganda, the bases are "party networks, patronage and coercion" embedded in "30 years of NRM rule, combined with social memory of the years of turmoil that preceded…" (op.ci., p. 583). In Manjacaze, the Party-State is present in the daily lives of the citizens, exercising control in favour of the comrades (as Frelimo members and sympathisers are known). Those who do not support Frelimo, 'the others,' including opposition members and anyone indifferent to party issues, are generally excluded, marginalised and sometimes persecuted. Thus, the terms 'comrade' and 'others' are not just political identifiers but are also used for political control. To understand the dynamics of this control and thus of the party-state at the local level, it is necessary to analyse the *estrutura,* composed of chiefs, leaders, and secretaries.

9.1.1 How are such sources mobilised and adapted in the electoral context?

My examination of Frelimo mobilisation during the 2019 general election campaign revealed a continuation and intensification of Frelimo's daily work to maintain its hegemony, building on privileged access to resources. The campaign strategy involved vote mapping, manipulation, and control in which the role of the teacher was fundamental, including in collecting card numbers, while the coercive actions of shock groups was decisive in voter control. Their essential function was, as their own members explained, to block the space and action of the opposition, if necessary, with recourse to physical violence. Violence emerges as central to Frelimo's strategy, but also demonstrates the weakness of Frelimo's peaceful mobilisation mechanisms at the grassroots, based upon its party cells.

Polling day added a further degree of intensification, by introducing fraud, mainly of ballot box stuffing, for which the number and/or voter cards collected during the campaign was fundamental. Among other things, these numbers and/or cards allowed existing voters, potential abstainers and 'ghosts' to be identified, and the number of ballots to be added to the ballot box on voting day to be estimated. This manipulation was facilitated by the connivance of some Members of the Polling Table (MMV) and opposition delegates, including some Frelimo infiltrators among the opposition members. The availability of money at the table also contributed to the fraud, the magnitude of which is, as I demonstrate, quite high.

If, on the one hand, fraud contributes to Frelimo hegemony, it also exposes the weaknesses of the hegemony, and of the regime itself, even at the heartland of Frelimo. It denotes that, indeed, Frelimo's hegemony, like the supermajorities that support it, is partly a product of fraud, not necessarily a reflection of the level of support of the citizens of Manjacaze for Frelimo. It is, therefore, manufactured hegemony, based on "manufactured consent," using the expression by McGregor & Chatiza (2020), for the case of Zimbabwe, which, in the case of Manjacaze, may lead to questioning the level of legitimacy of Frelimo leaders, since they do not enjoy real voter support. This leads to a broader reflection on the role of elections in Frelimo's hegemony, articulated in the last sub-question below.

9.1.2 Elections as moments of power

Initially it appeared that elections stood out as privileged spaces for Frelimo to produce its supermajorities, legitimise itself in power, and maintain the image of hegemony in Manjacaze. In fact, if on the one hand, this happens because, like the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda (see Volkes & Wilkins, 2016), in the elections, Frelimo party-state manages to reactivate and reinforce its political control mechanisms, on the other, analysing how people respond to these Frelimo strategies, show that, even under such control, elections were also serving the voters. Electors were using them to contest Frelimo's hegemony. With this expanded insight, elections now stand out as moments of power for both the incumbent and the voters, who, in them, negotiate and ´co-construct the system´, to use Schubert terms in the case of Angola (op. cit. 2016; 2017). But in the process, voters also resist Frelimo's strategies.

Based on Scott (1985, 1990), I define acts of resistance in Manjacaze as the refusal, sometimes explicit, of certain individuals or groups to comply with orders, rules, and decisions from the party-state, despite an awareness of the risks incurred, especially during elections. I addressed the most covert or subtle acts of resistance, which occur in everyday life, hence the designation of everyday resistance, also inspired by Scott. When I combine this analysis with Hirschman's mechanisms of 'exit, voice and loyalty' (1970) I find in the people's resistance a form of voice: most of them are not trying to escape, but rather to influence the situation in which they are enmeshed, which reveals the occurrence of a kind of internalized partisan citizenship (see McGregor & Chatiza, 2020, for the case of Zimbabwe).

The examples in the study include more commonplace cases and some relatively more daring ones, but all of them are ambiguous in the sense that either the message or the messenger is unknown, but, given the context, they risk having political connotations. The everyday forms of resistance of the first group are refusal to participate in public meetings; the walkout when they do participate, and silence. Among those in the second group, the obstruction of meetings stands out, as happened with the young people of Cambane; the threat of boycotting elections and abstention. These are '… political action *par excellence*' (*ibid* p.30), but still within the party-state, without questioning the loyalty to Frelimo. The most daring cases of exit, when discontent is expressed by desertion, are less common, at least publicly. They include those who openly express support to the opposition, some of them campaigning for it, even though they are aware of the dangers they face.

In short, the thesis shows that, even in its heartland, Frelimo hegemony, like any other hegemony, is constantly contested. Contestation is more intense in electoral periods, moments in which power is not only wielded by Frelimo but is equally exercised by citizens, creating spaces for the latter to force concessions from the party. Consequently, hegemony, including that of Frelimo, does not imply total control, and there may be situations of a false impression of compliance (Scott 1985) or, in Greenhouse's (2005) terms, an exaggeration in the performance of subordination,' hidden by the electoral results. Frelimo's resort to violence and fraud to secure the supermajorities, even in its own heartland reveals its foundations and legitimacy as intensely fragile. This definition is based on assumptions about the nature of social acceptance and how it can be verified. With this in mind, the level of fraud and violence deployed by Frelimo should lead us to question the extent to which there has been an inflated perception of the degree of social acceptance of the party's 'right to rule,' even in its own heartland.

9.2 Negotiating Authoritarianism in Manjacaze

Hagmann & Péclard (2010, p. 550) identify Frelimo as the only arena in which access to the state can be negotiated. I place Frelimo and its representatives as the main actors in the negotiation, along with the voters, and elections as the primary arena where negotiation takes place. It is at the interface of this asymmetrical but nonetheless dialogic and mutually constitutive relationship between the strategies of incumbent authority and the tactics of the voters that the objects, forms, and impact of negotiation are identified. All three are at the heart of the dynamics of the construction and maintenance of authoritarianism itself. I address each of them, returning to the aspects of resistance in the Frelimo heartland raised in Chapter 8.

9.2.1 Objects of negotiation

'Objects of negotiation' is the term Hagmann & Péclard (2010, p. 552) use to refer to what Ong & Han (2019, p.227) address as 'drivers' or, for Carothers & Press (2020, p.17), are 'triggers' of protests. The objects of negotiation in Manjacaze are governance issues, such as access to basic services in the different communities of that district. In Cambane, for example, young people, but initially also the *mamanas*, demanded the opening of the local health centre, power and water supply, and maintenance of the main access road to the village. The communities of Vamangue, Macedzene, Mambango and Marimane, and later that of Chicuatsu, also demanded the maintenance of the access road to their villages and power supply, but also the addition of the eighth grade at their local school. However, power supply, which stands out in the claims of almost all communities studied, was also claimed in the 2014 elections in Mungoi, Massango, Nhachengo, Baule and other villages of Manjacaze (Chaimite & Forquilha, 2015). Its placement on a placard, precisely on the first day of the electoral campaign in Chicuatsu, was another stage in a long negotiation process between the citizens, now voters, of that community and the party-state. In March 2019, they wrote a letter with the same content – 'No vote without electricity in Chicuatsu'. They sent it to the Administrative Post and the district, slipping it under the main door of the office. It was inspired by the communities of Vamangue, Macedzene, Mambango and Marimane, which had adopted a similar strategy a year earlier in 2018, at the beginning of the voter registration process.

While service delivery issues tend to be reflected in policies and/or projects the rulers and candidates include in electoral manifestos, in the case of Manjacaze, the electors placed them as an immediate condition for them to adhere to the electoral registration and, later, to vote. That is, they do not expect medium and long-term commitments, and this is based on their previous experience negotiating with Frelimo but also denotes their awareness of the need to put pressure precisely on those stages of the electoral process. Indeed, as I demonstrated in chapter 6, the manifesto was not even evoked during the election campaign in Manjacaze.

Regarding the urgency in putting pressure in the electoral context, the claim of the protesters of Chicuatso, evoked by a local leader I quoted in chapter 8, is unequivocal: according to her, protesters said, "... we know that today they are insisting that we obtain the voter card, only that tomorrow they can pressure us to vote. So, if we start by preventing the voter card [from being obtained today], it means that tomorrow they will not have the strength to come and tell us to vote because we will say that we do not vote because we do not have a voter card."[380]

Negotiations sometimes also raise issues of rights. The people at the roadblocks at the entrance to Chicuatsu said that power supply was a right and asked why they were not contemplated. The negotiation is seldom, or never, about the limitations of political pluralism generated by the asphyxiation or suppression of the opposition, attempts to change term limits or to dissolve parliament, electoral fraud, or delay in counting votes. Such pure political objects (Carothers & Press 2020, p.17) are not the intention of the negotiations. There are some examples, mostly isolated, of claims based essentially on political issues, as in the case of Marta, the young teacher from Ponjoane, and Mr Job, the 83-year-old man from Cambane who claim the right to choose, especially the opposition. Other 'negotiation objects' are economic and societal issues, which I also did not verify in Manjacaze.

9.2.2 Forms of negotiation

From the literature on protests in authoritarian contexts, it stands out that they tend to be spontaneous, leaderless, short-lived or, when longer, intermittent, as Carothers & Press (2020) also point out. The episodes analysed here, however, are well organised, and the

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[380] Teresa Milando, Locality Chief, Interview, Manjacaze, 4 April 2019.

participants include well-identified communities, with some figures who, despite not explicitly naming themselves as leaders, are clearly involved in the preparation of the negotiations.

To analyse the forms of negotiation I return again to Hirschman (1970). Some are simply loyal and see no need to negotiate their dissatisfaction. A significant number, like those who wrote the placard 'no vote without electricity,' negotiate within Frelimo without questioning its leadership. Others negotiate from outside, as independents or opposition members (though often undeclared), contesting Frelimo's leadership, or having been party members, they choose to leave during the negotiation, some openly contesting Frelimo leadership, as in the case of the young people from Cambane.

The mechanisms by which people make their dissatisfaction known include refusal to participate in meetings in general; the obstruction of meetings; the walkout when they participate; silence; the threat of a boycott of elections; abstaining and sending letters. Despite being clearly political, these actions are ambiguous and occur within without suggesting disloyalty.

9.2.3 Impact of negotiation

The third and final aspect concerns the response and, more importantly, the impact of the negotiation. Carothers & Press (2020) identify three possible responses: repression, minimal concessions or offering sacrificial scapegoats. During and after the protests in Vamangue, Macedzene, Mambango, Marimane, and Chicuatsu, there was no obvious repression, but there were indirect responses: the first, as happened specifically in Chicuatsu, was the attempt to identify the leaders, hypothetically to sanction them, but these leaders, aware of the consequences, did not show up, even though, during the interviews with me, they had identified themselves as protagonists of the negotiation. The second, more prevalent, involves 'coercion by anticipated agency,' i.e., a situation in which the action of a certain individual or group is influenced by the threat of the reaction of another (for example a patron or anyone else who has power over him/it), even if the said patron does not mobilise his power (Smyth, 1997; Kabeer, 2006). This situation dissuades many from even daring to express themselves openly against Frelimo, as they are aware of the consequences, which involve being catalogued as 'the other' and, consequently, being excluded, marginalised, and,

during election periods, risking violence or loss of property. It is a form of coercion already internalised during the socialisation process.

A common response is the partial concession. In the cases of Vamangue, Macedzene, Mambango, Marimane, after the First Frelimo Provincial Secretary intervened, the main access road was promptly rehabilitated, and 8th grade was introduced, although power supply is still pending, as in the case in Chicuatsu. In the latter, however, steps were taken to organise the community to identify a location for setting up an electric power plant. In Mungoi, Massango, Nhachengo, Baule and other villages where there were similar protests in the 2014 elections, poles were later placed on the eve of the 2019 elections, which some interviewees interpret as a way to contain new demonstrations. There are, therefore, concessions, even if minimal, but forced by the negotiations made during the electoral periods, and these same concessions inspire new attempts at negotiation.

In short, it is important to highlight two aspects regarding negotiation: first, like resistance, it is an integral part of building Frelimo's hegemony in Manjacaze. However, despite highlighting that negotiation stands out at the interface of the relationship between Frelimo's hegemony imposition strategies and the resistance tactics of citizens in general, and of voters, being "back-and-forth" communication...," as defined by Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 2012, p. xxv), is an element of the interconnection between the two actor groups, in their dialogic and mutually constitutive relationship. Negotiation itself, along with hegemony and resistance, is part of the dynamics of building and maintaining authoritarianism, whose understanding is central to studies on the phenomenon.

I contend that an examination of negotiation mechanisms and relationships of resistance is fundamental to an understanding of the dynamics of construction and persistence of authoritarianism. It is worth recalling that, for Scott (1985 p.299), resistance is what the subordinate class does, and its parameters are set by the institutions of authority. Resistance in the context of Manjacaze is the refusal to comply with orders, rules and decisions from the party-state, despite the risks. Yet, it is essentially a negotiation mechanism mostly from within Frelimo. The authoritarianism that is both resisted and negotiated is co-produced by the individuals who participate. In the case of Manjacaze, these same individuals also reproduce the imaginaries of Frelimo as a party-state, at home, in the community and in other

socialisation institutions, all influenced by Frelimo itself, thus creating conditions for the maintenance of its image of hegemony in those contexts.

9.3 Contribution and significance

The contribution of this thesis is twofold: theoretical and methodological. Next, I address both, ending with a brief reflection on the main challenges they respond to.

Theoretical

Theoretically, the thesis contributes to understanding how authoritarianism works in practice, within the framework of authoritarian institutionalism, especially in its most recent variant: the new authoritarian institutionalism. Informed by the new authoritarian institutionalism, that "takes seriously previously neglected pillars of non-democratic governance... such as legislatures, multiple parties, and elections" (Schedler, 2009, p. 323), the thesis analyses ´the party´, in this specific case the ruling party-Frelimo, and the elections, in part, as, for Schedler in other contexts, "... institutions and arenas of control and co-optation" (op .cit., p.337).

The thesis shows how control and co-option occur in everyday life, and are reinforced in elections, in both cases with Frelimo, as a party-state, in the sense of capture or coloniser of the State by the Party (Kopecky, 2006: Biezen & Kopecky, 2014), the latter taking advantage of its privileged access to state resources to feed patronage and clientelism networks. If, in everyday life, as in elections, the control and co-optation strategy also includes a coercive dimension, sometimes less explicit, since the phenomenon that Smyth (1997) and Kabeer (2006) addressed as power by anticipated coercion occurs, i.e., in the case under study, internalized threat of a reaction of Frelimo over the people of Manjacaze, without Frelimo always having to make this threat explicit, in elections there is explicit violence. As I demonstrated in chapter 6, this is perpetrated, above all, through Frelimo shock groups, with the aim, among others, to block the space and action of the opposition.

I identified parallels with the case of Uganda where, according to Vokes & Wilkins (2016), party networks, patronage and coercion, the bases of the continued domination of the National Resistance Movement, are embedded in the political culture of Ugandans, but are activated and reinforced in the elections, as part of the strategy of the NRM and its president, Yoweri Musseveni, to remain in power. In Uganda, as in the case of Manjacaze, memories of past violence, which include wars in Manjacaze, are mobilized and these structure the political

field in these places. The result is support, either by identification or by what I called 'default' – that comes about as a result of opposition to another party, while support by identification is due to an "effective bond or sense of loyalty" (Green & Bates, 2017, p.3). The distinction between these two forms of support, presented in chapter 4, is also a specific contribution of this thesis, namely to the debate on partisan support.

Frelimo support, and, with it, the image of its hegemony, is also manufactured, through the electoral fraud detailed in chapter 7, producing, as in Zimbabwe, 'manufactured consent' (McGregor & Chatiza, 2020), represented by electoral numbers. In this sense, elections also stand out as, in fact, sites for the accumulation, legitimation, and perpetuation of power (Hermet et al., 1978; Karlins, 1986; Schedler, 2009; Art, 2012; Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Lust - Okar, 2009), and as instruments of regime stability (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Boban, 2017). However, it was also evident in Manjacaze that elections are equally arenas of contestation and bargaining (cf. Przeworski, 2006; Gandhi, 2008; Schedler, 2009; Boix & Svolik, 2013; Smyth, 2021). Voters and other citizens of Manjacaze react to Frelimo's co-optation, control and manipulation strategies, adopting a set of tactics, which I discussed as resistance (chapter 8) and negotiation (chapter 9), more intense during electoral periods, which is why I present elections as 'moments of power,' for both 'the party' and the voters of Manjacaze, even in an authoritarian context. Indeed, Manjacaze electoral results, as in other authoritarian contexts, give a false impression of full compliance (Scott, 1985), or, in Greenhouse's (2005) terms, an exaggeration in the performance of subordination, hence the argument of thesis corroborates assumptions presented in the introduction (section 1.2), that "vote totals and incumbent victories mask almost constant change in regime strategies" (Smyth, 2021, p.1) and that examining such strategies is fundamental to understanding the regime itself (Hermet et al., 1978).

Following Scott (1985, 1990), I defined resistance in Manjacaze as the refusal to comply with orders, rules and decisions from the party-state, despite the risks, but I argued that there is a dialogical and mutually constitutive relationship between the incumbent's strategies and the people's tactics, which intensifies in elections. Voters, more specifically, not only resist Frelimo's co-optation, control and manipulation strategies, for instance, refusing to participate in public meetings, walking out when they participate, obstructing the meetings with noise, remaining silent, threatening to boycott and or even abstaining to vote, but also,

by adopting the aforementioned practices, they are engaging in a negotiation process with Frelimo. The 'objects of such negotiations', include governance issues, such as access to basic services in the different communities of that district. The 'forms of negotiation' range from the most episodic and short-lived to the most organized and long-lived, with well-identified participants, but three dimensions are distinguished where these forms of negotiation occur: from within Frelimo, without voters questioning the leadership of the Frelimo; from outside Frelimo, when the electors are opposition members or non-partisan; and from within to outside Frelimo, referring to situations in which certain voters start negotiating still as Frelimo members, but they end up leaving during the negotiation, openly contesting Frelimo leadership. Regarding the 'impact of the negotiations,' it was noted that, despite the occurrence of repression, typical of authoritarian contexts (Art, 2012), there are concessions, albeit partial.

The negotiations, with impact, as demonstrated, but also the resistance mechanisms addressed, show that Frelimo's hegemony and, with it, authoritarianism itself, is co-constructed and legitimized, precisely within the framework of the dialogical relationship between the incumbent's strategies and the people's tactics, of which the aforementioned negotiation and resistance mechanisms are part. In Angola, Schubert (2016, 2017) used the expression 'working the system' to refer to this process of co-construction and legitimation of the MPLA leadership, when the expression 'culture of immediatism' describes the Angolan's quest for benefits in the system, thus ending up legitimizing and perpetuating it (ibid.). I used the expression 'moments in the party-state,' i.e., specific circumstances and events in which, inside the party-state, each of these two entities, separately, mobilise the other, to reinforce their own legitimacy when citizens call it into question (chapter 4), demonstrating that the negotiations mentioned above are not only triggered by citizens/voters, but also by the elements of the *estrutura* themselves, which equally resist, inside and outside electoral periods (chapter 8).

I emphasize, then, that the notion of 'moments in the party-state' is also my original contribution, specifically for understanding the dynamics of the functioning of the party-states, thus engaging with the vast literature on the phenomenon in Mozambique (cf., Brito, 1988, 1990, 2019; Hagmann & Péclard, 2010; Orre, 2010; Sumich, 2010; Bertelsen, 2016; Nuvunga, 2013, 2014). Still in the analysis of the party-state, I suggested the term *estrutura*

as a fundamental starting point in our understanding of its organization and functioning. However, when addressing the elements of this *estrutura*, in addition to the chiefs and secretaries, the discussion about the 'leaders' referred to the widely shared finding that they are figures co-opted in favour of Frelimo (cf., Gonçalves, 2006, 2012; Buur & Kyed, 2006; Forquilha, 2007; Brito, 2010; Mosley, 2021).

The contribution of this thesis extends to the debate on elections in authoritarian contexts, also conceiving them as ´moments of power, ´ as detailed above, but the greatest contribution is in explaining the process of construction and maintenance of hegemony and authoritarianism within the dialogical relationship between the incumbent's strategies and the people's tactics, where resistance and negotiation mechanisms are integrated. In this endeavour, I do not just engage with Schubert (2016, 2017), Volkes & Wilkins (2016), McGregor & Chatiza (2020), with recent studies on similar dynamics in Africa, but also with broader literature on maintenance and persistence of authoritarianisms (Guedes, 1999; Magaloni, 2006; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Gandhi, 2007; Schedler, 2009; Levistky & Way, 2010; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Smyth, 2021), their trajectories (Magaloni, 2006; Levitsky & Way, 2010) and legacies (Slater, 2010; Riley, 2010).

In Mozambique, I also engage with literature on elections (cf., Brito, 1995, 2005, 2016; Mazula, 1995; Serra, 1998; Hanlon & Fox, 2006; Pereira, 2008; Matsimbe, 2017), addressing the dynamics of fraud, behind the electoral results (chapter 7); about political parties (e.g., Gentili, 2005; Do Rosário, 2009; Cahen, 2010; Chichava, 2010; Nuvunga & Adalima, 2011; Nuvunga, 2013, 2014), not only highlighting the ambiguity of the terms party domination and hegemony, but also demonstrating that, although the first is the most used to designate Frelimo, it is less appropriate (Chapter 2). However, the specific contribution to this debate is in demonstrating how Frelimo, as an authoritarian party, organises itself and functions in its own heartland, especially during electoral periods (Chapter 6). I stressed, however, that, despite being relevant, the essence of this literature on elections and parties in the country fails to fully capture how they function in practice, including to sustain the growing authoritarianism in Mozambique, as recent studies reveal (cf. Pitcher 2020; V-Dem 2020; The Economist 2022). This happens because, like other 'democratisation studies', in which I frame the literature on elections and parties in Mozambique, they still approach authoritarianism as a residual category (Art, 2012; Grugel, 2003; Glasius, 2018), always in reference to liberal

democracy, understood to be "the endgame" (Grugel, 2003, p. 244). For this literature, including that on Mozambique, fraud, control and coercion, are deviations or anomalies in democracies, hence addressing them in a marginal way. This thesis takes an alternative approach, informed by authoritarian institutionalism (Schedler, 2009), which incorporates analysis of parties and elections, including practices such as fraud, control and coercion, in efforts to understand the dynamics behind the construction and persistence of authoritarianism. But the contribution of the thesis is also methodological.

Methodological

Methodologically, I started taking into account the specific difficulties of the Mozambican context, mainly derived from the political control exercised by the Frelimo party-state. As some scholars have shown, these controls make it difficult to produce valid political information from surveys, which are widely used in political research (Brito et al., 2005; 2016; Forquilha, 2017), the reason why the use of ethnographic techniques, with emphasis on participant observation and informal conversations, proved to be more appropriate. As Buscato argues and this study also demonstrates, ethnography '... provides a privileged access to 'invisible' or difficult to access social phenomena…(and) gives access to people's practices, and not (just) to their oral justifications or representations… that is, to all those 'natural,' hidden taboos or difficult to express practices which people have difficulty in describing (or would not like to describe even if they were aware of them)' (2018, p.4). The result of applying these ethnographic tools to political issues is scholarship that is neither only political nor only anthropological, but what Goldman (2006) called an 'Ethnographic Theory of Politics,' i.e., a new theory that derives from this combination, with specificities that it highlights. In my study, it is a sort of 'Ethnographic Theory of Authoritarian Politics,' which allowed, for instance, to understand the manipulative process of elections from within, emphasizing the importance of thinking anthropologically about the manipulation. It is not only an institutional imperative but also a culture of rule.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the theoretical-methodological contributions presented above also respond to two major challenges facing the institutionalist analysis of authoritarianism. According to Andreas Schedler, a prominent scholar of modern

authoritarianism, the first challenge, methodological, "lies in the [difficulties in making a] systematic observation of institutional manipulation, … [that] requires contextual knowledge and power discernment..." (2009, p.339) to bring to the surface "...the less visible micro-institutional designs and strategies that form the core of political struggles in authoritarian regimes" (ibid.). The second, theoretical, stems from the need to overcome the dichotomy between probabilistic and possibilistic explanatory approaches, with the first considering institutions as mere constraints, while the second conceives them as enabling devices and vulnerable to contestation. As Schedler points out, '[even] in autocracies then, institutions are arenas of control and co-option, but also of contention.' In addition to the methodological and theoretical challenges, these approaches also struggle with a third, practical, which has to do with the impossibility of overcoming the ambivalent nature of authoritarian institutions, namely the fact that they can serve both ...to fulfil such regime-supporting functions... [] and yet, inevitably, although to variable degrees, … contain seeds of subversion' (Ibid. p.337). The latter is closely associated with the former, the theoretical, from which it derives.

As explained in this section, this thesis responds and, therefore, contributes to addressing the first two challenges, while next highlighting that the third is an important avenue for further research.

9.4 Future research

The findings of this study corroborate Schedler's observation about the prevalence of ambivalence in institutions that sustain authoritarianism, and the suggestion that this should examined. We may ask, for instance, how these institutions serve both the regime itself and the peoples under the same regime. This question opens a fundamental field of study for understanding modern authoritarianism, in which the intricacies of engagement between people and the party-state are revealed and the potential trajectories that each may take become easier to discern.

More case studies are suggested to better understand the ambivalence evoked above or, better, to capture how, in practice, authoritarian institutions are both constrainers and enabling devices. Such undertaking is relevant given that, on the one hand, "research on electoral authoritarianism is still in its infancy" (Morse, 2012, p.163), and, on the other hand, the phenomenon of authoritarian reconversion (Messiant, 2006; Péclard, 2008), or, for Bermeo (2016), 'democratic backsliding', is spreading fast all over the world (cf. Wood, 2017; Glasius, 2018; Waldner & Lust, 2018; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019; Cassani & Tomini, 2019; Hyde, 2020; Haggard & Kaufman, 2021; Gaventa, 2022).

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